From Grey-Zone Intimidation to Control: Gao Zhikai’s Path to Reunification (Part 1)

"I believe that from [Lai's] seventeen points, it should be clear to us that the reunification of the motherland cannot be endlessly delayed. Decisive action must be taken."

Among China’s establishment intellectuals engaging with Western media, few defend Beijing more pugnaciously than Gao Zhikai (高志凯), better known internationally as Victor Gao.

A Yale Law School graduate, later admitted to the New York Bar, Gao worked at China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 1980s, acting as an interpreter for Deng Xiaoping. Since then, he has held senior positions across investment banking, regulatory bodies and corporate management. Gao now serves as vice-president of the Beijing-based think tank Centre for China and Globalisation (CCG).

What distinguishes Gao from many of his scholarly peers is his readiness to debate and confront China's critics abroad in unvarnished, even provocative English. He not only deploys his assured diction, quick retorts and courtroom style to reinforce official talking-points, but often pushes them into more hawkish, headline-grabbing territory—such as when he warned Australians that acquiring nuclear submarines could turn their country into a nuclear target; or when he suggested that, following reunification with Taiwan, residents of Japanese ancestry should be made to sign pledges of loyalty or face expulsion. Much like China’s “wolf-warrior diplomats” of recent years, Gao puts the slogan “daring to struggle” (敢于斗争) into practice with notable fluency.

His recent interview on cross-Strait relations with Guancha is similarly combative and deserves no less attention than more cautious arguments put forward by scholars who emphasise strategic patience, deepening socio-economic integration across the Strait and achieving reunification through peaceful means. Gao, by contrast, calls for a sharp escalation in Beijing’s coercive pressure: expanding grey-zone tactics and intensifying efforts to document any Taiwanese involved in “anti-PRC” behaviour. He argues that President Lai Ching-te has already crossed Beijing's red line and insists that “decisive action must be taken” sooner rather than later—confident that the United States would not intervene militarily to defend Taiwan, should Beijing move to take the island by force.

The publication of hawkish views such as Gao’s suggests that Beijing endorses them, or at the very least condones them, as it sees strategic value in their dissemination—both at home and abroad. The same cannot be said of perspectives that challenge core tenets of Beijing’s Taiwan policy. For instance, scholars who strongly oppose reunification through armed force tend to do so implicitly, as will be evident in a yet-to-be-published article by Shen Zhihua (沈志华), a leading Chinese historian of the Cold War.

Key Points

1. Lai’s seventeen security strategies targeting China, along with his designation of the mainland as a “hostile foreign force”, have “fundamentally altered the cross-Strait status quo”.

   • Gao: “I believe that from these seventeen points, it should be clear to us that the reunification of the motherland cannot be endlessly delayed. Decisive action must be taken.”

   • Gao: “We must seize the opportunity to strike hard while they are on the back foot. Now that Lai Ching-te has revealed his true colours, we must crush his every move, leaving these Taiwanese separatists no more room [to stir up further trouble].”

2. Lai’s recent measures targeting mainlanders living in Taiwan are intended to intimidate, suppress pro-China sentiment and discourage cross-Strait interaction further.

3. They also aim to coerce alignment with his pro-independence agenda and to promote the narrative that Taiwan and the mainland are fundamentally separate national entities. This is all “extremely dangerous”.

4. Beijing should establish a system to track and score individuals in Taiwan based on their stance towards reunification, enabling future rewards and punishments according to documented behaviour.

5. Beijing should also send unarmed civilian vessels, uncrewed boats and drones ever closer to Taiwan’s soil—forever disregarding the median line, establishing a new normal and framing PRC actions as peaceful and non-military in nature.
   • Gao: “[However,] if you dare to fire upon them, you will bear the consequences — we won’t fire the first shot, but that does not mean we won’t fire the second.”

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6. Reunification requires strategic ingenuity beyond a simple choice between negotiation or military force. A coup like the 1936 Xi’an Incident by a key figure within Taiwan could offer such an opening.

7. Beijing should make clear that the “One Country, Two Systems” framework is an offer of goodwill; if Taiwan rejects it, only “One Country, One System” remains, and preferential policies will no longer apply.

8. The PRC should integrate economic and demographic data from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau into national statistics to challenge the perception of Taiwan as a separate entity.
   • Gao: “Internationally, the term Greater China [大中华地区] is often used […] I believe the time has come for us to put forward openly and confidently [our own] concept of a One-China Region [大中国地区].”

9. It should also require annual written reaffirmations of the One-China principle from countries who engage diplomatically with China. Noncompliance must carry consequences, and Taiwan’s increased participation in international organisations must be blocked.

10. Trump’s aim is “to bleed Taiwan dry and seize its wealth”, not to protect it. If Beijing pursues reunification through military means, the United States will not come to Taiwan’s defence.

*Today’s post is too long to be sent out all at once. Part two will follow tomorrow.

The Author

Name: Gao Zhikai (高志凯)
Year of birth: 1962 (age: 62/63)
Position: Vice-President, Centre for China and Globalisation (CCG); Guest Professor, School of Law, Soochow University
Previous roles: Translator, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (where he worked for Deng Xiaoping and at the UN) (1983-89); Senior positions at Morgan Stanley, CICC, Daiwa Securities and CNOOC; China Policy Advisor at the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission (1999-2000)
Other: According to his biography, Gao has produced hundreds of internal reports for various ministries and senior officials on topics ranging from diplomacy and public security to the economy and public welfare—some of which have received written comments (批示) from Xi Jinping himself.
Research focus: Generalist
Education: BA Soochow University (1980); MA Beijing Foreign Studies University (1982); MA-PhD Yale University (1993)
Experience abroad: United States (1980s and 1990s)

NO ONE CAN STOP US FROM ENTERING OUR OWN TERRITORY — TAIWAN, PROVINCE OF CHINA
Gao Zhikai (高志凯)
Published by Guancha.cn on 2 April 2025
Translated by Paddy Stephens

N.B. For the sake of concision, the interviewer’s questions have been summarised.

Question 1: On Lai Ching-te designating the mainland as a “hostile foreign force”, discussing Taiwan’s “five major national security and united front threats”, and proposing 17 strategies in response.

Gao Zhikai: Recently, Lai Ching-te and his administration have taken a series of perverse and regressive actions [倒行逆施] around the issue of cross-Strait relations. Let’s refer to this set of measures as "Lai’s seventeen-point strategy". The most notable of these measures is the designation of the mainland as a "hostile foreign force" [Note: 境外敌对势力; lit. a hostile force outside (the ROC’s) borders], a formulation that effectively alters the status quo that has existed since the early 1980s.

Although the United States and the G7 have recently reiterated their “opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion”, Lai’s seventeen-point strategy—particularly the designation of the mainland as a "hostile foreign force"—has already fundamentally altered the cross-Strait status quo and overall situation. Therefore, I believe the mainland must, first, attach great importance to this matter, and second, adopt effective countermeasures in response.

As for why the Lai Ching-te administration has taken such action, I believe the reason is quite clear: the Lai administration is in a state of considerable panic [十分慌乱]. [This sense of urgency arises] both from a series of recent incidents between the two sides of the Strait and from significant shifts in the international environment. The Lai administration is concerned that if it does not act now, it may miss out on future strategic opportunities.

They have observed the latest developments in Ukraine. They witnessed the US’s abrupt U-turn on the conflict [立场的180度转变], suddenly casting Ukraine aside and negotiating directly with Russia in several areas. Everyone noticed President Trump’s blunt remark to Ukrainian President Zelensky: “You don’t have the cards right now.” This has forced Lai Ching-te to consider the strength of his own hand, fearing that Trump and his administration might one day say the same of Taiwan — that it has no cards to play. As a result, the Lai administration has concluded that if it does not act now, future opportunities may no longer exist. Thus, it has adopted a more confrontational posture [采取强硬措施] and redefined relations across the Taiwan Strait.

Given the situation, what will the Lai administration do? I believe that his first step will be to [continue] instilling fear [进行威慑] among the Taiwanese public. This involves pressuring more and more people to enlist in the military, as well as requiring all sectors of the economy — [even] taxi drivers — to prepare for war. At the same time, [Lai] will [continue] expanding Taiwan’s military and stockpiling strategic materials. Additionally, his administration will be constantly engaging in various forms of collusion with the US, Japan and other countries.

In short, Lai’s seventeen-point strategy is, in fact, an extremely dangerous course of action taken by him and his supporters. In my view, it has fundamentally altered the status quo across the Taiwan Strait [实质性地改变了台湾海峡两岸的现状]. I believe that from these seventeen points, it should be clear to us that the reunification of the motherland cannot be endlessly delayed [不能一拖再拖]. Decisive action must be taken [必须采取果断措施].

Of course, the key question is: what specific decisive measures should be taken? Should our approach be negotiation, reunification using military force, or perhaps something else? As I have emphasised before, we might consider a “Xi’an Incident” strategy [Note: Gao is alluding to the December 1936 “Xi’an Incident”, when Generals Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng detained Chiang Kai-shek, forcing him to halt the civil war and agree to a united front with the Chinese Communists against Japan]. Perhaps a Zhang-type figure could [yet] emerge in Taiwan. If that were that to happen, the Taiwan issue might be resolved through a shrewd [multi-pronged] strategic approach, rather than just through peaceful reunification or a similarly simple one-track solution [单一手段].

So, [the question is,] how then do we prevail through guile [如何实现智取]? By what wise [means] can we bring about [our] reunification with Taiwan? This ought to stand at the very top of our agenda.

Question 2: On Taipei's so-called “green authoritarianism” [绿色威权] and its extension to mainland spouses residing in Taiwan: in March, three women had their residence permits revoked for advocating cross-Strait “unification through force”.

Gao Zhikai: The Lai administration's expulsion of mainland spouses is both deeply malicious and extremely dangerous. Everyone knows that since the 1980s, there have been mutual exchanges [相互走动] between [our] Taiwan compatriots and people from the mainland. It is said that there are now over 500,000 mainland brides and grooms living in Taiwan, who have started families and built their careers there.

This has already become an unstoppable trend, demonstrating powerfully that people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are one family, united by our common ethnicity and language [同文同种]. [Our] Taiwanese compatriots are able to come to the mainland to live, study, work, visit relatives and friends, travel and more. In the past, people from the mainland could also travel to Taiwan for a range of purposes. However, Lai has imposed numerous obstacles to prevent mainland compatriots from entering the island — a marked departure from the previous state of affairs.

I believe Lai’s adoption of such extreme measures against mainland residents or mainland brides serves several purposes:

First, it is [the approach of] "killing one person to scare one hundred" [杀一儆百]. It sends a clear signal to mainlanders living in Taiwan: "You must not promote the idea that 'Taiwan is a part of China'. You must fall in line with the pro-independence agenda. You are not allowed to advocate for mainland interests in Taiwan." Such measures are clearly highly targeted.

In addition, I believe they are also trying to use this to suggest that Taiwan and the mainland are separate entities. They claim that people on either side of the Taiwan Strait do not share the same heritage [不是同宗同源] and [are, in fact,] “two entirely separate countries [国家] or peoples [民族[”. Such rhetoric is extremely dangerous.

Their recent expulsion of mainland individuals is yet another step down this misguided path. Their intention is to intimidate our Taiwanese compatriots — to warn them against interacting freely with mainlanders, starting families with them, or building their lives together, [let alone] becoming part of any united front efforts. Instead, [our Taiwanese compatriots] are pressured to commit to the cause of “Taiwan independence”, binding their fate to pro-independence figures and forces. This is another deeply malicious move aimed at fundamentally altering cross-Strait relations.

Question 3: On whether the following statement by the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office indicates a shift in Beijing’s approach towards Taiwan: “There is no such things as 'international waters' in the Strait, as it includes China's internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone […] China respects the navigation rights enjoyed by all countries in relevant waters of the Strait in accordance with Chinese law and international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea but firmly opposes relevant countries' illegal activities that provoke and endanger China's sovereignty and security in the name of 'freedom of navigation'.”

Gao Zhikai: The Chinese government's clarification of the Taiwan Strait’s legal status is both entirely correct and absolutely necessary. It serves as a warning to certain ill-intentioned countries that deliberately misinterpret the current situation and engage in disruptive actions.

Why do I believe [its] description to be accurate? For the following reason: in 1949, the Kuomintang fled to Taiwan, establishing a defensive position on the island while declaring their intention to retake the mainland. At the time, they still adhered to the principle that “there is only one China, and both the mainland and Taiwan belong to it”. However, since the emergence of the “Taiwan independence” faction, Taiwan has drifted further and further away [from this]. In practice, this faction regards Taiwan and some of its surrounding islands as a separate country. They even drew the so-called “median line” in the Taiwan Strait as its [supposed maritime] boundary, claiming that everything to the east of the line belongs to Taiwan and everything to the west belongs to the mainland. This is completely incorrect. We must be clear: the mainland and Taiwan constitute one country — that is the most fundamental meaning of the one-China principle.

Let’s consider this in more detail. The western shore of the Taiwan Strait is Fujian, while the eastern shore is the main island of Taiwan. Extending eastwards from the mainland coast and westwards from Taiwan, we first encounter our territorial sea, then the contiguous zone, and finally [our] exclusive economic zone.

Given that the Taiwan Strait is very narrow, the overlapping of these different maritime zones leaves no remaining waters in between. In other words, there are no so-called “international waters” in the middle of the Strait—and indeed, the term “international waters” itself is not an accurate one [不是一个严谨的术语]. This demonstrates that China, as a [single unified] country, exercises jurisdiction, governance and sovereignty over both sides of the Taiwan Strait—that is, over the mainland and Taiwan.

Therefore, whether we are referring to the territorial sea, the contiguous zone or the exclusive economic zone, we have the right to exercise jurisdiction and control [over the Taiwan Strait]. In my view, this is entirely reasonable and broadly acceptable by all — both from the perspective of China’s domestic law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as well as other international treaties. This is a crucial point right now — and one day, it will be of even greater importance [将来某一天会变得更加重要].

When might such a day arrive [哪一天呢]? Suppose real action [真有所行动] were to occur across the Taiwan Strait. In the past, we have often heard foreign countries declare that they would intervene—saying [things like] “ a Taiwan contingency is a contingency for Japan”, and similarly for the United States. Former US President Biden repeatedly stated that if anything happened to Taiwan, the US would send troops to intervene. So how, exactly, would they intervene? If they plan to send ships into the Taiwan Strait, we have already made our position clear: the Taiwan Strait is not “international waters”, and foreign warships or submarines cannot pass through it at will. They must follow proper procedures and act according to relevant regulations. We even have the legal right to impose a blockade. This [position] is not only important now; [it will be even more critical] should unforeseen developments arise in the future, ensuring that the shipping lanes between the western and eastern shores of the Taiwan Strait remain free from foreign interference or incursion.

Therefore, I believe we must clearly explain this point to both sides of the Taiwan Strait, [particularly] to compatriots in Taiwan and to the world at large. It must also be properly documented. This will be crucial should any exceptional circumstances arise in the future.

*Today’s post is too long to be sent out all at once. Part two will follow tomorrow.

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