China's Lack of Soft Power in Central Asia
China's Lack of Soft Power in Central Asia
"Central Asians have the genes of Islamic and Turkic cultures in their blood. Their values and lifestyles differ completely from China’s ... [Young people] seem more open to the Western way of life."
China recently hosted its first in-person summit with the five Central Asian states known as the C5 (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), signalling its growing clout in a region traditionally dominated by Russia.
Asked about the strengthening of economic and security ties between China and the C5, Pan Guang (潘光), the former director of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) and now a senior researcher at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, made the following assessment:
“Over the years, relations between China and Central Asian countries have developed relatively quickly. The reason for this is that we have complementary economies and common interests in such areas as countering terrorism and opposing colour revolutions. Of course, the current Russo-Ukrainian war is also an important factor … China and the five Central Asian countries are basically on the same page when it comes to this conflict. Central Asia was once a part of the Soviet Union. It does not want the Russo-Ukrainian war to continue and will of course not be recognising Russia's ‘referendums’ pertaining to these territorial issues.”
Although optimistic about the future of China’s ties with the C5, Pan acknowledges that certain difficulties still lie ahead, highlighting both anti-China sentiment at the grassroots level and the influence of the West in the region.
The perceived effectiveness of the West’s soft power in Central Asia and China’s lack of it is the focus of a recent article by Lu Gang (陆钢), the director of East China Normal University’s Centre for Central Asian Studies. Lu stresses the importance of fostering a stronger sense of cultural affinity with China among Central Asians and urges his government to do so by focusing on Central Asia’s consumer markets. More on this below.
THE STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE OF THE PRC’S WESTERN PERIPHERY AND [CHINA’S] CENTRAL ASIA STRATEGY
Lu Gang (陆钢)
April 2023
SUMMARY
What Central Asia means to China’s national security:
“China's foreign policy takes the periphery as its starting point, and has made ‘placing the periphery at the forefront of [the PRC’s] overall foreign policy’ one of its core foreign strategy policies.”
“The geopolitical environment surrounding China is highly complex and there are many uncertain factors: territorial disputes, military tensions, unbalanced economic ties and the interaction of politics and culture. The security risks in [China’s] western periphery are relatively high.”
These have been exacerbated by three major changes over the past couple of years: the COVID-19 pandemic; the Taliban regaining power in Afghanistan; and the war in Ukraine.
Coupled with China’s increasing competition with the West over the region’s natural resources, potential for development and general political landscape, such a complex environment “is bound to cause serious disturbances to the stability and security of China's western periphery.”
When considering China’s border security and social stability in its western regions (e.g. Xinjiang), Beijing should look at its western regions and their neighbouring countries “as a whole” and place more of its focus on education, culture and, of course, economic development.
On the De-Russification and Westernisation of Central Asia:
De-Russification:
Russia continues to play “a major role” in the region but its influence is evidently waning.
“The Russo-Ukrainian war has triggered a reshuffling of Eurasian geopolitics. And in Central Asia, the first signs of a strategic shift have emerged.”
These formerly “tame” Central Asian countries were shocked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and appear both increasingly unwilling to kowtow to Putin and intent on freeing themselves from Moscow’s control.
Westernisation:
Having somewhat neglected this region since the collapse of the Soviet Union three decades ago, the West has only recently begun to pay more attention to Central Asia.
The West has a “clever” [巧妙] and “carefully thought out” [周密] strategy to gradually and “silently” [无声地] transform the region’s cultural identities by injecting them with elements of its own culture.
“Through such actors as multinational corporations, NGOs and the media, they have been able to infiltrate, divide and reshape Central Asia in a sustained manner, with the ultimate aim of transforming the whole of Central Asia.”
“With over 65% of Central Asians now under the age of 55, many of whom were [just] teenagers at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is a lack of collective immunity to the 'gentle' onslaught [‘温柔’攻势] of Western culture. Overall, the cultural identities of Central Asian countries are beginning to shift away from their traditional [cultures] and towards Western [culture].”
China's “strategic advantages and disadvantages” [战略优劣势] in Central Asia:
Strategic advantages:
Political trust: “After more than 30 years of [diplomatic] practice, China has established a highly trustful political relationship with the five Central Asian countries [i.e. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan]. The leaders of China and the[se] Central Asian countries visit each other every couple of years or so.”
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) offers another platform for officials at different levels to meet on a regular basis.
In terms of future economic cooperation and development aid, China now has the upper hand when compared with Russia [中国比俄罗斯更有实力].
“Furthermore, one of China's natural advantages over the US, Japan and Europe is its geographical proximity [to these countries]. As the saying goes, a distant relative is no match for a close neighbour [远亲比不上近邻].”
Strategic disadvantages:
Cultural identities: “The people of Central Asia have the genes of Islamic and Turkic cultures in their blood. Their values and lifestyles are completely different from China’s. What is more, young people in Central Asia seem to be more open to the Western way of life than their fathers’ generation. Some of the leading universities in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan use the American system of education and teach in English … Apart from Russian [news], the Central Asian elites are mostly informed by Western media and social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and [now] even ChatGPT … In another 20 years, when the remnants of Soviet culture will have all but disappeared, one can expect the gap between China and Central Asia in terms of cultural identity to be even wider.”
Unlike the US, which has used its soft power to “penetrate” Central Asia at the grassroots level, China has been too focused on the decision-making levels of Central Asian society.
“Thus, for Chinese policy makers, people-to-people bonds [民心相通] must be at the forefront of [China’s] Central Asian strategy.”
On the importance of people-to-people bonds:
“In practice, people-to-people bonds have been understood [too] simplistically as external propaganda [对外宣传]. Therefore, [our] work on people-to-people bonds has been reduced to telling China’s story [well].”
“Traditional culture in China often emphasises the need to win over the hearts and minds of [another state’s] people, [thus] making winning their support the primary objective of [a ruler’s] strategic planning … Capable rulers in ancient times attached great importance to cultural soft power … From the Han to the Tang dynasties, Chinese rulers, officials and envoys were always seeking both to present a civilised image [of themselves] and to treat their neighbours with respect in their dealings with [China’s] periphery. They often won the respect of neighbouring states through a seemingly gentle but actually very powerful diplomatic approach, which brought lasting peace to China's periphery.”
“Today, the situation has changed considerably … Compared with the days of Emperor Wu of Han and Emperor Taizong of Tang, China has stronger external powers, particularly in terms of hard power. But this is not the same as saying that China now has more options than its forefathers.”
“First, the scope of China's strategic interests is expanding and the efforts it is investing are more dispersed, so that the resources invested in Central Asia are relatively limited.”
“Second, Central Asia has recently become very popular among the world's major players, who have successively ventured into the region. Some countries around Central Asia, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, are unwilling to be left behind. Their strategic investments in Central Asia are by no means inferior to China's [毫不逊色于中国].”
This has given Central Asian countries more options to choose from.
If China cannot move beyond its focus on economic cooperation and simplistic propaganda, “it will not be able to have a lasting influence on the Central Asian region [中国就无法对中亚地区产生长久影响].”
Lu’s policy recommendation:
“Without cultural commonalities [文化共性], it is not easy to form ties and bond with the local population. Furthermore, Chinese businessmen have not been organised [properly] [没有被组织起来]. They are scattered all over Central Asia and lack influence [话语权] in Central Asian consumer markets. In short, there is an interactive relationship between cultural commonalities and the consumer market.”
“Everyday behaviour in a consumer market nurtures cultural commonalities among consumers. Through the transaction of commodities, consumers get to know each other, learn about their respective values and eventually develop common cultural characteristics and habits, which can in turn contribute to the development of the consumer market.”
On fostering “cultural commonalities”: “The design of [our] Central Asia strategy should focus on building up Central Asia's consumer market [for Chinese products] and, while using this as a basis, gradually develop a range of products and projects that will be able to appeal to the hearts and minds of the people in Central Asia [吸引中亚人民心], thereby nurturing a feeling of closeness towards China. This will become an important advantage for China when compared with other major powers.”
Conclusion:
“The final conclusion is that China needs to think about its strategy towards Central Asia in a new way. The idea is to pay [much] close[r] attention to the issue of cultural identity in Central Asia, to raise significantly the strategic importance of people-to-people bonds, and to take seriously the path of building and taking part in the supply chains of Central Asian consumer markets [with a focus on] essential everyday goods. To achieve this goal, the state [should] encourage businessmen from all over China, including Taiwanese businessmen, to enter Central Asian markets and provide them with guarantees against political and commercial risks. The purpose of this new strategy is [also] to build mutual trust and friendship between Chinese businessmen and the people in Central Asia through their transactions with one another, so that Central Asian people can gain an understanding of the behavioural patterns of Chinese businessmen and so as to demonstrate the charm of traditional Chinese culture: "Do not do to others what you would not want done to you [己所不欲，勿施于人]."