Liu Zongyi: India’s Disruptive Role Threatens the SCO’s Future

"To many observers of international affairs, India has already become an internal cancer [内部毒瘤] threatening the healthy development of the SCO."

Today's edition opens with an introduction by Andrew Small, Senior Transatlantic Fellow with GMF’s Indo-Pacific Programme. He recently served as the inaugural China Fellow at IDEA, the advisory hub reporting directly to the President of the European Commission. Andrew is also the author of The Rupture: China and the Global Race for the Future and The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics. Very grateful to him for his contribution to this newsletter. — Thomas

In recent years, SCO meetings at various levels have taken the form of diplomatic hand-to-hand combat, with Indian officials refusing to support Beijing’s pet initiatives, and pushing back forcefully against Chinese efforts to intensify the use of the organisation as an anti-western vehicle. While China knew that the simultaneous admission of India and Pakistan would bring many of the two sides’ tensions to the table, it is the impact of the fraught Sino-Indian dynamics that has been far more damaging to Beijing’s agenda.

This article from Liu Zongyi, one of China’s leading South Asia hands, is an unusually candid exposition of the frustrations on the Chinese side ahead of the hosting of the 2025 Tianjin summit. While his main focus is on New Delhi’s approach to the SCO—which he describes as an “internal cancer”—he also throws the responsibility to fix it on Russia, which backed India’s admission despite Beijing’s reluctance. The article concludes with a call for Moscow to persuade New Delhi to either “cooperate or withdraw”.

Some of his prescriptions—such as a recommendation for qualified majority voting—are likely to be read by many observers with a raised eyebrow, given Beijing’s proclivity for using unanimity and consensus requirements to its advantage in other contexts. But it is indicative of the challenges China will continue to face in its efforts to institutionalize cooperation with like-minded actors: given that the truly like-minded grouping is relatively small, expansion of these groups can mean dilution or paralysis. Beijing has also been navigating many of these diplomatic tensions with India in the BRICS, but the irritation about the dynamics inside the SCO is higher, given that this was so clearly intended to form the institutional nucleus of a China-centred anti-western bloc.

The article was written, however, before the peak of India’s tensions with the Trump administration. While Beijing knows these will not translate into a dramatic transformation of the deeply competitive Sino-Indian relationship, it is precisely in multilateral contexts where China will be hoping to soften the edge of India’s pushback against Beijing’s drive to build a “counter-hegemonic” architecture. The help that Liu was looking to solicit from Moscow has instead come in the form of another round of self-defeating moves from Washington.

— Andrew Small

Key Points

1. The 2017 admission of India and Pakistan has increased the SCO’s weight significantly, but it has also imported deep-rooted regional tensions, resulting in recurring deadlocks and inefficiencies under the organisation’s current consensus-based decision-making mechanism.

2. India’s recent refusal to endorse SCO joint statements, coupled with its confrontational stance towards Pakistan and China, has repeatedly undermined the organisation’s cohesion, exposing its structural weaknesses and inability to manage internal crises effectively.

3. India consistently obstructs China-led initiatives like the BRI, pushes alternative agendas, instrumentalises the SCO platform to bolster domestic nationalist sentiment, and aligns strategically with Western powers, undermining the organisation’s unity and shared vision.

4. India is thus increasingly viewed as an "internal cancer" undermining the SCO’s stability and development.

5. The recent Indo–Pakistani military conflict has destabilised SCO security cooperation, disrupted regional trade corridors, escalated mutual terrorism accusations and deterred investors, revealing the fragility of both economic and security integration efforts in the region.

6. Moreover, Russia’s balancing act between India and China, coupled with US and Turkish positioning in the conflict, has deepened intra-SCO rivalries, eroding trust and weakening the organisation’s ability to present a united geopolitical front.

7. Without institutional reform, India’s disruptive influence risks paralysing the SCO’s future. Urgent measures include qualified majority voting, stronger Secretariat authority, crisis mediation mechanisms and independent counter-terrorism investigations.

8. Russia should take a leading role in driving reforms, pressing India to either cooperate or withdraw from the group, while China focuses on strengthening regional cooperation and safeguarding the SCO’s long-term relevance.

Name: Liu Zongyi (刘宗义)
Born: Not publicly disclosed (age: late 40s)
Position: Director and Senior Researcher, Centre for South Asian Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS); Director, Major Power Relations Research Office, Institute for International Strategic and Security Studies, SIIS
Previously: Joined SIIS shortly after completing his PhD in 2007; career has been at SIIS since 2007–2008.
Other: Chinese Director of the Centre for China Studies in Bangladesh
Research focus: India’s Economy and Foreign Policy; South Asian Regional Issues; BRICS, G20 and BRI
Education: BA Economics, Shandong University of Finance and Economics; Graduate Diploma, Johns Hopkins University–Nanjing University Centre for Chinese and American Studies (now called the Hopkins–Nanjing Centre); MA-PhD International Relations, China Foreign Affairs University (2007).
Experience Abroad: Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.; German Development Institute (Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik); India’s National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP); Pakistan’s Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI)

LIU ZONGYI: FOR THE HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT OF THE SCO, ISSUES POSED BY INDIA MUST BE ADDRESSED URGENTLY
15 July 2025
Liu Zongyi (刘宗义)
Published by Guancha.cn on 15 July 2025
Translated by Jan Brughmans
(Illustration by OpenAI’s DALL·E 3)

1. India’s Disruptive Role in the SCO

This year’s Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit will be held in Tianjin, China [from 31 August to 1 September 2025]. However, during the latest SCO Defence Ministers’ Meeting in Qingdao this June, India’s Defence Minister, [Rajnath] Singh, declined to sign the joint statement, accused Islamabad of supporting terrorism and boasted of India’s victory [against Pakistan] — once again positioning India as an “outlier” [另类] within the SCO.

Between 7 and 10 May this year, a significant military confrontation broke out between India and Pakistan following an attack in Indian-administered Kashmir. As both countries are SCO member states, the crisis posed a serious challenge to the organisation. It not only tested the SCO’s capacity for crisis management but also highlighted structural weaknesses stemming from internal differences [矛盾] among its members.

The military strikes carried out by Israel and the United States against Iran in June further exacerbated these tensions. The SCO strongly condemned the Israeli military action against Iran, stating in its joint declaration that the action “violated international law and the UN Charter”. However, India, as a member of the SCO, withheld its endorsement of the statement and issued a separate communiqué in parallel, clarifying that it “did not participate in the organisation’s decision-making process regarding this matter.”

To many observers of international affairs, India has already become an internal cancer [内部毒瘤] threatening the healthy development of the SCO. This view echoes that of Professor Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr., former Vice-President of the BRICS New Development Bank and a Brazilian economist, who argues that under Prime Minister Modi’s leadership, India is increasingly becoming a disruptive presence within the BRICS grouping.

In other words, how the issue of India is handled will have a direct bearing on the future and fate of the SCO.

2. New Delhi: Aligning with the West, Countering China

Firstly, India’s posture towards China and Pakistan has further highlighted the structural weaknesses in the SCO’s internal coordination mechanisms.

The accession of India and Pakistan in 2017 marked the SCO’s first expansion into South Asia, significantly increasing its population size and economic weight, but also introducing complex internal friction [复杂的内部矛盾].

As a major power in South Asia, India’s accession to the SCO was shaped both by Russia’s interest in balancing China’s influence and by India’s own ambition to expand its geopolitical reach into Central Asia. However, India’s participation has been marked by various “contradictions”: on the one hand, it seeks to deepen engagement with Central Asia and Russia through the SCO; on the other, its ongoing border disputes with China, opposition to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and long-standing tensions with Pakistan have made it a hindrance to effective internal coordination within the organisation.

The SCO’s decision-making relies on the principle of “consensus through consultation” (“协商一致”). Since India’s accession, the recurring India–Pakistan conflicts and China–India tensions have repeatedly disrupted its security and economic agenda, often leading to deadlock and making the inefficiency of the organisation’s internal coordination mechanisms increasingly apparent.

Secondly, in recent years, India’s tendency to resist or undermine collective initiatives within the SCO has become increasingly evident.

Since the Doklam standoff in 2017, India has increasingly viewed the SCO and BRICS mechanisms not as platforms for deepening cooperation, but as tools for offsetting and balancing China’s influence.

Economically, the joint development of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has emerged as a public good for developing countries across the Eurasian continent, including member states of the SCO. However, since its accession, India has consistently opposed the inclusion of China-led initiatives—such as the BRI and the concept of a “community with a shared future for mankind”—in SCO documents. Instead, it has actively encouraged other member states to support its own proposals for connectivity and economic cooperation.

Politically, India has increasingly used the SCO as a platform to cater to its domestic nationalist sentiment. In particular, following the 2020 Galwan Valley clash, India banned Chinese apps and imposed restrictions on Chinese investment — policies that extended into the SCO framework and contributed to a breakdown in cooperation. This antagonistic stance culminated at the 2024 SCO Heads of Government Meeting, where India was the sole member that refused to endorse the Belt and Road Initiative in the joint communiqué, leading to a degree of collective distancing by the other nine member states.

In the realm of security, India aligns itself closely with Western powers, participating actively in the United States’ “Indo-Pacific” strategy and the Quad mechanism alongside the US, Japan and Australia. It has also been deepening military cooperation and signing high-tech defence agreements with the United States. In contrast, India remains largely passive within the SCO’s military framework, often obstructing initiatives led by China and Russia. Notably, it refused to take part in the 2021 joint counter-terrorism exercise hosted by Pakistan, thereby undermining the cohesion of the SCO’s counter-terrorism efforts — all while citing its so-called policy of “strategic autonomy”.

In addition, Indian leaders have been repeatedly absent from key meetings, such as the 2024 Astana summit, and have even demanded that English be made a working language, challenging operational norms advocated by China and Russia.

3. The Indo-Pakistani Clash and Its Toll on the SCO

In the aftermath of the recent India–Pakistan conflict, India initially remained silent about the heavy losses it sustained following its military strike on Pakistan without presenting any evidence [of Islamabad’s alleged wrongdoing]. It subsequently went on to widely publicise its so-called overwhelming victory over Pakistan. Now, two months later, India has gradually acknowledged that several of its advanced fighter jets were shot down by Pakistan. Nevertheless, Lieutenant General Rahul Singh, Deputy Chief of the Indian Army, has claimed that India was confronting three adversaries simultaneously [Note: Liu is most likely referring to Pakistan, China and Turkey, the latter having been perceived as supporting Pakistan in one form or another]. From every angle, the conflict has dealt a serious blow to the SCO:

(1) The SCO faces the risk of its security cooperation framework unravelling.

Firstly, its counter-terrorism agenda has faced significant setbacks. One of the SCO’s core functions is the joint fight against the “three evil forces” (“三股势力”) — terrorism, extremism and separatism. At present, India accuses Pakistan of supporting armed militants in Kashmir — allegations that Pakistan denies. Conversely, Pakistan accuses India of backing Baloch separatist groups and the Pakistani Taliban, and has presented evidence of this to the international community. As a result of this mutual suspicion, both countries refuse to share intelligence within the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS).

Secondly, military mutual trust among member states is in decline. Although a ceasefire is currently in place following the India–Pakistan conflict, Indian Prime Minister Modi has referred to it as a “temporary truce”. Military communication between India and Pakistan has been suspended, and India may boycott future SCO joint exercises — a repeat of its absence from the 2021 drills appears likely — further undermining tactical coordination among member states.

(2) Setbacks in the Process of Economic Integration

At present, in addition to India’s longstanding resistance to the SCO’s economic integration initiatives, the recent [Indo-Pakistani] conflict has further exposed the fragility of regional connectivity projects. During the hostilities, India and Pakistan closed both airspace and land routes to each other, disrupting trade corridors linking India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and even Central Asian countries — routes that form the backbone of the SCO’s economic agenda.

Secondly, the conflict has undermined international investor confidence. It has heightened geopolitical risks in South Asia and led to significant declines in both Indian and Pakistani stock markets. In the aftermath of the conflict, terrorist attacks within Pakistan — allegedly supported by India — surged. The situation in both Pakistan and Afghanistan risks further deterioration, potentially delaying progress towards regional economic integration.

(3) Severely Undermining Internal Cohesion and Intensifying Major Power Rivalries

Firstly, the India–Pakistan conflict has placed Russia in a difficult position. Russia aims to balance its relationships with both China and India — supporting India as a counterweight to China on the one hand, while simultaneously relying on Chinese economic support in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis on the other. During the India–Pakistan military confrontation, Russia adopted a position of tacit approval towards India.

Secondly, external interference by the United States and Turkey has further eroded the SCO’s internal cohesion. In the aftermath of the conflict, India deepened its military cooperation with the United States, distancing itself even further from other SCO member states. At the same time, Turkey’s support for Pakistan in its standoff with India may have lasting implications for the geopolitical landscape and security dynamics of Central and South Asia.

4. Reform or Decline: The SCO at a Crossroads

The India–Pakistan military conflict has exposed shortcomings in the SCO’s institutional flexibility and crisis response capabilities, while also presenting an opportunity for transformation. If the SCO could pursue structural reform to strengthen internal coordination and reduce India’s obstructive influence [弱化印度掣肘], it has the potential to evolve into a core platform for security and economic governance across Eurasia. Conversely, if internal divisions continue to paralyse it, its geopolitical influence risks being further eroded by Western-led alliance systems.

First, the SCO must optimise its decision-making mechanisms by reforming the current consensus-based principle and introducing a “qualified majority voting” system in key areas. For economic cooperation projects, approval by two-thirds of member states should be sufficient to proceed. Member states that dissent may choose to opt out, but should not be permitted to obstruct the overall process. In addition, the Secretariat’s role should be enhanced by granting it greater authority over agenda-setting and by limiting interference from individual member states in the organisation’s daily operations.

Second, the SCO should establish a dedicated conflict mediation and crisis management mechanism. A special task force—led by China and Russia, with the involvement of neutral members such as Iran and Kazakhstan—should be formed to facilitate ceasefire negotiations between India and Pakistan and to help revive the Indus Waters Treaty. Military communication channels must be strengthened and formally integrated into the SCO Defence Ministers’ Meeting framework, including the establishment of an India–Pakistan military hotline to prevent miscalculations and escalation.

Finally, the functions of the SCO’s regional counter-terrorism bodies should be reformed. A third-party investigative mechanism ought to be established to carry out independent assessments of terrorist incidents, helping to reduce mutual accusations among member states. For example, Pakistan has recently labelled India’s National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, as the “chief architect” of terrorism on Pakistani soil.

Russia is a key stakeholder in the reform of the SCO. The Eurasian continent—including the SCO—serves as a strategic cornerstone for Russian influence. If Russia wishes to see the SCO flourish, it must take active steps to encourage India either to cooperate or to withdraw.

India has frequently used major diplomatic events hosted by China as opportunities to make unreasonable demands and engage in diplomatic coercion. In light of this consistent behaviour, the Chinese government need not be overly concerned about whether Prime Minister Modi attends the Tianjin summit. Instead, it should focus on advancing initiatives that promote regional cooperation and the development of the SCO, while pushing forward internal reforms that support the organisation’s long-term progress.

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