Pan Wei: The Pro-Trump Case for American Power and Populism
"In the US, the Democratic Party has closer ties to the military-industrial complex than the Republican Party, which tends to favour ending wars rather than initiating or escalating them."
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Pan Wei presents a strangely counterintuitive idea here: that, rather than a symptom of continuing social fractures, the second election of Donald Trump is evidence of strengthening cohesion between America’s elites and the masses. The common description of America fragile internally but strong externally is therefore too negative; America’s current external strength is still dependent, like that of all great powers, on its internal cohesion—which the recent election has strengthened.
Given what we know about Trump and American politics in recent years, this may at first sight seem a surprising claim. It helps to put this in the context of Pan’s intellectual background, which is deeply concerned with explaining social ferment and change. As a relatively conservative intellectual, the core of Pan’s thought is that a nation’s overall strength relies largely on the state’s ability to face social tensions and re-establish cohesion [内聚力] between the elites and the populace. Elite alienation from popular concerns, as the Soviet Union once experienced with its prioritisation of cutting-edge technology over popular wealth creation, constrains the power of a nation on the world stage. In the past, Pan has opposed the dominance of a single elite perspective on China’s “reform and opening up” process over and above popular interests, arguing that “the era of uncontested reform is over”.
Broadly, Pan sits at the left-end of a conservative spectrum that espouses the “China model” of eschewing democracy in favour of a consultative political model. By his understanding, social progress is caused by dialectical tensions between the political stances of the elites and the populace, which create “social protest movements” like the identity-based movements America has experienced in the past decade. While this is vital to progress, it inevitably causes instability and—fatally for a nation’s strength—undermines elite-popular cohesion. Rather than democratic competition, Pan’s proposed solution to this has been a “consultative rule of law regime”, a China-specific modernisation model capable of ensuring cohesion between the elites and the populace.
From this perspective, Trump’s victory has re-corrected excesses in elite social concerns, realigning elite and popular priorities and taking the heat out of identity-based social movements.
James Farquharson
Key Points
Domestic cohesion [内聚力] between elites and common people is a key determinant of a nation’s relative international power.
The recent division that the US has seen are signs of a “social revolution”—the process through which a society evolves—arising from dialectical tensions caused by a global economic shift from “manufacturing wealth” [制造财富] to “wealth creation” [创造财富].
Trump’s victory and the response to it is not a sign of division in the US; quite the reverse—it will lead to greater domestic cohesion by re-balancing elite and popular concerns.
China’s power in the next decades depends on whether its rulers can, like America’s, balance popular concerns with elite ideology, which would include limiting the scope of government and upholding market mechanisms.
It would be unwise for Beijing, as the Soviet Union once did, to prioritise elite concerns such as cutting-edge technology and the space race over popular concerns such as mass wealth creation.
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Trade flows are determined by relative international power. Countering China's manufacturing dominance does not require war—tariffs and non-tariff barriers may suffice.
As a secular power that uses a non-alphabetical writing system in a non-secular world that uses alphabetical systems, China lacks the cultural and religious interoperability to spread a vision of global civilisation, unlike the West.
Rather than narratives of the “East is rising while the West declines” or even a “bipolar world”, we are actually returning to a situation more akin to the post-Cold War “unipolar world” dominated by the US.
However, one upside is that this will reassure the US and help avert the “Thucydides Trap”.
Furthermore, a return to populism [平民主义] in the US, which is at root against international ideological interventions and in favour of market mechanisms (in spite of Trump’s pro-tariff stance, which is temporary), will give China more space to grow.
The Author
Name: Pān Wéi (潘维)
Year of birth: 1960 (age: 64)
Position: Chair Professor, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Macau
Previously (until 2023): Director, Centre for Chinese and Global Affairs, Peking University; Professor, School of International Studies, Peking University
Other: A conservative associated with the Chinese “New Left”
Research Focus: Comparative politics; social evolution; China’s foreign relations
Education: BA-MA Peking University (1978-1984); PhD University of California, Berkley (1996)
Experience abroad: United States
TRUMP’S “RESTORATION” AND THE INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURE
Pan Wei (潘维)
Published by Global China (海外看世界) on 13 November 2024
Translated by James Farquharson
(Illustration by OpenAI’s DALL·E 3)
Many thanks to Professor Pan Wei (潘维) and the editors of Global China (海外看世界) for reviewing today’s translation and allowing Sinification to share this article.
The term "international structure" [that I employ in my title] refers to relative military strength among “powerful nations”. The foundation of relative military strength is relative economic strength; otherwise, military power is difficult to sustain. Up to now, the most effective way to measure relative economic strength remains GDP per capita calculated at exchange rates, rather than at purchasing power parity. A “powerful nation” is defined by three factors: its relative landmass and population size, its GDP per capita calculated at exchange rates, and the cohesion between its elites and the general populace. There is significant tension among these three factors, which is why there are only a handful of powerful nations.
First, over the past thirty years, we have witnessed dramatic shifts in the international structure. One of the two “poles” [of the previous international structure], the Soviet Union, collapsed entirely, and its successor, Russia, has shown no signs of recovery over the past three decades. The United States, able to wage war at will [想打谁打谁], established a “unipolar world”. However, the US has faced at least two severe crises—the financial meltdown and the global pandemic—both of which revealed clear signs of decline. Meanwhile, China rose rapidly, only to fall into an undefinable period of long-term economic stagnation. Thus, the notion of "the East rises as the West declines" [东升西降] evolved into a “bipolar world” [两极世界], only to revert back to the “one superpower, multiple strong states” [一超多强] structure of thirty years ago.
Whither the next thirty years? The only certainty is uncertainty; the future international structure could develop in several possible directions. First, much depends on whom [out of China and the US] Russia aligns with and whether it can find a reliable path to revival. Second, it remains to be seen whether China's leadership can curb its elitism [精英主义], acknowledge the need for a “limited government” [有限政府] and carefully uphold market mechanisms, thereby restoring local dynamism and public confidence in the market. Third, the United States must decide whether it can preserve its long-term strength by restraining the impulse to expand its sphere of influence through military force. After all, Donald Trump’s term lasts only four years.
Second, changes in the international structure do not depend on one or two cutting-edge technologies, but rather on an overall rise in per capita income. We must not forget that while the Soviet Union once sent satellites into space, the red flag ultimately dropped to the ground [卫星上天,红旗落地]. National strength is not determined by a handful of advanced technologies but by the increase in per capita wealth across the entire population.
The United States recovered from the financial crisis in just three years, with GDP per capita rising from $50,000 to $60,000. Similarly, it took only three years to recover from the pandemic, with GDP per capita surpassing $70,000. [Note: US GDP per capita surpassed $80,000 in 2023] This extraordinary economic resilience demonstrates the US’s outstanding business and innovation environment.
Over a decade ago, Professor Wang Jisi argued that not only had the United States not declined, but the gap between it and other major powers was continuing to widen. It was merely China’s rapid rise that made the US appear to be in decline. But if China’s era of rapid ascent has come to an end, how should we now assess the international structure?
Third, traditional mainstream media have been abandoned by the American public. The US mainstream media, in combination with advanced polling methods, have actively participated in election campaigns, only to suffer three consecutive “Waterloos” in their election predictions, each one proving less reliable than the last. This highlights two key points: first, that the American elite have become severely disconnected from the general public; and second, that scholars and experts worldwide must seek alternative ways to understand American society.
Fourth, the overwhelming victory of “populism” [Note: 平民主义, rather than 民粹主义, a translation Pan rejects as too pejorative] is a sign of the restoration of unity between elites and the general public, rather than of greater social division. The opposite of populism is elitism [精英主义]. Those who have scorned populism or even slandered it as a form of mob-led “Nazism” have been proven wrong by Trump’s complete victory. Standing with the people requires respect of common sense and the upholding of market mechanisms by elites, which has ultimately led to Trump’s “restoration” [复辟].
Humanity is undergoing a profound transformation in modes of production—what we produce and how we produce it. Just as wealth once shifted from agriculture to manufacturing, we are now moving from manufacturing wealth to intangible wealth creation. During such a large-scale transformation, many traditional jobs disappear while many new ones emerge. Those who successfully adapt to new roles and earn high salaries will inevitably remain a minority, at least temporarily. This shift in production methods thus serves as a hotbed for “social revolution”. In an era of intangible goods production, the rise of “identity politics” [认同政治] —from racial and ethnic equality to gender equality and income equality—reflects social progress and an expansion of personal freedoms, rather than societal decay. However, every overcorrection leads to excess [“矫枉” 必然 “过正”], inevitably creating a divide between elites and the general public. While increasing tolerance for homosexuality in monotheistic societies is a sign of personal liberty and social progress, categorising official gender identities into dozens of categories is an example of going too far. Compared to a full-scale “social revolution”, a more measured approach—where social (protest) movements push forward but then take half a step back [进一步退半步] —ensures stability and progress.
Trump, compared to eight years ago, has become far more “centrist” [中性], and his overwhelming victory has been received by the American elite with complete acquiescence [输得心服口服]. How, then, could this be seen as evidence of a more divided America? Sixty years ago, legal racial segregation still prevailed in the United States. Since then, the country has seen a Black president elected, and today, Trump’s opponent, Kamala Harris, serves as the sitting vice president [Note: at the time of writing, in November 2024] embodying multiple identities—woman, Black, Latina, Indian, and second-generation immigrant. Clearly, American society has progressed steadily through social protest movements [社会 (抗议) 运动]. Those who confine themselves to an “informational cocoon” [信息茧房] may still believe that shoplifting is rampant across the US [Note: “零元购”, a conspiracy theory on the Chinese internet that hypes up US lawlessness and racial divides] or that Trump is “anti-immigration.” In reality, he supports immigration—he simply opposes illegal immigrants [Note: Pan may have underestimated the complexity of US immigration laws and practices here].
Fifth, international trade relations have never been a purely economic matter; they really belong to the realm of international political economy. The mainstream of the “popular ideology” movement [at its core] supports market mechanisms and limited government. Regarding the “anti-globalisation” trend in the international economy, this is a reaction to income inequality, but is temporary and will be offset by trade liberalisation within allied zones. A deeper reason for “anti-globalisation” lies in geopolitics, reflecting concerns over Chinese manufacturing dominance sweeping across the world. Britain once banned domestic opium consumption while using military force to compel China to import it. After China’s defeat [in the 19th Century Opium Wars], it was forced to legalise domestic opium cultivation as a “substitute” for opium imports. Today, however, the United States is pressuring China to ban the export of drug precursors to the US, and under intense pressure, China has complied. This is not about economics—it is about power politics and geopolitics.
Sixth, compared to elitists, proponents of popular ideology have a more “inward-looking” and “realist” view of international affairs. They are more inclined to carefully calculate the costs and benefits of power struggles and proxy wars. They show little interest in framing international conflicts in terms of “ideology” or “civilisational clashes”, and they are generally less inclined to provoke other countries through military action or brinkmanship. In the United States, the Democratic Party has closer ties to the military-industrial complex than the Republican Party, which tends to favour ending wars rather than initiating or escalating them. Trump’s victory speech lasted only three minutes, yet he mentioned Elon Musk 11 times. Musk is an outspoken opponent of bureaucracy and a strong advocate of market mechanisms—he is not a supporter of foreign wars, let alone conflict with China. It is highly probable that the Russia-Ukraine war will reach a ceasefire when Trump takes office. Although idealists believe that “human will triumphs over nature” [人定胜天], perceiving climate change as man-made and manageable through international cooperation, this is not a cause that particularly resonates in popular ideology.
Seventh, Trump’s enthusiasm for tariffs on international trade may reveal the true nature of US-China rivalry and offer a new perspective on stabilising the relationship. We mustn’t forget that restricting high-tech trade is nothing new—it has been common sense and practice in international politics throughout history. The specific technologies subject to restrictions are constantly evolving, but the goal remains the same: to maintain a lead in key areas for as long as possible. The US-China confrontation is [presented as] “structural” and intractable. However, the accurate interpretation of the Thucydides Trap is actually that war arises from Sparta’s fear of Athens’ rapid rise—in other words, from the US’s fear that China’s rapid ascent could threaten its global hegemony. This fear seems to make war or proxy wars inevitable. But what if the US became certain that China was no longer rising rapidly and lacked the capacity to challenge American dominance?
Hegemony is always upheld by “one hand wielding the sword and the other clutching a scripture” [一手持剑,一手持经]. China cannot establish military bases around the world or project force across the globe as the need arises. Nor does it offer a universal vision of the afterlife [关于来世的普世憧憬]. We remain the only nation in the world that does not use an alphabetic script and are too shaped by materialism to be able to offer a “scripture” to the world—be it the Bible, the Qur’an, the Communist Manifesto, or the ideals of “liberal democracy”.
Moreover, the entire world has observed China’s looming demographic decline. Last year, around 18 million children entered primary school in China [Note: the author later corrected this figure to 19 million], yet only about 9 million babies were born. This means that in six years, the number of new primary school students will have halved. In other words, within three generations, China’s population is projected to shrink to 700 million—which will be on par with the US by that time. For now, China’s comparative advantage lies in manufacturing. Made in China products dominate global exports, crushing the manufacturing industries of many other nations. But countering this advantage does not require war, let alone nuclear conflict—tariffs and non-tariff barriers may well be sufficient. Japan, during its three “lost decades”, gradually became a hegemon in the global car export market, yet this did not translate into becoming a global hegemonic power. The main historical arc of economic progress is in the transition from “manufacturing wealth” to “wealth creation”.
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