China and the World: Reflections by Zhang Yunling

"All major powers have a tendency towards self-centredness and hegemony ... External constraints—as long as they do not lead to confrontation or attempts to destroy us—are actually helpful for China."

Today's edition opens with an introduction by Rosemary Foot, Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford, and a Research Associate at the Oxford China Centre. Professor Foot has a particular interest in China as a multilateral actor in world politics. I extend my thanks to her for contributing to this newsletter and to Prof. Tang Shiping (唐世平) for reviewing today’s translation and permitting Sinification to publish this exchange. — Thomas

This interview, involving two well-regarded scholars of International Relations and Area Studies, provides a candid and wide-ranging discussion of Dr Zhang Yunling’s intellectual preoccupation with determining how a China that has grown more powerful can live in peaceful coexistence with its neighbours and other major powers. Dr Zhang attributes his focus on establishing peaceful coexistence and the bases for international cooperation to the influence of Confucian thought (he was born in Confucius’s home town) and the ten years he spent studying European integration which led a region that had been deeply scarred by conflict to unite and live in peace and prosperity.

Zhang is particularly keen to explore how China should best conduct its Asia-Pacific regional relations in a world that no longer resembles the immediate post-World War II era. We live now, he argues, in a period in which power has dispersed, where states that are weaker or smaller than China strongly guard their strategic autonomy, and where any attempt by China to establish a hegemonic order would be resisted and likely fail. One response, beyond China’s acknowledgement that power has dispersed, is to recognise that China’s national security strategy should start from the premise that there is no existential threat to China – no country has the capacity to invade China as he puts it. And thus, on this basis, China’s range of strategic options becomes much broader.

The theme of coexistence and cooperation is also taken up when Dr Zhang discusses China-US relations. Zhang considers, as many other scholars have recently, the pressure that Asia-Pacific countries are experiencing to choose sides in response to the strategic competition between the United States and China. Zhang’s view is that such a choice – except in extreme circumstances – should not be forced upon any of China’s neighbours and that each should be allowed a “flexible space for coexistence.”

Even with regard to the United States itself, while Zhang acknowledges that strategic competition may be inevitable, there are also elements of potential reciprocity in the relationship. The two countries could build upon their “shared responsibilities” as major states. Again, he advocates searching for a space for manoeuvre in this relationship.

Looking to the wider world, Zhang notes the serious demands that are being made for reforming world order. He agrees that developing countries need to expand their levels of representation, and have their demands met for redistributing wealth and decision-making power. To these ends, he wants to see a China that is “building temples, renovating temples, but not demolishing temples.”  

Many would support this remarkable statement of advocacy for the transformation of China into a country that is more at ease with its place in the world. However, the current serious tensions in China’s external relations are essentially neglected as Zhang casts back to an era when China’s diplomatic reassurance strategy once held sway. 

Rosemary Foot

Summary

1. China experiences both an inferiority and a superiority complex—feeling inferior in comparison to developed countries, yet also superior on account of its long history, rich culture and sheer size.

2. All major powers are prone to hegemonic and self-interested behaviour, including China.

3. However, China's rise is occurring in a much more constraining environment than that faced by the US after WWII. This has helped China keep such tendencies in check.

4. The pursuit of peaceful, harmonious and mutually beneficial relations with other countries remains the key to China’s success. This applies to all countries, including those closest to China’s Significant Other—the United States.  

5. International relations theory has long been aligned with Western values and interests. Chinese scholars should explain the world using their own culture’s distinctive way of thinking.

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6. China should stop basing its strategies on the assumption that it could still be invaded. Such a fundamental shift in approach would open up a whole new range of strategic options.

7. China seeks the emergence of a new world order more aligned with its economic interests and those of the developing world. It aims to improve, not to destroy, the current international system established by the West.

8. The BRI provided a way for a latecomer like China to (re)engage with the world. It was driven in part by a need to transfer some of its “production capacity” abroad and by an ambition to become as much a maritime power as it is a land-based one.

9. Tomorrow’s world order will be defined by the diffusion of power. Hegemony will gradually become a relic of the past and “traditional ideologies” will, with luck, wane.

10. The “Peak China” theory focuses on China’s current economic difficulties. In the long run, economic growth and a country’s influence may no longer be measured using today’s metrics. Much is set to change, including the weakening bond between citizens and the state. From this perspective, China has yet to reach its peak.

The Interviewee

Name: Zhāng Yùnlǐng (张蕴岭)
Date of birth: August 1945 (age: 79)
Position: Director of the Institute of International Studies, Shandong University
Other: Member of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)
Previously: Spent most of his career at CASS and directed several of its departments; Member of the 10th, 11th, and 12th National Committee of the CPPCC
Research focus: China’s international relations; Global and regional governance; International economics
Education: Studied English at Shandong University in the lead up to and height of the Cultural Revolution (1964-1969); MA University of CASS (1978-1981)
Experience abroad (visiting scholar): Harvard and Princeton University (1985-1986); European University Institute (1991-1992); MIT (1997); Chuo University in Japan (2000); NTU Singapore (2009)

The Interviewer

Name: Táng Shìpíng (唐世平)
Date of birth: January 1967 (age: 57)
Position: Distinguished professor, School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University
Other: Cheung Kong Distinguished Professor, PRC Ministry of Education
Previously: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (1999-2006)
Research focus: : International relations; Institutional economics; Comparative politics; Political theory; Philosophy of (social) sciences.
Education: BSc Paleontology, China University of Geosciences (1985); MSc Molecular Biology, University of Science and Technology of China (1988); PhD Molecular Biology and Genetics, Wayne State University (1995); MA in international relations, UC Berkeley (1999)
Experience abroad: Studies and postdoc in the US (1990-1999); Senior Fellow at RSIS in Singapore (2006-2009)

FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE TO A REGIONAL FOCUS (EXCERPTS)
Zhang Yunling (张蕴岭) and Tang Shiping (唐世平)
Published by International Politics Scholars (国政学人) in two parts on 4 September and 5 September 2024
Lightly edited machine translation
(Illustration by OpenAI’s DALL·E 3)

I. Chinese Diplomacy

Tang Shiping: In the early 2000s, China stated that “US-China relations are the highest priority [重中之重] and major powers are the key [关键]”. This later evolved into “major powers are the key [关键], neighbouring countries are the priority [首要] and developing countries are the foundation [基础]”. After President Xi Jinping took office, “multilateralism is an [important] stage [多边是舞台]” was added to this. Your earlier research focused on Europe, but later shifted to the Asia-Pacific, particularly China's neighbouring regions. Could you please tell us how you assessed [China’s] relations with major powers, neighbouring countries and the Third World at that time [i.e. around the year 2000]? Why did you advocate that China adopt a more balanced diplomatic stance?

Zhang Yunling: It might be that, because I come from Confucius’s hometown and was influenced from a young age, I have a strong belief in the concept and principle of “harmonious coexistence” [和合共处]. My ten years of working in Europe and my research on European integration greatly enriched my knowledge. How did European integration come about? After the rebuilding of its constituent countries, Europe managed to revitalise the region by establishing rules, opening markets, creating a unified market, promoting a single currency and implementing regional governance, thereby resolving issues of peace, coexistence and co-prosperity that could not otherwise have been resolved.

Later, I joined the Asia-Pacific Institute [of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences] and began to focus on the question of “what should China do?” [中国“怎么办”]. China faced two major issues: the first was residual problems [遗留问题], which included territorial disputes, historical matters and the legacy of foreign invasions [外敌入侵的遗留问题]. I advocated resolving these issues through peaceful means, via negotiation and consultation.

After World War II, although most issues were initially resolved through military means, this gradually shifted towards a peaceful and cooperative approach, much like the path taken by Europe. As China developed and opened up, we needed to think about how, as a major power, China would interact with other countries.

Historically, China had its own approach, namely the tribute system and the Sino-barbarian order [华夷秩序]. Japanese scholar Takeshi Hamashita believes that maintaining the tribute system required three essential conditions: first, China had to be powerful enough; second, when countries within the system faced dangers, China had to be able to help resolve them; and third, countries within the system needed to gain more benefits from their relationship with China [than vice versa]. If these three conditions were not met, the order could not be maintained. Today, China no longer possesses the [appropriate] environment, capabilities and overall conditions to fulfil these requirements, so it is impossible to return to this past model.

The issue China must [now] face is how to transform itself. From the very outset, we have been discussing what China should do: first, China must stay true to its own path and identity; second, it must open up and learn from the outside world; and third, it needs to manage its relationships with neighbouring countries well.

After World War II, for the first time in human history, the Charter of the United Nations established the principle of equality and independence of every country, which also meant that new ways of interacting with other states had to be adopted. Initially, I used the term “periphery” [周边], but later I changed it to “neighbourhood” [周邻]. I then introduced the concepts of “I and my neighbours” [我与周邻] and “my neighbours and I” [周邻与我].

First, the relationship between our country and its neighbours changed—regardless of size, all countries were [now] equal. Second, negotiations would [now] be used instead of traditional military force. Third, China was no longer in a position to offer guarantees to other countries from a commanding height; cooperative and open development were the paths forward for the world.

Later, I proposed the concept of “my neighbours and I”, advocating that China and its neighbours jointly create a region of coexistence [共处区], [with the goal of] achieving [peaceful] coexistence and coprosperity [共处共生]. This requires us to include “ourselves” in this equation, while considering the interests and concerns of others, not just our own. Historically, the Sino-barbarian order emphasised the emperor’s dominance [君临天下]. As long as other states in the system did not oppose this, that would suffice. Today, this approach no longer works.

Later, I put forward the concept of “close but not intimate” [近而不亲]. However, “not intimate” does not imply not establishing a relationship, nor does it necessarily mean [being] enemies. I believe that only through regional cooperation can issues that cannot be resolved bilaterally be addressed. For neighbouring countries, whatever term we use—whether “community with a shared future for mankind”, “good neighbourliness”, “secure neighbours” or “prosperous neighbours”—the fundamental point is that the current era is different from the past.

II. Restraining China-centrism

Tang Shiping: For historical reasons perhaps, I believe there is a rather obvious “China-centrism” [中国中心主义] when we study or [try to] understand neighbouring countries. How do you perceive or understand the impact of “China-centrism” on how we think about China's relations with neighbouring countries today?

Zhang Yunling: First, we must face reality. Any major power will [naturally] have a strong sense of great-power centrism, and China is no exception. This is an objective fact. Second, we must recognise the unresolved issues China faces. The decline of modern China [c. late Qing to 1949] has left behind problems such as those related to national identity, self-esteem and historical memory, which have fostered a strong sense of enmity in China towards the outside world [很强的对外仇恨情结]. At the same time, [we have a tendency] to look down on others [看不起他人]. In other words, China harbours a duality of both inferiority [自卑] and arrogance [自傲]—inferiority because China is less developed than other countries, and arrogance on account of its vast territory, abundant resources and long cultural history.

As scholars, what we need to do is restrain China's egocentrism [约束中国的自我中心性]. The rise of the United States is a unique phenomenon in human history. The two World Wars provided it with a special environment, status and unprecedented opportunities. After World War II, the US established its absolute dominance [in the world]. By contrast, China's rise is occurring in a new environment—one that places certain constraints on it. I remember someone suggesting that China join ASEAN, and I was asked to explore this possibility. I said it was impossible, as China-ASEAN relations would be severely damaged. Another example is Yunnan's strong enthusiasm for Lancang-Mekong cooperation. It proposed establishing a secretariat and creating a regional organisation led by China. At the time, I warned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that this was very risky and had to be stopped. I also warned that no institutional framework should be created; instead, the focus should be on cooperation. Why? Because ASEAN is most concerned about maintaining its centrality and emphasising the collective [集体性]. China does indeed wish to draw [拉拢] one or several ASEAN countries over to its side, providing support for them so as to avoid opposition. This is the type of consideration that all major powers have.

My duty was to restrain this tendency through my understanding of and ideas pertaining to [China’s international relations] and, indeed, I had a bit of an impact. This is also why I later emphasised “close but not intimate”, [stressing that] we should not view others as enemies simply because we do not have a particularly close relationship with them. We [Chinese] have the traditional expression “only people of the same group are close” [自家人才亲], but we are not “of the same group” [自家人], we are different countries.

Second, I proposed the concept of “choosing projects, not sides” [选项不选边]. Most states are choosing not to take sides. We should not force a majority of countries to align with China because of the strategic competition between us and the United States. Later, I proposed the idea of “choosing sides but still choosing projects” [选边亦选项]. This was aimed mainly at US allies like Japan and South Korea, but also the European Union. These countries may have to side with the US on certain issues, but this does not mean they will completely refuse to cooperate with China. I believe we should not allow ourselves to be swayed by our emotions [不能感情用事], nor define relationships based on the choice of sides and certainly not resolve issues through the use of war. Instead, we must create a flexible space for coexistence [灵活的相处空间].

III. On Hegemony and Building a New World Order

Tang Shiping: Understood. When it comes to neighbourhood diplomacy, I believe that the relationship between China and its neighbours forms a system [一个系统] and that it is interactive. Going back to US-China relations, not only are we “China-centric”, but we are also strongly “US-centric” [中国不仅有“中国中心主义”，也有很强的“美国中心主义”]. As you just mentioned, there is a significant difference between the rise of China and the rise of the United States. China is particularly sensitive to some neighbouring countries forming close military alliances with the US, since these alliances do indeed constrain China’s freedom of action. This is something we’ve been reluctant to accept. However, ASEAN countries hope to maintain a certain level of competition and balance [均衡和平衡] between China and the US. They do not want either side to dominate completely. In essence, I believe ASEAN countries consider that it is beneficial for them to have the US provide them with some level of security and to have China provide them with [its] market. This balance works well for them, but I think many [Chinese] scholars are not entirely comfortable with this arrangement. How do you view this issue?

Zhang Yunling: I believe Chinese scholars have different opinions on this issue. Some scholars are quite influenced by Western writings and strategies, and I have never opposed their theories. After the West's rise, it naturally created theories that align with its ideas, values, interests and strategies. However, China must now develop its own different understanding. The West adheres to a dialectical way of thinking [两点论], while Chinese philosophy places more emphasis on a multi-faceted perspective [多点论], which is combined with dialectical thinking [辩证的思维]. I believe the core of Chinese thought lies in resolving and easing contradictions [化解和缓和矛盾].

In my view, a moderate amount of external constraints is beneficial for China. All major powers have a tendency towards self-centredness [中心主义] and hegemony. [On account of] today's challenging international landscape, maintaining hegemony involves enormous costs. [Moreover, most] countries are not keen to see China become a hegemon. This implies that the world has changed. Under these circumstances, external constraints—as long as they do not lead to confrontation [对抗] or attempts to destroy [消灭] China—are actually helpful for our country.

I once wrote a report in which I put forward a basic judgment [基本判断]: in today’s world, no country has the ability to invade China anymore. This should be the basic starting point for China's stance towards [national] security. All [our] strategies [一切战略安全的设计] should be based on this premise. However, this view was later rejected, as many continue to believe that threats [still] exist. But this is my belief. Were we to take this basic judgment as our premise, our range of strategic options would become much broader [战略选择的空间就会大得多]. Therefore, I believe that although strategic competition between China and the US is inevitable, it nevertheless leaves a great deal of room for manoeuvre [操作空间].

This is different from having "shared interests" [共同利益]. The two sides cannot cover all areas, [but] they have reciprocal demands and shared responsibilities. We need to focus on the areas where there is space for manoeuvre and avoid intense confrontation between the two countries. We should also refrain from discussing this issue openly—it depends on whether the Taiwan issue can be dealt with skilfully [取决于如何技术性地处理好台湾问题].

Taiwan is an issue left over by history and must be resolved in a “historical manner” [Note: Zhang is implying a preference for a patient and careful approach to Taiwan, rather than a forceful one]. While it is complex, it needs to be handled properly.

The following is also a real issue: China does not seek to replace or defeat the United States, but the US worries that it will be replaced. China hopes to change the world [中国希望改变世界], while the US is concerned about the direction of this change.

China is popular on this point because many countries want to change the international order established after World War II. The first change occurred when the Cold War ended, but this was more in the form of a [global] movement [运动式的改变]. Real change [must be] practical. This means giving more space to developing countries and creating opportunities for shared participation in and distribution of global wealth. As for who will lead this process, I think most countries are not particularly concerned. Should China be able to assume leadership [in driving this change] [如果中国能够承担领导角色], I would support it, [but] this is just one “option” [选项].

I have proposed the idea of “building temples, renovating temples, but not demolishing temples” [建庙、修庙不拆庙]. China can establish new systems [i.e. economic, regulatory, political etc.]. If you are able to, go ahead and build them, [but] your ideas must be widely accepted. This is not about forming alliances or drawing together military cliques; rather it is more about reflecting China's economic interests [而是更多地体现中国的经济利益]. “Renovating temples” means supplementing existing systems. “Not demolishing temples” means being a builder, not a destroyer.

IV. China as a “Responsible Major Power”

Tang Shiping: OK, so my next question concerns the concept of “responsible major power” [负责任大国]. This concept was used more frequently following the 1997 financial crisis and its meaning has been evolving continuously. As someone who experienced this firsthand, how does your current understanding of this concept differ from that of 20+ years ago?

Zhang Yunling: We initially took pride in the fact that the Renminbi did not devalue during this financial crisis. This was when the concept of “responsible major power” was first introduced. Later, its meaning was expanded to include how a major power should behave: destructively [破坏性], constructively [建设性], or as a follower [跟随性]. We introduced the idea of a "responsible major power" mainly with the US in mind [针对美国], which [we saw] as a destructive power. The US had labelled China a revisionist state. At that time, the notion of “revisionism” was relatively clear—China wanted to revise some of [the world’s] established rules [中国希望修改现有的一些基本规则]. Therefore, the debate centred on what exactly China was going to seek to revise.

Later, we introduced the roles of "defender [捍卫者], contributor [贡献者] and builder [建设者]" in order to make the concept of a "responsible [major power]" more concrete and clear. As a global power, China does not follow the traditional path of hegemonic expansion. The world will not allow China to become an expansionist power, nor is there any way that China will take that old path. Times are changing and the world is evolving. Under different circumstances, the responsibilities and interests that China needs to defend will also differ. I once wrote an article discussing the issue of power transition, pointing out that future power transitions will not simply involve a transfer [of power] from one major country to another; rather, power will shift from being overly concentrated to being more dispersed.

V. Power, Influence and National Identity

Tang Shiping: Your answer has actually touched upon my second sub-question on [the concept of] "responsible major power". I believe US government officials and scholars have two main doubts: first, what qualifies China to stand on an equal footing with the US?; second, the so-called “Peak China” theory that suggests that China is essentially on a downward trajectory from here on. How do you view these two points?

Zhang Yunling: After experiencing two to three centuries of historical changes, the world may look very different from today. The way humans coexist will undergo significant shifts. The era of a single country dominating the world is already gone for good. People continue to use historical knowledge and experience to assess both current and future issues. However, in future, assessing a country's influence might not simply be based on its ability or potential to dominate the world. Instead, it will require consideration of many more factors. GDP is a stage-specific metric, based on material production. In future, if a large portion of human activity and values is no longer centred around material production, the current standards for measuring a country's capabilities will also change.

Second, the function of the state [国家的功能]. The period for nation-building has been relatively short. Although states will continue to exist in the future, their ability to provide benefits to their citizens may gradually weaken; the perception that [people] are dependent on the state will also steadily fade; and [our] understanding of the state may progressively fragment [对国家的认识可能会逐渐分解]. As our perception of the state gradually weakens, the question of how to prevent major powers resorting to traditional ideologies and strategies to solve problems will require deep reflection.

Tang Shiping: This will be very difficult due to cognitive inertia [认知惯性].

Zhang Yunling: But it's possible. In this regard, I am an optimist when it comes to the future. Returning to today’s “great changes not seen in a century” [百年未有之大变局], their defining feature is uncertainty. I believe this might be one way to explain the current [international] landscape. The US does indeed see China as a challenger, but for Chinese people living in the US and Americans living in China, their views may not be so extreme. For example, Japan is facing a serious aging of its population. It is [now] bringing in large numbers of foreign workers. Future generations of Japanese people will definitely view Japan and the world differently from their compatriots today. Therefore, we should leave these issues to future [generations]. With the changing [international] environment and the force of globalisation, human behaviour and national identities will evolve. We must understand these issues from the perspective of transformation and transition.

VI. “Peak China”

Tang Shiping: How do you understand the [West’s] “Peak China” theory?

Zhang Yunling: This so-called "peak" is actually referring to the economic and political transition issues [经济和政治转型问题] that China is currently facing. A significant share of China's economic growth has been driven by its [now crisis-hit] real estate sector. The COVID-19 pandemic has also impacted [our economy]. Although these [issues] have not led to an economic crisis, the overall economy and its ability to create jobs have weakened. China is currently facing challenging structural changes, but I have never been pessimistic about China. Problems will always exist, and they need to be viewed with a long-term perspective.

Tang Shiping: I would like to follow this up with another question. The "Peak China" theory has two implicit assumptions. First, the aging of [China’s] population. One of the core conclusions of endogenous growth theory is that if population growth slows, economic growth will inevitably slow down as well. Second, there is a belief that China’s institutional reforms [体制改革] will not be able to solve [China’s] fundamental problems.

I believe that population aging is a trend that is difficult to reverse, so let's focus on discussing China's institutional problems [体制问题]. What is your view on the idea that [I just mentioned that] "China’s institutional reforms will not be able to solve [China’s] fundamental problems"?

Zhang Yunling: I believe that [the issue of] population aging is indeed important, but a decrease in population is not necessarily a bad thing. After World War II, the world’s population grew too rapidly, reaching around 8 billion [today]. An adjustment is required. In the past, adjustments came through wars, famine and disease. Today [the world] relies more on human self-restraint.

Regarding [your] second question, major powers differ from smaller countries: the influence of a major power is reflected in its comprehensive [strength], not in some average [measure] [大国的影响力体现在综合性而非平均性]. In future, the way we assess economic growth may change. We will [also] need a new system for evaluating comprehensive national strength. [Our] market economy has developed gradually based on past experiences and lessons. The key lies in how we will quantify [growth] with the use of key indicators. No other country in human history has mobilised over a billion people to participate in [its] economic development as quickly as China has. From this perspective, I believe China has not yet peaked.

VII. The Belt and Road Initiative

Tang Shiping: Regarding the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), I have two small questions. First, the BRI mainly involves connecting China with Southeast Asia, Central Asia and other regions. I believe the BRI builds on previous developments in these two directions. Over the past decade, the BRI has achieved many successes but it has also encountered some problems. This may have to do with [our] academic community's failure to provide sufficient knowledge-related support. How do you view this issue?

Zhang Yunling: The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was put forward on the basis of two major considerations: First, after reaching a certain stage of development, China needed to transfer some of its production capacity abroad [产能向外转移]. Second, China is traditionally a land-based country. As it [began] its decline a couple of centuries ago, it faced foreign invasions from the sea, followed later on by the emergence of disputes in the South China Sea. Maritime issues became increasingly prominent. I was the first to propose “production capacity cooperation” [产能合作] and “recovering lost memories” [找回失去的记忆], advocating for the reconstruction of major land-sea connectivity corridors.

At that time, China mainly promoted cooperation through its signing of bilateral agreements with countries along [what is now called the BRI]. Today, [we] put forward joint construction. It is not just about advancing westward; more countries are now involved. The BRI has now become a global strategy.

As for the problems encountered during the BRI’s construction, the first issue is one of understanding [理解问题]. China’s approach is to transmit targets to lower administrative levels [下达指标] and all provinces are required to participate. However, some provinces may not have that much knowledge of the countries they are engaging with. Initially, the focus was on large projects, which were led primarily by state-owned enterprises. Later, adjustments were made; "small and beautiful" [小而美] projects were put forward, thereby encouraging the involvement of the private sector.

Two unresolved issues remain: First, defining its boundaries—what [type of] projects fall within the scope of the BRI? At present, all signed agreements and participating projects are counted. Second, the issue of assessment and evaluation. On the 10th anniversary [of the BRI], there was a call to increase the benefits and conduct comprehensive assessments [of these projects], but no clear method for implementing these evaluations was outlined.

Although China avoids calling the BRI a national strategy in its communication abroad, domestically provinces still treat it as such. Each year there are statistics and regulations related to provincial participation, which means provinces often give less consideration to costs, benefits and sustainability. I believe some issues can be avoided, but others are inevitable. The BRI is a way for China, as a late-developing country, to engage with the world. Within this framework, all actors have considerable room to operate.

Tang Shiping: Thank you for your time.