China's "Ideological Propaganda" and its Impact on the PRC's Foreign Policy
"Not many U.S. officials and observers have taken enough notice of changes in China's ideological propaganda and the implications for its foreign policy" – Wang Jisi (王缉思)
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recently released a series of articles focusing on the rekindling of US-China scholarly exchanges. I am away on holiday this week, so am using this opportunity to help shine some extra light on this important project. The following piece by Wang Jisi (王缉思), founding president of Peking University’s IISS, is one of the many excellent contributions to be found in this report. Thank you to Scott Kennedy, its editor, for allowing Sinification to share it. The complete 100-page report can be accessed here.
Key Points
Too little attention has been paid to the transformation of the CCP’s guiding ideology and the impact this is having on Chinese foreign policy.
Three main changes stand out:
Xi Jinping Thought’s subsumption and de-facto replacement of Marxism as the CCP’s guiding ideology.
The gradual disappearance of Leninism from official rhetoric, which may be due to its violent and radical characteristics.
The Party’s increasing emphasis on Chinese traditional culture and thought.
Some of these changes have led to a pushback among China’s staunchest defenders of Marxist-Leninist ideology.
The Party’s increasing emphasis on Chinese civilisation has gone hand in hand with the promotion of Han nationalism.
Much of China’s historical research is now focused on buttressing the nation’s primordial and irredentist claims.
This is constraining the work of Chinese scholars in the humanities and social sciences.
Unlike the Soviet Union, Beijing does not see its ideology as universal and is not as intent on exporting it abroad.
Rather, CCP ideology aims first and foremost to embody what Beijing regards as the fundamental characteristics and interests of the Chinese nation.
These include such values and principles as peace, harmony, anti-aggression and an opposition to hegemony.
From China’s perspective, political tensions with the US are now less ideological than they are civilisational: an opposition between East and West.
The Author
Name: Wang Jisi (王缉思)
Date of birth: Nov. 1948 (age: 75)
Position: Founding president of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies (IISS) and Professor, Peking University
Formerly: Director of CASS’s Institute of American Studies (1993-2005); Director of the Central Party School’s Institute of International Strategic Studies (2001-2009); Dean of Peking University’s School of International Studies (2005-2013); Member of the Foreign Policy Advisory Committee of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008-2016)
Research focus: US foreign policy; US-China relations; Security in East Asia
Education: BA-MA Peking University (1983)
THE RESHAPING OF CHINA'S IDEOLOGY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Wang Jisi (王缉思)
Full report: From U.S.-China Scholarly Recoupling: Advancing Mutual Understanding in an Era of Intense Rivalry (27 March 2024)
The international scholarly literature on China's ideology abounds. In their book chapter "Ideology and Chinese Foreign Policy,” Eun A. Jo and Jessica Chen Weiss state that “geostrategic competition between China and the United States has been cast in increasingly ideological terms," and that "many U.S. policymakers also acknowledge China's growing ideological appeal." However, not many U.S. officials and observers have taken enough notice of changes in China's ideological propaganda and the implications for its foreign policy and international studies.
The most noticeable change in China's ideological work is its emphasis and extolling of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, which has been replete in Chinese official discourse. In the newest version of the constitution of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Xi Jinping Thought is placed parallel to Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the "Three Represents Important Thought," and the "Scientific Concept of Development" in the chain of leading ideological principles. As compared with the theories of other Chinese leaders listed above, Xi Jinping Thought is uniquely praised as "contemporary Chinese Marxism, Marxism in the 21st century, and the essence of the times of Chinese culture and Chinese spirit." Plainly speaking, it is now no longer sufficient to proclaim that the CPC's ideology is Marxism without referring to Xi Jinping Thought.
Another significant change is the absence of Leninism in most CPC official narratives except for its constitution and very few other cases where Marxism-Leninism continues to appear. In his numerous speeches and writings, Xi rarely refers to Marxism-Leninism. No official interpretation has been publicized to give an explanation for this modification. It likely has something to do with the Leninist assertion of a violent proletarian revolution and other radical ideas that the CPC no longer holds, although the Leninist theory of "dictatorship of the proletariat" is still very much alive in China today, which is practiced as the "people's democratic dictatorship."
Interestingly, the lack of reference to Leninism seems to be controversial among senior CPC theorists. Wang Weiguang, a former president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), the largest and arguably most influential think tank in China, contends emphatically in a lengthy article that Leninism must not be separated from Marxism and must not be discarded as a guiding principle. He states that:
Influenced by those who demonize Lenin and negate Leninism in international spheres, there have been similar erroneous thoughts in China. Some people only refer to Marxism without mentioning Leninism and, by doing that, attempt to ... call off the leading role of Marxism, deny the leadership of the Communist Party of China, and sabotage the socialist system.
Wang's remarks are obviously targeted at some people with political weight in the CPC.
A third change in the CPC's ideological work is its emphasis of China's civilizational heritage and cultural traits. Xi expounds that "peace, concord, and harmony are ideas the Chinese nation has pursued and carried forward for more than 5,000 years. The Chinese nation does not carry aggressive or hegemonic traits in its genes." These are concepts not often found in Marxist doctrine.
In recent years, Xi has developed an extraordinary interest in archeology. On September 28, 2020, he called for a group study session of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee. Xi announced at the session that "archaeological findings reveal the origin and evolution of the Chinese civilization, its glorious achievements and great contributions to the world civilization." He further proclaimed that "China is the homeland of human beings in the East, and it is the earliest place of human origin along with Africa." "Through exchanges with other civilizations," Xi continued, "the Chinese civilization has contributed to the world a profound system of thoughts, a wide range of technological, cultural and artistic achievements, and unique institutional creations, thereby deeply influencing the development of the world's civilizations." Noting that there is still a long way to go to unveil ancient Chinese history, he called on archaeologists to continue forging ahead, explore the unknown, and reveal more about the origins of Chinese civilization. He stressed focusing on major archaeological research programs and concentrating resources to achieve new breakthroughs. The funding, according to some informed people, is astronomical.
The advantage of these research programs is to mobilize Chinese nationalism – essentially Han nationalism – as a powerful resource in the service of the CPC's campaign of "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation." In addition to showing the uniqueness and merits of Chinese civilization, these programs are meant to find evidence that Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and other national minority regions have been part of China since time immemorial. The New Qing History, a historiographical school that gained prominence in the United States about two decades ago by offering a wide-ranging revision of the history of the Manchu-led Qing dynasty, has met with a great deal of antipathy among mainland Chinese scholars. Qin Shi Huang, China's first emperor, is viewed by mainstream Chinese thinkers as an "outstanding statesman, strategist, and reformer" who unified the whole country, rather than as a merciless tyrant ruling a short-lived dynasty.
The CPC propaganda organs have made great efforts to combine Marxism with Chinese cultural tradition. A new television series produced in China, When Marx Met Confucius, was released online in October 2023.110 This is not another blockbuster drama of the sort China has been adept at producing in recent years, but a propaganda film aimed at popularizing the latest version of what is known as "Xi Jinping Thought on Culture." Its aim is to reconcile the leadership's official Marxist underpinnings with an appeal to a more specifically Chinese cultural heritage. As some scholars remarked, Marx was interpreted by Chinese thinkers and substantively involved in Chinese historical course; in that sense, he changed China. Meanwhile, China actually changed Marx's image as well. In this interaction, Confucianism has played an important and constructive role. Meanwhile, some Maoist websites vehemently accused this film series of disparaging Marx and betraying Marxist historical materialism.
All of these changes in China's ideology described above are meaningful to observers of Chinese politics and foreign relations. To be sure, Marxism nominally remains the official ideology. In practical terms, however, Xi Jinping Thought is serving as the actual overarching, defining ideology.
This makes a striking contrast with the ideology that the Soviet Union maintained in the Cold War years when the Soviets wanted to establish Marxist-Leninist regimes in many countries and to wipe out imperialist powers led by the United States. China's current political and ideological debates with the United States are essentially defined in China along nationalist, cultural, and civilizational lines – "the East versus the West" – not between socialism and capitalism, between proletariat and bourgeoisie, or between worldwide proletariat revolution and imperialism in the traditional Marxist-Leninist conceptual framework. While Marxism in its original sense was regarded as a universally applicable value system about social classes and their contradictions, the leading Chinese ideology today is seen as reflecting China's peculiar national conditions, interests, and values. Issues such as the geographic origins of the earliest human beings are not important to traditional Marxists, but they are touchy and essential to China's ideological workers. If an individual is a disciple of Karl Marx, they should pay homage to Confucius and Qin Shi Huang as well.
As a result, the bar is higher today for scholars of China in the West to collaborate with their Chinese counterparts, and vice versa. There are increased sensitivities with regard to China studies in areas such as ancient and modern history, CPC history, ethnic relations, religion, social welfare, demography, and culture, not to mention the current political and economic transformation. Foreign scholars' publications in China are meticulously scrutinized. Mainland Chinese scholars of social sciences and humanities are very careful about what they may want to publish abroad or in Taiwan and Hong Kong.
For international relations specialists in China, the reshaping of China's ideology may restrain the scope of evaluating Beijing's foreign policy, especially deliberations regarding its approach to the United States. On the other hand, China's international relations scholars are reminded that they have to widen their horizons to look at China itself beyond the conventional space of international affairs. Moreover, studies of comparative politics, economics, and culture are gaining more relevance than the "three isms" (realism, liberalism, and constructivism) in international relations theory.
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Discusssing XJP Thought, Wang Jisi states: "Another significant change [in ideology under XJP] is the absence of Leninism in most CPC official narratives".
I think we should not take this absence too literally; although not mentioned Leninism is still in the background. According to Steve Tsang and Olivia Cheung's book (Page 18, 3d paragraph). "Our examination of Xi's discourse reveals that there are 3 main sources of inspiration for XJP Thought. The most important source is Leninism, but he has not spoken much of it directly. This notwithstanding, he is a committed Leninist. The reason Xi does not talk much about "Leninism" per se is simply because he sees Leninism as an operational add-on to Marxism. Leninism merely explains how to implement Marxism in practice. Since Leninism forms a part of Marxism, Xi does not see a need to single it out when praising Marxism. Furthermore Xi always benchmarks himself against the great figures in history, and Lenin was secondary to Marx in the mythology of Communism."
In my opinion it would be a big mistake to believe that XJP is not Leninist.
This is well-timed as I'm working on a project for a cultural institution at the moment that want to ask what their role can be for engagement with China in an ideologically driven academic environment like this.
Given that their PRC-based peers are largely unable or unwilling to speak outside of political orthodoxy, does engagement legitimise such ideas or provide space to challenge them? Should they just withdraw from engagement entirely? Try to find politically neutral (and likely boring/unimportant) activities in an effort to maintain some level of relations? Redouble their efforts to engage with either the mainland to try and build cross-cultural dialogue? Or even pivot to focus exclusively on the Chinese diaspora until the ideological environment has changed, maybe in a decade or two?
Its an interesting set of questions to be helping them to think through right now.