PKU Prof. Zhang Weiying on China‘s "Resentment Complex"

"Bad news for the West is always good news for China. Whatever the West supports, we oppose; and whatever the West opposes, we support."

As some of you enjoy a well-earned summer break, Sinification is taking this opportunity to revisit a selection of thought-provoking pieces and influential debates from recent years. — Thomas

The economist Zhang Weiying is best known for his long-standing advocacy of reduced government interference in free markets—running counter to the prevailing trend in China in favour of industrial policy. He has expressed his dismay at the way close government-business ties are now promoted as a form of indigenous practice, partially displacing the free market ideology increasingly regarded as an undesirable Western import from the 19th century. In his view, this shift away from Western-liberal market orthodoxy reflects a broader nativist turn rooted in what he calls a “resentment complex”, a mindset that first emerged when China was forced to adopt Western value systems and transform itself into a modern nation-state during its “century of humiliation” (百年国耻).

We shall cover Zhang’s economic views in greater depth in a forthcoming piece. In the meantime, the following article deals with the resentment complex he perceives in Chinese society today. According to his argument, national resentment arises from a tension between a sense of present-day inferiority and a belief in historical superiority, expressing itself in ethnic nationalism, hypersensitivity to perceived slights and a rejection of universal values.

Whether or not one agrees with Zhang’s diagnosis, it is difficult to deny that resentment remains a potent force in the PRC. Last month, a female student at Dalian Polytechnic University was given notice for expulsion after having been the victim of online sexual bragging by a Ukrainian e-sports competitor in December last year. In an official notice that named her publicly, the university claimed she had “damaged national dignity through improper relations with foreigners”. Though the decision drew strong criticism, the initial online reaction largely praised the move and condemned the student for “idolising foreigners” (崇洋媚外). As the university’s public issuing of the expulsion notice led to the incident resurfacing some six months after the event, some have suspected a publicity stunt aimed at appealing to patriotic sentiment—akin to certain Chinese CEOs declaring they will not hire graduates of foreign universities.

In the full article (excerpted here), Zhang compares contemporary China with historical examples from France, Germany, Russia and, of course, Japan where historical resentment was fuelled by a belief in ethnic or cultural exceptionalism. His critique of modern Chinese intellectuals—particularly their emphasis on unique national conditions over universalist principles—may strike a familiar chord with readers of Sinification.

— James Farquharson

Key Points

1. In China, a sense of inferiority first arose in the late 19^th century, driven by the pressing need to adopt Western institutions and values. This process clashed with the country’s deeply entrenched native traditions.

2. As the Chinese sense of modern nationhood developed, this feeling of inferiority gave rise to a resentment complex—a psychological response to the tension between perceived weakness and a strong sense of historical superiority.

3. One way to alleviate this inferiority was to align with nations that did not evoke the same feelings of inadequacy—such as the Soviet Union—helping explain why China “followed the Russian path” more readily.

4. Today, this resentment complex manifests itself primarily through a revivalist fixation on native traditions, which serve either to counter foreign influences or to reframe imported innovations as somehow indigenous.

5. The notion that Western technology can be adopted while preserving Chinese cultural essence [中体西用] remains prevalent, alongside a conviction that ancient Chinese principles of governance are superior to Western ones.

6. As such, universalist ideologies are rejected in favour of emphasising China’s uniqueness. This precludes meaningful comparison with other nations and serves to deflect any form of criticism.

7. Capitalism, democracy and liberalism are all viewed with suspicion and largely rejected, as embracing them would be seen as compromising Chinese dignity; only a market economy with “Chinese characteristics” is deemed acceptable.

8. National identity in China is not grounded in shared civic values but rather in a closed, ethnically defined framework, which poses significant political challenges concerning China’s non-Han populations.

9. Domestically, state interests and power consistently take precedence over individual rights; in international affairs, national interests invariably override moral values.

10. As the West is deemed untrustworthy, self-reliance is elevated as a strategic imperative. Everything possessed or produced by the West must be replicated, while conspiracy theories about Western “cunning” find widespread acceptance within China.

The Scholar

Name: Zhang Weiying (张维迎)
Born: October 1959 (age: 65)
Position: Boya Distinguished Professor of Economics, National School of Development (NSD), Peking University
Formerly (notable roles): Research fellow, Economic System Reform Institute, a think tank under the former State Commission for Restructuring the Economic System (1984-1990), now dissolved and subsumed under the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC); Dean, Guanghua School of Management, Peking University (2006-2010); Assistant President, Peking University (2002-2013)
Research focus: Macroeconomics; Economic Reform
Education: BA-MA Northwest University in Xi’an (1979-84); MA-PhD University of Oxford (1990-94)
Experience Abroad (visiting scholar): University of Tokyo (1997); Australian National University (1998); Seoul National University (1998)

THE “RESENTMENT COMPLEX” OF LATE-DEVELOPING NATIONS [EXCERPT]
Zhang Weiying (张维迎)
Published by Gelonghui on 6 August 2018
Translated and put together by James Farquharson
(Illustration by OpenAI’s DALL·E 3)

N.B. The following excerpt has been selected for relevance from the full article, which places the idea of “resentment” in a broader world-historical context.

1. How Present Inequality Fuels Resentment

Resentment, simply put, is an emotional blend of admiration, envy and hatred. In Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, the American historian Liah Greenfeld tells us that the term “resentment” [Note: “ressentiment”, in the original] was coined [as a philosophical term] by Nietzsche and later defined and developed by the German philosopher Max Scheler. It refers to a psychological state resulting from repressed and unextinguishable envy and hostility—what Scheler termed “existential envy”. Greenfeld points out that during modern nation-state formation, less developed countries have inevitably sought to learn from and imitate more advanced ones. Throughout the course of imitation, the imitated must be superior to the imitator—even in the eyes of the imitator, for otherwise there would be no need to imitate. Furthermore, the very act of mutual contact often serves to highlight the inferiority of the imitator. The usual response, therefore, is resentment.

Specifically, two social conditions are necessary for resentment to arise. The first condition is that the imitators believe they are fundamentally comparable to those whom they imitate. In theory, they are equal and thus [their positions] could be interchanged—implying the possibility of catching up. The second condition is that the imitators perceive an existing inequality between themselves and the imitated. Regardless of the temperament or psychological disposition of individuals [within the collective], the presence of these two conditions generates a collective tendency towards resentment.

Greenfeld further notes that resentment produces a creative impulse to resist foreign values. Ultimately, it may result in a “re-evaluation of [one’s] values”—that is, a shift in value standards. Values once held as supreme are denigrated and replaced by notions that are trivial [无足轻重的], external [外在的] or even ones that would have carried negative connotations under the original value system.

Out of a sense of pride, a society with a rich historical and cultural heritage cannot open its door to all [来者不拒] foreign value systems and accept them wholesale [全盘照收]. Resentment often leads to the deliberate selection and cultivation of elements within native traditions that oppose foreign values. In order to restore psychological equilibrium, these elements may be used to counter foreign values or repackaged to appear as longstanding local equivalents of foreign ideas. Resentment breeds xenophobia and pride borne of national exceptionalism, fuelling the emotional foundation of nascent nationalism.

2. The Emergence of Resentment in the Chinese Nation-State

Ethnic identity has long existed throughout human history, but the “nation-state” is an entirely new concept. For most of history, the state was the private property of the ruler, and people typically identified with the monarchy or religion, rather than with a nation-state. In medieval Europe, it was not uncommon for a king to rule two or more kingdoms simultaneously, much as one might today serve as the chairman of several companies at once.

According to Greenfeld's research, England was perhaps the first modern nation-state in human history, having taken shape by the early 17th century. Its core principles were citizenship, liberty and popular sovereignty. This concept of the nation was later inherited by the United States, which emerged between the late 18th and mid-19th century. Compared to England, other countries such as France, Russia and Germany developed their national identities much later: France in the 18th century, Russia in the latter half of the 18th century, and Germany from the late 18th century to the early 19th century. In contrast to the civic nationalism of Britain and the United States, the nationalism of Russia and Germany may be described as ethnic nationalism, with France occupying an intermediate position.

During the formation of modern nation-states, the leading groups were the social, political and cultural elites (in England, France and Russia the key groups were the aristocracy, while in Germany it was the middle-class intelligentsia). The ideas of these elites became the genetic foundation of the broader national identity.

Although Chinese civilisation has a history spanning thousands of years, the formation of Chinese national consciousness is a relatively modern phenomenon. It could be said that it was the “sturdy ships and powerful cannons” [坚船利炮] of the Western powers that catalysed the birth of China’s national identity and led to the emergence of “China” as a nation-state in the minds of the Chinese people. Prior to the 20th century, the objects of loyalty for the Chinese people were the various emperors and courts that successively ruled over the land and its people, not the sovereign nation-state. The change of dynasties and the division or unification of territories were seen as matters for the rulers, with no direct relevance to the ordinary populace—much like how changes in leadership or mergers in modern corporations have little bearing on the everyday worker.

For an ordinary person, regardless of whoever sat on the imperial throne, they would be their subject. Whether the emperor was Han, Khitan, Jurchen, Mongol or Manchu made no difference to them. As such, they could not have possessed a clear concept of being “Chinese” [as we understand it today].

With the arrival of the West, particularly after [our] defeat in the Opium Wars, Chinese national consciousness began to awaken. The focus of allegiance gradually shifted from the court and emperor to the nation and state (although this shift was never fully realised). In the formation of Chinese nation-state consciousness, the dominant forces were the political and intellectual elites of China during the second half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. These elites awakened a sense of national crisis among the Chinese people and shaped their national identity. However, just as the aristocratic elites of France and Russia and the intellectual elites of Germany once held a sense of resentment towards the West [Note: Zhang is referring to England, which in another section of the article he describes as the source of imitation for emergent nation-states in mainland Europe], China's political and intellectual elites also harboured a deep-seated resentment complex towards the West from the outset.

3. Choosing to Follow Russia over “the West”

For the people of a nation like China—with thousands of years of civilisation behind it and a self-perception as the centre of the world—it was natural to feel resentment upon suddenly discovering a foreign civilisation more advanced than their own. The feelings of China's elites towards the West were a blend of admiration, envy and hatred. On one hand, they introduced Western values such as republicanism, democracy, liberty, individual rights, reason and science into China. On the other, they filtered these Western values through traditional Chinese political and cultural beliefs, absorbing or rejecting them selectively. National pride and a resentment complex caused most of them to resist Western values instinctively, making wholesale acceptance impossible. Wherever possible, they sought alternatives from China’s own cultural resources or from other countries that were not [perceived as] superior to their own [不优于自己的国家].

Chinese resentment towards Russia was largely due to territorial issues, but there was less resentment based on differences in stages of development. This may be one of the reasons why China eventually chose to “follow the Russian path” [走俄国人的路]. Of course, this Russian path also appeared more suited to China’s national conditions [国情]: Russia itself was underdeveloped and was following a unique route [to modernisation]. If this path could lead to rapid prosperity and strength, it promised to wash away the shame of national humiliation and restore national glory. As a result, following the Russian path promised substantial benefits while causing less harm to Chinese national pride.

3. Modern Chinese Manifestations of Resentment

The formation of national consciousness was crucial for China's modernisation, as it provided the Chinese people with a concrete goal towards which to strive. However, the resentment complex embedded in the formation of China's national identity has also led to a series of consequences, including:

First, the concept of ethnicity in Chinese nationalism still prevails over civic identity. We are “Chinese” because we are all “descendants of the Yan and Yellow Emperors” [炎黄子孙] sharing a common ancestry, rather than because we are citizens with equal rights within a sovereign state. This ethnicity-based concept of nationality presents challenges in contemporary governance, as not all Chinese people are descendants of the Yan and Yellow Emperors. Furthermore, this national idea makes it difficult for China to attract foreign immigrants. A foreigner, regardless of how many years they live or work in China, will never be recognised as Chinese.

Second, sovereignty takes precedence over human rights [主权大于人权], and might prevails over rights [权力优先于权利]. Chinese nationalism, shaped by the historical processes of “self-strengthening” [图强] and “national salvation” [救亡], is inevitably directed by state efficacy and collectivism. It emphasises the supremacy of the state and the collective, and under the guise of the national and collective interest can justify any violation of individual rights. To this day, ideas such as “there can be no families without the nation” [有国才有家] and “when the main river has water, the tributaries will be full” [大河有水小河满] remain prevalent, even though these notions are fundamentally illogical. Furthermore, the state is equated with the government, and the government with its officials. Thus, the power of officials always takes precedence over individual rights, making the rule of law difficult to establish.

Third, exceptionalism is emphasised while universalism is denied. Exceptionalism serves as a [psychological] antidote to the resentment complex: it denies the very possibility of comparison [with other countries] and with it distinctions of superiority and inferiority [否定了优劣之分], thereby protecting one's self-esteem. As a result, nations harbouring a resentment complex tend to adopt an exceptionalist stance, and China is no exception. Exceptionalism also provides justification for rejecting universal values with a sense of moral certainty [理直气壮], enabling behaviours that diverge from international norms.

Fourth, technology is imitated, but the imitation of institutions is rejected. Shortly after the Opium Wars, the Chinese began to acknowledge their technological backwardness and the need to learn from the West, leading to the Self-Strengthening Movement. Yet the idea of “Chinese Learning as Substance, Western Learning for Application” [Note: 中学为体，西学为用, first proposed by the Qing dynasty scholar Feng Guifen in 1861] remains the guiding principle in China's reform [efforts] to this day [至今仍然是中国变革的主导思想]. As long as the “substance” [体] is our own, there is no need to feel inferior—just as scientists do not feel inferior to engineers. Therefore, we are always seeking values within traditional [Chinese] culture that can counter [those of] the West, believing that Western ideas on governance are in no way superior to the governing principles established by our ancestors [我们老祖宗] long ago.

Fifth, [we are] against capitalism, democracy and freedom [反资本主义，反民主和自由], which Chinese people tend to equate with the Western world. To acknowledge [their value] would be to admit the overall superiority of the West, which would strip the Chinese of their dignity. Therefore, China cannot embrace capitalism—let alone democracy and freedom, which [are often dismissed as intangible ideals that] cannot be eaten as sustenance [不能当饭吃]. Unlike the Germans, who had the Jewish community against whom they could harbour resentment, the Chinese have tended [historically] to direct their resentment towards those engaged in commerce and the making of money. And even when China requires a market economy, it must be a socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics—fundamentally distinct from [Western] capitalism.

Sixth, [we are to be] self-reliant [自力更生], never depending on others [万事不求人]. China must establish an independent and comprehensive industrial system: whatever the West possesses, we must also possess. We need to be self-sufficient in food, and all essential goods upon which the nation’s economy and people’s livelihood [国计民生] depend must be produced domestically. The Western world cannot be trusted; its desire to see us fall remains ever-present [亡我之心不死], always ready to choke us the moment an opportunity arises. The “ZTE incident” stands as proof of this [Note: referring to the shock caused by the trade embargo placed on the Chinese tech company ZTE in 2018 by the first Trump administration for its violation of American sanctions on trade with Iran and North Korea; ZTE was allowed to pay a fine to continue trading with US companies].

Seventh, “conspiracy theories” have a vast market in our country, with China always being [seen as] the victim of Western machinations. China fell behind not because we have lacked intelligence, but because the West is too cunning. It is not that our [political] system and culture are inferior, but rather that Westerners are constantly scheming to prevent us from developing. [Consequently,] if foreigners are helping China, they must have ulterior motives.

Eighth, one can only praise [China], and never criticise [it]. Chinese people are particularly sensitive to criticism [about their country]—not only from among themselves, but even more so from foreigners. Chinese people cannot criticise [China] because “a son does not fault his mother for her ugliness, nor a dog its household for being poor” [儿不嫌母丑、狗不嫌家贫]. Criticising one's own country is considered “unpatriotic” and as tarnishing one’s own image [就是抹黑自己]. Foreigners, [meanwhile,] are not permitted to criticise [China] because such remarks are perceived as damaging to our self-esteem. Foreigners who criticise China have to be “anti-China forces” [反华势力], while those who offer praise must be friendly figures. Little do they know, it is often the flatterers who have ulterior motives [别有用心].

Ninth, in international relations, we only discuss interests and ignore values [只讲利害不讲是非]. Sometimes even interests are set aside in favour of simple likes and dislikes [好恶]. Bad news for the West is always good news for China. Whatever the West supports, we oppose; and whatever the West opposes, we support. If a Western country clashes with a non-Western country, most Chinese people hope that the former loses and the latter wins—not because we like the latter, but because we hate the former. For instance, after the 9/11 attacks, some Chinese people applauded; during the Iraq war, many Chinese cheered for Saddam. Of course, if the US were to clash with Japan, we would side with the US simply because we resent the Japanese more than we do the Americans.

Tenth, we “become arrogant before we’ve made it” [未富先骄] and lose all measure as soon as we are slightly strong [稍强即狂]. Our resentment complex leaves Chinese people with an irrepressible yearning to rise above others as soon as they have the opportunity. As such, their sense of inferiority easily shifts to arrogance. The moment our country has become the slightest bit stronger, we start to exhibit a nouveau riche attitude [暴发户心态], no longer self-effacing but rather swaggering all over the place. To “hide our strength and bide our time” [韬光养晦]—how difficult that is in practice!

5. The “China Model” and the Century of Humiliation

Nearly 180 years have passed since the [First] Opium War. After forty years of reform and opening-up, China has not only achieved great success in economic development, but has also significantly improved its international standing. Yet, our resentment complex towards the West seems undiminished—and appears even more pronounced among overseas Chinese. In recent years, phrases such as “the China model” and “the four great new inventions” [四大新发明] have generated a tremendous clamour [甚嚣尘上], which can only be understood as a manifestation of this complex [Note: though none were actually invented in China, the idea of “the four great new inventions”(the originals were papermaking, printing, gunpowder and the compass) refers to high-speed rail, mobile payment, e-commerce and bike sharing; they became political currency after being chosen in a poll of students from 20 “Belt and Road” countries studying in Beijing as the four things they would most like to bring to their own countries]. If the “China model” can be spread across the globe, then China not only will be able to reclaim its long-lost position of superiority, but also erase the unbearable memory of its century of humiliation [不堪回首的百年耻辱]. How gratifying that would be!

The degree of resentment is inversely proportional to a nation's level of development and the maturity of its people. The day that the Chinese people's resentment complex fades from view may well mark the moment of China's true rise [中国的真正崛起之时]!

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