Negotiating Stability: Da Wei on a Xi-Trump Deal and Summit
"The US has left a vacuum for the world, but no country can and no country wants to fill that vacuum." — Da Wei
Today’s edition opens with an introduction by a figure I respect greatly, François Godement—Special Advisor and Resident Senior Fellow for Asia and America at the Institut Montaigne. He was previously a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and, until last year, an external consultant to France’s Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs. Formerly Director of ECFR’s Asia & China Programme, he has taught at Sciences Po and INALCO, founded the Centre Asie at IFRI (1985–2005), and established the think tank Asia Centre in 2005. It is a privilege to have him contribute. — Thomas
This issue of Sinification focuses on the short-term prospects of the U.S.–China trade confrontation, drawing on a compelling interview with Da Wei, now a Tsinghua academic and former director of American affairs at CICIR. His most noteworthy assessment is that China could settle for a tariff level significantly higher than the rates currently agreed by America’s allies. And while Da Wei does note Donald Trump’s well-known unpredictability, he relies on the President’s desire for a meeting with Xi Jinping in early autumn to suggest that a compromise may be reached informally before then.
Yet the author remains cautious. President Trump has reversed course before. As noted elsewhere, his repeated “pauses” since the 4 April “Liberation Day” on additional tariffs imposed on China are proof enough that he is capable of threatening high and punitive trade measures, only to settle for less if it results in a deal he considers favourable to American interests — and avoids clashes with strong partners.
But Da Wei’s perspective also illuminates China’s stance. There are three questions one should ask of any Chinese analyst:
Is he interesting?
Is he relevant — i.e. can he be thought to reflect an official perspective?
Is he writing for “barbarians” — signalling messages intended for foreign audiences?
Da Wei clearly meets the first criterion. On the second, the jury is still out. His long association with CICIR certainly lends him a certain credibility, unlike many online commentators who emerge from obscurity with sweeping claims. Yet CICIR itself — and its parent organisation, the Ministry of State Security — has often engaged in sensitive geopolitical dialogues — from South Asia to the Middle East — and sometimes diverges from the PLA’s harder, more confrontational tone. Intelligence-linked bodies tend towards moderation, knowing their adversaries well.
The third question, however, may matter most. We are at a decisive juncture in the evolving trade triangle between the U.S., the EU and China. Xi Jinping’s strategy appears focused on avoiding a full-scale confrontation, even over trade. The 143% counter-duties announced in late April, framed as a response to “ridiculous” U.S. measures, were implicitly positioned as temporary. Within this triangular dynamic, Xi has treated the EU in an underhanded fashion, but not the United States. The recent and unexplained disappearance of Liu Jianchao, a senior diplomat who had toured the U.S. advocating “stability”, underscores the need for Beijing to reassure others about its intentions.
Whether Da Wei speaks independently or as an informal messenger, his interview reflects this broader emphasis on engagement. Yet a close reading of his view shows few concessions. Beyond acknowledging that China may need to accept higher tariffs, his interview rules out major compromises: fentanyl-related demands are dismissed as “unreasonable”, and any broader geopolitical bargain is rejected. Instead, China seeks a commitment to regular state-to-state dialogues — effectively an engagement policy by another name — alongside eased restrictions on technology exports and licensing, while conceding that military-related domains will remain off-limits. None of this contradicts Xi’s priorities. In fact, China’s recent rejection of Nvidia’s H20 chips demonstrates a readiness to accelerate selective decoupling where strategic interests demand it.
And so, as becomes clear, the wide gap between strategic signalling and practical compromise leaves the outcome of U.S.–China trade talks deeply uncertain.
— François Godement
Key Points
There is cautious optimism about the prospects for a US-China trade deal, but the outcome depends on the definition of success. Achieving very low tariffs like Europe or Japan is extremely unlikely, if not impossible.
Although any agreement will probably retain relatively high tariffs, it would nevertheless help enhance predictability and provide a stronger foundation for stabilising bilateral relations:
Da Wei: “We need that deal, then we can have a summit, then we can start a process of managing bilateral relations.”
Progress on fentanyl remains possible, but the Trump administration’s “very unreasonable demands”, driven by domestic electoral considerations, complicate negotiations. Greater cooperation could allow a further tariff cut.
A “consensus of stabilising bilateral relations” should be established during the next Xi-Trump summit, along with mechanisms enabling regular meetings between economic, foreign policy and military officials to manage relations beyond the two leaders.
While his administration maintains hardline policies towards the PRC, Trump continues to speak positively about Xi and China, seeking space for potential deals.
I will be in Paris throughout September. If you would like to connect — whether to exchange views or simply say hello — please feel very welcome to reach out.
His softening gestures, such as allegedly denying Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s transit through the US, are merely tactical. Trump’s aims remain unchanged: reducing US economic reliance on China and bringing manufacturing back to the US.
Although restricting military-use technology and diversifying imports is reasonable for any country, Washington should not impose trade limits aimed solely at hindering China’s economic and technological growth, as this risks fuelling hostility and damaging relations.
If Chinese antagonism towards the US is to be reduced, Washington should also reaffirm its one-China policy and stop “hollowing it out” while discouraging “pro-independence” actions by Taipei.
The implementation of Hegseth’s “peace through strength” approach in the Indo-Pacific is doubtful. Moreover, Trump’s unpredictability and recent policies towards the region, are causing the balance in Southeast Asia to tilt gradually in China’s favour.
Globally, the US has created a leadership vacuum by stepping back from multilateral institutions, yet Beijing neither seeks nor has the capacity to replace it as the dominant global power. It faces enough domestic challenges.
Da Wei: “I don’t think China is a country that can really bring peace to Ukraine … There are two direct parties involved – Russia and Ukraine – and there are at least two indirect partners – that’s the EU and the US. China is not playing that direct or indirect role, so I don’t think we can play a decisive role on that issue.”
The Scholar
Name: Da Wei (达巍)
Year of birth: 1973 (age: 51-52)
Position: Director, Centre for International Security and Strategy (CISS); Professor, Department of International Relations, Tsinghua University
Formerly: Analyst, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) from 1995 to 2017; Director of CICIR’s Institute of American Studies (2013-2017); Assistant President and Dean of the Department of International Politics, University of International Relations (2017-2020)
Research focus: US-China relations; US domestic politics; US foreign and security-related policies
Education: BA-MA University of International Relations; PhD CICIR
Experience abroad (visiting scholar): Atlantic Council (2006–2007); Johns Hopkins University (2008–2009); Stanford University (2024); and NTU Singapore (2025)
OPEN QUESTIONS | ‘IGNORANCE AND NEGLECT’ MARK FLAWED US POLICY IN RACE WITH CHINA: DA WEI
Interview by Dewey Sim
Published by the South China Morning Post on 25 August 2025
Many thanks to its editor for granting Sinification permission to share it here
(Illustration by OpenAI’s DALL·E 3)
SCMP: China and the United States have held several rounds of high-level trade talks recently, and they have just extended the tariff truce by 90 days. How do you assess the ongoing China-US negotiations and trade tensions? How do you think the trade talks will end?
Da Wei: I am cautiously optimistic about the potential for the two countries to reach an agreement over tariffs. But of course it depends on what the criteria are and how we define success. If we say there will be a deal, then it’s a success. I guess we would have a good chance to have a deal. I don’t know when but ideally later this autumn. Obviously, I think both sides want to have a deal.
From the American perspective, China is the most important country [when it comes to its] international trade relations. Without such a deal, Trump’s policy agenda of redefining or maybe adjusting the US external trade relations with the rest of the world will not be completed. China also wants a deal because it can inject a strong sense of predictability to its external economic environment. That’s good for the economy. Politically, a trade deal will pave the way for the China-US presidential summit sometime later this fall, which is also key to the general stability of bilateral relations. So, both China and the US need a deal.
Having said that, we also need to be realistic about the future level of tariffs. This is the reason why I said it depends on what your definition of success is. If you want to reach a deal with a very low tariff level or a similar tariff level that the US has with, say, Europe, Japan, South Korea or Britain, I think that’s very unlikely and basically impossible.
I think China and the US will probably reach a deal with a relatively high level of tariff remaining there. I don’t know the number, but it could be higher than the countries I mentioned earlier and maybe more similar to some Southeast Asian countries. But even if the tariff level won’t be very low, a deal still can increase the sense of predictability, so that’s still a good thing.
SCMP: How consequential will the result of the trade talks or the trade deal be in shaping the direction of US-China relations, at least in the near future?
Da Wei: I wouldn’t say it’s a precondition, but I think it’s directly related to the political atmosphere and also the mutual trust or even political foundations for a presidential summit, which will lead to a process of managing overall China-US relations. We need that deal, then we can have a summit, then we can start a process of managing bilateral relations.
Again, I wouldn’t say it’s a precondition. I think the two leaders have to meet sooner or later. But if we have a deal, it will create a constructive atmosphere for bilateral relations and start a period of relative stability. Of course they could also meet without a deal, but if that happens, the summit would be more difficult. And then maybe we’d see more fights or tensions ahead. I think [a deal] is the most important factor so far for the future of China-US relations.
SCMP: Regarding the summit, Harvard professor Graham Allison in a recent commentary predicted a “great balancing” when Xi Jinping and Donald Trump meet. He predicted they would announce not just progress on trade but also things like a Chinese crackdown on fentanyl precursor exports and possibly a resolution of the TikTok issue. He believes they might also announce a partnership. What is your take on this? Are you similarly optimistic that such a breakthrough could happen?
Da Wei: I haven’t read Professor Graham Allison’s piece on this, but on the economic issues you mentioned, I think it’s possible. Fentanyl per se is not an economic issue, but fentanyl tariffs have an economic impact. I’m not sure if “likely” is too strong or too optimistic a word, but I think it’s possible. We do need a truce on tariffs. That’s the first thing. I don’t think it’s very likely that the American side would further lower its reciprocal tariffs.
It’s at least 10 per cent plus the 20 per cent punitive tariff on fentanyl imposed in March, which would be a 30 per cent tariff rate. I think it’s hard to be cut further, but if the two sides could cooperate better over the fentanyl issue and get fentanyl tariffs cut too, it would be great.
Removing part of the fentanyl tariff could turn out to be another form of the US’ tariff cut. For that reason, I think the fentanyl issue is an issue that has potential to move forward. But of course, it’s very difficult, to be honest. I think the Trump administration has raised many – from my perspective – very unreasonable demands. I strongly criticise their approach.
I think the US raised some of their requests based on their domestic political needs. The Trump administration cares more about their image as being tougher on the fentanyl issue rather than what is the most effective and workable solution to this important issue which is critical to the health of the American people.
And TikTok, I think it’s a relatively smaller and insulated issue compared to other issues like tariffs and fentanyl. I do think it’s possible [to be resolved] and it has already been negotiated for over half a year. President Trump himself personally invested his political capital in this case. So, if a mutually acceptable deal can be struck, it would be great for China-US relations. For all those things, I think it’s possible.
[As for China-US partnership] I think it’s quite possible on the economic side. But if we’re discussing geopolitical issues, I would say it’s very unlikely, at least in the short term.
SCMP: Trump has been pushing for a meeting with Xi. From the Chinese perspective, what are some of the leadership’s key considerations when agreeing to or planning for a summit? You mentioned how important trade issues will be. Apart from that, are there any other issues that you think China will seek to push for before or during the summit?
Da Wei: A presidential summit is not a meeting between ordinary individuals. If the two leaders plan to meet, it would be better that we know in advance that the summit will be fruitful. We need to make sure that it will be a successful summit and that after the summit we can start a process of managing bilateral relations. I think this is what the Chinese side needs.
Of course, it will include several things like a potential trade deal and also a mechanism that can solve near-term things like TikTok and the fentanyl issue. I think the Chinese side also wants to, through the summit, set up a kind of mechanism through which China and the US can manage bilateral relations together in the future. We cannot just rely on the two presidents to manage the bilateral relations in the coming years.
[China would want] the two sides to agree during the summit or have their leaders instruct their respective teams to basically say we have a consensus of stabilising bilateral relations, and we need some kind of mechanism to implement this consensus. I think that’s what the Chinese side wants – some kind of regular or frequent meeting between the leaders of their economic teams, foreign policy teams and militaries. With those meetings and dialogues, we could manage bilateral relations better. Besides this, the [mainland] Chinese side of course needs President Trump to at least reaffirm the US policy on Taiwan.
SCMP: In recent weeks, Trump has ramped up engagement with China and he appears to have softened his rhetoric on China. Do you see a shift in the way Trump is approaching China?
Da Wei: Generally speaking, I think President Trump himself has been quite consistent when he talks about China and also the Chinese leader. Particularly with President Xi, he always says something very positive. He always says he respects China. He respects the history. He respects the people.
He has been quite consistent with China but at the same time on specific issues he still has his quite hardline policies. I think President Trump has tried to create a space for a negotiation or deal with China. I don’t think his fundamental belief has changed, and I don’t think he wants to be viewed as soft, for instance, make really big compromises on the tariff issue or issues that he really cares about.
Tactically, President Trump has been quite careful in dealing with China. But his goals, like reducing or managing the economic linkage with China and trying to encourage the manufacturing sector to move back to the US, these are his long-time strategic goals, and I don’t think that will change.
There are signs of a kind of softening, including the Taiwan issue. At least the US postponed – if not denied – [William] Lai Ching-te’s transit to the US. I read all those gestures as an effort to try to create space for a deal with China and then a summit with the Chinese leader. But President Trump could change his position suddenly. I think these soft or hardline policies are all his tactics to facilitate a deal.
SCMP: Several recent polls have shown that American public perception of China is improving. How should we make sense of this? And will improved sentiment towards China within the US shift the dynamics in the US-China relationship?
Da Wei: Reading polls sometimes is very challenging [as is] analysing the reason behind the changes. But I think there could be several reasons for this. First, after almost 10 years of trade dispute with China, the two sides still rely on each other. Ordinary Americans can still feel the strong impact of the Chinese economy on them and the strong economic linkage between China and the US. This is very much related to their ordinary daily life.
Secondly, I will say maybe for many Democrats and for some independents, when they watch the policy of the Trump administration – I’m not saying the Trump administration’s policy is correct or wrong but – [they see that] the policy is very unpredictable. I think we all agree about that. He changed his positions very dramatically and very quickly, and he also changed many long-time US policies. So probably, I guess, from some Americans’ perspective, China is more predictable than their own country. China’s policy is more predictable than that of the US. Of course, maybe the respondents who lean to the Republican side may not think in that way, but at least on the Democratic side I think China is [seen as] quite stable and predictable.
SCMP: You wrote in a recent Foreign Affairs commentary that most Chinese people believe the US does not want to see the rise of a strong China and that it is taking steps to contain Chinese development. Is there a trigger that could potentially shift Chinese thinking? How dangerous will it be for US-China relations if such views in China continue to harden?
Da Wei: I have to say the Chinese perspective on the US has not changed a lot in the past six months. Or it is even worsening because of this changing, unpredictable policy in the US. But let’s imagine, in the future, if several things happen, I think ordinary Chinese perception of the US could change towards a positive direction.
At least two things are important:
One is the Taiwan issue. The US needs to at least adhere to its own one-China policy. I’m not saying the US should fundamentally change its one-China policy. That’s very unlikely. But I hope that the US has stopped hollowing out their one-China policy. And even within this framework, they can also say and do something to discourage the pro-independence inclination of the Taiwan authority. Taiwan is one of the issues that the US could fundamentally change China’s perception of.
The other thing is technology. If the US side can lift some, if not all, of its technological restrictions and export control measures on China, I think then that perception could change. Export control measures are the hardest evidence [making] many Chinese believe that the US government does not want China to surpass the US and dominate those hi-tech industries.
Though I don’t agree with many arguments in the US regarding the export control measures, I do think it’s reasonable that a country does not want its technology to be used by a competitor or an adversary on its military forces. It’s also understandable that a country wants to diversify its import of some products like basic medicine. But if the country limits its exports to the other country just to slow down their economic or technological development, how can you expect the other side to view you positively?
In that regard, if the US side can change its policy at least to some extent, I think that would be positive. These are the two most important factors.
SCMP: You have long emphasised the importance of people-to-people ties between China and the US while expressing pessimism about them under Trump. Based on your recent visit, are you seeing continued declines in academic exchanges? How does the current climate compare to what you observed during your visits in recent years?
Da Wei: I wouldn’t say it’s continuing to decline. The situation is not worse than one or two years ago. But of course, it’s not in good shape; it’s not getting better. After the end of the coronavirus pandemic, there was a kind of rebound. In 2023, we saw some kind of recovery, a very slow and difficult recovery. And then it reached a certain level in 2024, and I think we’re still at that level. It’s not getting better. It’s not getting worse. It’s still at a very limited and difficult level. This is what I’m witnessing. I don’t think it’s becoming more difficult, but obviously it has not recovered to the pre-pandemic level. So that’s the situation.
SCMP: Traditionally, Southeast Asia has relied on the US for security and China for economic growth and trade. Can countries in the region still maintain that delicate balance amid Trump’s trade war? Considering Secretary of Defence [Pete] Hegseth’s “peace through strength” statement at the Shangri-La Dialogue, are we seeing the emergence of a more defined Trump-era Indo-Pacific strategy? If so, how might this shift impact China?
Da Wei: I think we still need some time to understand how US policy in this region will be. For instance, whether what Secretary of Defence Hegseth said at the Shangri-La Dialogue this year will be really effectively implemented in this region. To be honest, my personal view is that I doubt it. But of course, again, we need some time.
From the perspective of Southeast Asian countries, Southeast Asia is not a unified unit. There are different countries. The foreign policy of the Philippines, for example, will be very different from that of Cambodia. Generally speaking, Southeast Asian countries, of course, would want to balance between China and the US. If you ask our colleagues in those countries, they will say they are trying to balance, and I believe them because that’s in the regional countries’ interests.
Having said that, on the Chinese side, I think the interactions between China and most Southeast Asian countries are constructive, developing and rising, not only on the economic side but also in security. On the security side, China and many Southeast Asian countries are developing their security cooperation.
At the same time, on the other end of this balance is the US. I think the Trump administration’s policy has created a very strong sense of unpredictability in the region and, of course, worldwide. I think when the Republican Party is in the White House, US policy towards the region has always been [characterised by] some kind of ignorance and neglect to some extent. It’s not only limited to Trump. It happened in Trump’s first term, and it also happened in the term of George W. Bush, the 43rd US president. In this century, I think the Democrats tend to emphasise the region more than the Republicans.
In this balance, China is still there and has become even more important. But on the other end, the US is unpredictable and maybe in the next three and a half years will not engage [the region] as closely as the previous [Joe] Biden administration. The balance will still be there. And our colleagues in Southeast Asian countries will always say they want to maintain this balance. But if we look at the reality, the reality on the ground is that this balance is slightly tilting towards China – I will say for the next three to four years.
SCMP: I want to go back to the Foreign Affairs commentary where you suggested that Beijing’s position on the Ukraine war was limiting the development of its ties with Europe. But you also argue that Beijing’s hands are somewhat tied, given its deep ties with Moscow. What then is your suggestion for China in its response to the war and to furthering ties with Europe? Is there a good solution at this point?
Da Wei: I don’t have a good solution. But of course, we know that President Trump and President [Vladimir] Putin have met recently in Alaska. We are now in a period of very intensive diplomatic efforts. I really don’t think China can do a lot. If you asked me two years ago what I personally thought China could do, I might have said I want to see China play a more balanced role, increasing engagement with our European partners and also the Ukrainian side. But even if we did that, I don’t think China is a country that can really bring peace to Ukraine. China can be helpful in the peace process and in the reconstruction process, if invited, but I don’t think China is a key country to make peace [in Ukraine].
There are two direct parties involved – Russia and Ukraine – and there are at least two indirect partners – that’s the EU and the US. China is not playing that direct or indirect role, so I don’t think we can play a decisive role on that issue.
It’s still too early to know whether this round of diplomacy will lead to a meaningful deal, a truce or a peace agreement. We still need more time to wait for the outcome.
My hunch is we should not be too optimistic and should not draw a conclusion too soon. Ending a conflict like this is a very complicated process. Even if there will be a deal, I don’t know whether it will be an agreement or process that [only involves] Ukraine, Russia and the US or if it will be a more multilateral one. It could be a three-party thing that involves the US, Russia and Ukraine or a four-party thing including the EU. It could also be a more multilateral one. Unless it becomes a kind of multilateral process, I don’t think China can play a meaningful role. And also a more important role in post-conflict reconstruction.
But now, when it comes to ending the conflict, I think China is a second-tier player on that issue.
SCMP: China has in recent months sought to present itself as a reliable partner while Trump has made countries more cautious and wary with his actions including his tariffs. Given that Trump is also increasingly isolating the US from countries in Europe and others like India and Russia, how do you think the Chinese leadership is viewing all of these developments?
Da Wei: I don’t know how the Chinese leadership views this. But when I travel to the US and other countries outside China, many foreign observers always say that it looks like the US is withdrawing from multilateral institutions, so it seems that the US has left a vacuum for the whole world, so will China fill the vacuum? Will China play a bigger role? Or will the current Trump administration’s policy be an opportunity for China to play a bigger role on the international stage?
My answer is that I agree there is a vacuum that the Trump administration left to the world. But I don’t think China has a very strong appetite to fill that vacuum and also, I don’t think China has the capability to fill that vacuum. The US has been kind of a hegemon for decades, if not a century. I don’t think China is in that position. At the same time, I don’t think China is so eager to replace the US, to be the leading country in the world.
China is facing a lot of domestic challenges, no matter our economic development, economic situation and our technological innovation. China has a lot of challenges to deal with and filling that vacuum will not solve those challenges. China still wants to handle its own business better, to make its economy successful and to make its innovation successful. I think that’s the key for the Chinese government. I don’t think we have a very strong appetite to try to compete for leadership or hegemony by filling the vacuum that the US left.
So, in sum, I think the US is leaving global governance and other multilateral platforms. China may continue to do our own business. It may continue to try to contribute to the international system, but I don’t think there will be dramatic changes. So, there will be a gap in leadership and global governance. The US has left a vacuum for the world, but no country can and no country wants to fill that vacuum.
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Da Wei and Wang Jisi on US-China Relations
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