China's Ukraine Supporters: an "Infantile Disorder" by Zhang Wenmu

"If this political infantile disorder is not corrected—let alone if it becomes deeply entrenched—then China’s tomorrow could very well be the Northern Song’s Shame of Jingkang."

Zhang Wenmu (张文木) is a well-known old-school strategist, belonging to the generation of “educated youth” who were sent down to the countryside during the 1970s. Although he presents his views in notably more “red” language, his basic position on Ukraine is similar to that of Cheng Yawen (程亚文): national policy should be decided by geopolitical interests rather than moral values, and the risk of a US-Russia alliance meant that it was a matter of strategic necessity for China to side with Russia.

What makes Zhang’s piece fascinating is his deep unease, as a scholar belonging to the same generation as the current Chinese leadership, at what he perceives to be the imprudence of younger generations of analysts and online commentators on questions of national security. Calls for China to side with Ukraine during the early stages of Russia’s invasion draw his ire, with special contempt reserved for those “well-meaning commentators” who, he says, suffer from an “infantile disorder” and would sacrifice security interests in the name of moral values. He frets about China encountering a similar fate to the Soviet Union during its next generational power transition, in which a Gorbachev-type figure—privileging ideals over the national interest—could unwittingly bring about the nation’s demise.

It might be tempting to take Zhang’s anxieties about a generational gap at face value. Nonetheless, his observations are more useful for what they may reveal about the concerns held by figures of his generation and background, rather than for his characterisations of China’s younger generations.

Firstly, the ideological rudiments of his arguments and his narrative of the Soviet Union’s collapse will surely be familiar to China’s educated youth, many of whom have studied such content in compulsory “political thought” (思政) classes. Furthermore, although younger generations are undoubtedly at a remove from the “red culture” of their forbears, they are also—in all likelihood—not the morally driven Gorbachevs-in-waiting whom he evidently fears them to be. The more liberal-minded scholar Xu Jilin (许纪霖) has observed that China’s younger generations tend not to hold strong political ideals and are instead more focused on their private lives. It is revealing that—rather than ideological support for a particular side—a dominant sentiment in the online space during the initial stages of the Russian invasion was anxiety at a more conflict-riven world.

— James Farquharson

Key Points

1. China’s younger generations—both scholars and the general commentariat—seem to lack the deep understanding of strategic issues and the importance of national security possessed by the older generation.

2. Immediate pro-Ukraine reactions to Russia’s invasion in 2022—whether admiration for Zelenskyy or reckless proposals that China opportunistically take some of Russia’s territory—are symptomatic of this.

3. The current moment in international politics, with the US pivoting towards Russia, exposes the “infantile disorder” [幼稚病] which generates these pro-Ukraine views.

4. Up until now, China’s national security and stability has been upheld by a trustworthy generation of cautious and ideologically sound politicians who have steered clear of moral performance.

5. Mao’s promotion of “unpretentious and reliable” politicians with experience in the Cultural Revolution-era “Down to the Countryside Movement” [上山下乡运动] shaped this generation, encouraging them to learn politics from practice rather than as abstract ideals.

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6. In contrast to this, the individuals expressing pro-Ukraine views possess technical knowledge but lack strategic depth, which only comes from real experience of the world and a knowledge of history.

7. The “performance” of sincere moral beliefs by these more radical or liberal groups may propel them into power in the future, which could be a great threat to China’s security in 10-20 years’ time.

8. The most pressing historical analogy to this is Gorbachev’s rise within the state bureaucracy of the Soviet Union; as someone driven by abstract moral ideals, his liberalisation attempts led to the state’s collapse.

9. In particular, the spectre of “democratic socialism”—which Lenin and Mao both identified as a core threat to the Communist project—continues to risk eroding the structure of the Chinese state.

10. The consequences of “failed politics” could throw the Chinese nation back to “pre-liberation” conditions after decades of progress; the lessons from both the Northern Song and the Soviet Union make the cost of naïve politics clear.

The Author

Name: Zhang Wenmu (张文木)
Year of birth: 1957 (age: 67-68)
Position: Researcher at Beihang University’s Strategic Issues Institute; and an executive director of the World Socialism Research Centre of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)
Other: Sent down to the countryside in 1975 after graduating from middle school, resumed education in 1979 at Northwest University in Xi’an after resumption of the Gaokao
Research Focus: National security strategy; naval power; comparative development (with a focus on India-China comparisons)
Education: Northwest University, Tianjin Normal University, Shandong University (PhD in law, 1997)
Foreign Experience: Visiting scholar in 2000-2001 at India’s Jawaharlal Nehru University’s international relations faculty

SOME REFLECTIONS ON CHINA’S FUTURE AS THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR DRAWS TO A CLOSE
Zhang Wenmu (张文木)
Published on Zhang’s Wechat public account on 4 March 2025
Translated by James Farquharson
(Illustration by OpenAi’s DALL·E 3)

1. Diagnosing an “Infantile Disorder”

The Russia-Ukraine war is drawing to a close. Before it ends, we ought to as Lu Xun [Note: one of China’s most influential writers of the 20^th century] once said, “engage in rigorous self-examination” [严于解剖自己], reflecting upon and summarising the thoughts and perceptions that we once held during the course of the conflict. During the course of this war, most of us have in fact already mentally rehearsed its progress and ultimate outcome according to our own understandings.

After examining Zelenskyy’s performances over the past few years and the highly upvoted online comments [跟帖] calling him a “hero”, and then comparing that with the Chinese government's resolve amid its high-level and correct diplomatic choices, I have come to understand some things better: Chairman Mao’s decision back then to send us to the countryside and “receive re-education from the poor and lower-middle peasants” [“接受贫下中农的再教育”] contained profound strategic foresight.

During the Russia-Ukraine war, China's online sphere effectively conducted a simultaneous run-through of the conflict in the form of a “war of words” [口水战]. Some “online strategists” demonstrate knowledge of technical detail but a lack of strategic depth [长于技术性缺少战略性]. Looking back over this last couple of years at how they have fallen into embarrassing self-contradictions [打脸], which they brazenly ignore as they carry on their performances undeterred [面不改色心不跳地再继续], it really makes me fret for China’s future in ten or twenty years’ time. At the time [of the invasion], quite a few professorial level “strategic analysts” advised that China should “abandon Russia” and thereby join the Western “civilised” camp [加入西方“文明”阵营]. Some [even] advocated for seizing the opportunity to gain a few minor “Jingzhou-style” advantages to our north [Note: a reference to “borrowing Jingzhou” (借荆州), an episode recounted in the novel Romance of the Three Kingdoms (三国演义), when Liu Bei (刘备) of Shu (蜀) took advantage of the temporary weakness of his erstwhile ally Sun Quan (孙权) of Wu (吴) to “borrow” parts of Jingzhou (located in present day Hubei), which in the long-run backfired and led to significant territorial and strategic losses for his own kingdom of Shu].

Had China actually adopted their so-called “strategies”, then now, as the United States rapidly pivots to embrace Russia, China would have instantly become the biggest laughing stock of the Ukraine conflict [最大的“乌克兰笑柄”] upon Biden’s loss of power. Those experts who advocated incessantly for “abandoning Russia and siding with America” [弃俄入美]—if, that is, they were genuinely sincere and not intentionally aiming to harm China—would have ended up with a fate even more unfortunate than the presently mocked Zelenskyy.

The most dramatic reversal came when Trump assumed office—these very same people experienced instant amnesia [瞬间失忆] and swiftly joined the chorus mocking Zelenskyy. These individuals are unwilling to reflect on what their “suggestions” just yesterday would mean for China today. Let us set aside for the moment the distant Northern Song dynasty [Note: in the conventional understanding, the Northern Song is viewed as having succumbed to invasion by the Jin due to the naïve political decision-making of their leaders, previously referenced in Cheng Yawen’s piece] and the not-so-distant Soviet Union. Simply look at present-day Ukraine, at Syria, and at Iraq and Afghanistan twenty years ago.

Do [these commentators] genuinely not know—or perhaps they really don’t know—that failed politics can result in the deaths of millions [失败的政治是要千百万人落地], or that a country which has only just achieved a modest standard of living can, in a single night, be hurled back to pre-liberation conditions? [刚进入小康的国家又会“一夜回到解放前”] Though all this unfolds right before their eyes, they would rather dismiss such analysis as a “conspiracy theory”, unable to believe that those civilised Westerners would engage in conspiracies themselves [不信西方文明人会搞“阴谋”]. [Nikolai] Bukharin and others had this condition in their time, which Lenin called a political “infantile disorder” [政治幼稚病]. Chairman Mao once instructed an [overly] sincere senior cadre to read Lenin’s Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder [Note: a pamphlet denouncing moderate left-wing or democratic-socialist parties in Germany and the United Kingdom, advocating for a disciplined movement on the Bolshevik model]. It seems that we today—especially the well-meaning “online strategists” [真诚的“网络战略家”]—need to read this book all the more.

2. The Risk of Generational Drift

As the war in Ukraine draws to a close, China’s ability to stand on the right side of history reflects a mature capacity for national strategy. However, my concern is that in another ten or twenty years, the generation that experienced “re-education by the poor and lower-middle peasants” during the Down to the Countryside Movement [上山下乡运动] and who possess a relatively mature grounding in Marxism-Leninism, will be in their twilight years [已垂垂老矣]. Among their successors, it is likely that a considerable number will emerge bearing the Li Ling-style [李陵式] “air of a patriotic minister” [国士之风] praised by Sima Qian [Note: the Han-dynasty general Li Ling was known for his bravery and heroism until he surrendered to the Xiongnu (匈奴) after finding his army surrounded; the historian Sima Qian, who defended him, was condemned to castration by Emperor Wu (汉武帝)]. These are not the “unpretentious and reliable” [少文厚重] individuals whom Chairman Mao called upon to participate in China’s political life. If this political infantile disorder is not corrected—let alone if it becomes deeply entrenched—then China’s tomorrow could very well be the Northern Song’s Shame of Jingkang [靖康之耻], the Soviet Union’s national self-destruction [自残国脉], or Ukraine’s tragedy of a performer bringing down a nation [戏子亡国] (such echoes with the Northern Song!).

Chairman Mao expressed concern about this in his later years. Fortunately, the generation who underwent tempering [锻炼] through “re-education by the poor and lower-middle peasants” during the Down to the Countryside Movement did not betray his trust. They have led China to a place close to the centre of the world stage.

In recent days, the internet has once again been flooded with analyses regarding Europe—particularly the United Kingdom and France—and their collective support for Ukraine in its resistance against the United States. These analyses either fail to mention or are unaware of the systems that shaped modern history: the post-Napoleonic Wars Congress of Vienna, the post-World War I Treaty of Versailles and “Washington-Versailles” system, followed by the post-World War II Yalta framework, the Cold War framework, and the efforts under Clinton and George W. Bush to abandon the Yalta framework and establish a new-style “Washington-Versailles” system. Given this, how can our so-called “online strategists” [网络战略家] possibly make sense of the underlying logic behind Trump’s seemingly “abnormal” foreign policy? ([Zhang notes:] To grasp the thread of this logic, I recommend studying modern and contemporary world history, as well as my nearly 1.5-million-character work China’s National Security Strategy in a Global Perspective. Although this book is currently out of print, it has been included in Volumes V and VI of the Zhang Wenmu Strategic Works Collection.)

As I have said: those who understand five thousand years of history can explain fifty years clearly; those who know fifty years can explain five; but someone who knows only five years of events cannot even explain five days. The problem with many of our “online strategists” lies in their lack of understanding, superficial grasp or [even] outright ignorance of history. It is one thing for such people to speak idly about strategy today. However, what if tomorrow they, like Zelensky, were to be propelled into positions of leadership—especially senior leadership? Would China’s future really be so distant from the tragedy we see today in Ukraine? [今天乌克兰的悲剧离中国还会远吗?]

I truly worry that in ten or twenty years, China may follow in the tracks of the former Soviet Union’s Bukharin and Gorbachev, Ukraine’s Zelenskyy and the once silver-tongued (口若悬河) Wang Ming [Note: 王明, Mao Zedong’s main rival within the Communist Party in the late 1930s, was an advocate of Popular-Front Communism but is usually depicted as an out-of-touch dogmatist in mainstream PRC histories]. These individuals were not wicked, but simply suffered from the condition of political infantile disorder. The key to avoiding this disorder lies in deeply engaging with workers, peasants and soldiers [深入工农兵] and immersing oneself in practical experience. Throughout the great struggles of the new era, one should study and genuinely master Marxism-Leninism; in an age of imperialism, Lenin in particular must be thoroughly studied and mastered.

3. Maintaining the Correct Path

Unlike the theoretical enemies of Marxism—such as today’s “liberalism”—the enemy of Leninism is “democratic socialism” [民主社会主义], disguised as Marxism. It was for this reason that Lenin wrote The Historical Destiny of the Doctrine of Karl Marx, in which he stated, “The dialectics of history were such that the theoretical victory of Marxism compelled its enemies to disguise themselves as Marxists.”¹ [He also wrote,] “Pre-Marxist socialism has been defeated. It is continuing the struggle, no longer on its own independent ground, but on the general ground of Marxism, as revisionism.”²

The historical origins of democratic socialism lie in Britain, and it was later advanced across Europe by Germany’s [Eduard] Bernstein. Its approach is no longer to confront Marxism head-on, but rather to insinuate itself by hiding within the belly of the “Princess Iron Fan” [Note: 钻在“铁扇公主”的肚子里, a reference to Sun Wukong carrying out such a manoeuvre in the novel Journey to the West (西游记)], or by borrowing an opponent’s strength [借力打力]. This can involve employing tactics such as “low-level red; high-level black” [Note: 低级红，高级黑, sarcastic or insincere uses of the Party’s language]—or using their opponent’s own language and preferences to numb and ultimately bludgeon them to death through flattery [用对手的语言和偏好麻痹和捧杀对手]. For example, the British historian Arnold Toynbee deliberately avoided mentioning socialism and the leadership of communist parties—a typical trick [手法] employed by democratic socialism. Instead, he speaks in abstract terms, claiming that the Chinese people possess a strong spirit of cooperation and stating: “The Chinese, in collaboration with the peoples of East Asia, may well play a leading role in the process of human unification—widely regarded as both essential and inevitable. That is the reason.”³ [Note: We were unable to verify the accuracy of this quote]

Democratic socialism once swept across the northern hemisphere [民主社会主义曾横扫北半球]. After toppling the Paris Commune and defeating socialism in Europe, it went on to bring down socialism in the Soviet Union. Its next target is China.

In his later years, Chairman Mao emphasised that the principal target of “opposing and guarding against revisionism” [反修防修] was precisely “democratic socialism”—the very force against which Lenin had waged a lifelong struggle. Today, our Party repeatedly stresses that henceforth “we must be absolutely certain that we make no catastrophic mistakes on fundamental issues. With the determination to never let up until we reach our goals and the attitude that the last leg of the journey only marks the halfway point, we must make unremitting efforts to advance the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” [Official translation of: “决不在根本性问题上出现颠覆性错误，以咬定青山不放松的执着奋力实现既定目标，以行百里者半九十的清醒不懈推进中华民族伟大复兴”, from the 2021 “Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century”] To revisit these ideas now is of profound significance.

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1. Lenin, The Historical Destiny of the Doctrine of Karl Marx, Selected Works of Lenin, Vol. 2, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1972 edition, p. 439.

2. Lenin, Marxism and Revisionism, Selected Works of Lenin, Vol. 2, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1972 edition, p. 3.]

3. From: Choose Life: A Dialogue, by Daisaku Ikeda and Arnold Toynbee, translated by Gou Chunsheng, Zhu Jizheng, and Chen Guoliang, International Cultural Publishing Company, 1985, p. 294.