Prof. Wang Jisi on Trump and US Foreign Policy (Part 1)

"When it comes to international affairs, I have so far seen no evidence that Trump is following any kind of plan, or indeed that he actually has one."

Professor Wang Jisi (王缉思) is one of China’s most respected international relations scholars, whose views have shaped a long line of Chinese scholars, diplomats and policymakers. After spending a decade working in the countryside as a sent-down youth during and just after the Cultural Revolution, Wang went on to build a distinguished academic career spanning more than four decades—marked by his moderate, internationalist and liberal-leaning outlook. Now 76, he continues to serve as an important bridge between China and the United States, advocating tirelessly for dialogue, trust-building and cooperation.

He and the editorial team at the Contemporary American Review (当代美国评论) have kindly allowed this newsletter to share extensive excerpts from his latest interview, published last month. Perhaps its most striking feature is Wang’s deep dismay over the state of American society and politics. Unlike some of his more hawkish peers, whose tone often veers towards schadenfreude and nationalistic hubris, Wang expresses more alarm than triumphalism. He appears to view the return of Trump and his MAGA movement less as a source of opportunity for China, than as a growing danger to the increasingly fragile US–China relationship. As he puts it, “Trump's goal of ‘making America great again’ is fundamentally at odds with our aspiration for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”

Key Points

1. American society is becoming less safe, less ethically minded and more hostile to outsiders.

2. Trump’s foreign policy has been marked by chaos and improvisation. China should pay less attention to what he says and more to what he does.

   • Wang: “Once American hegemony has cast aside moral taboos and broken through domestic constraints, its government may well take actions previously deemed unimaginable.”

3. Trump alone cannot end the Russia–Ukraine conflict, as US policy is shaped by broader political forces and European allies are unlikely to simply follow his lead.

4. Similarly, tensions between the US and Russia are too entrenched for bilateral relations to be repaired merely because Trump wants them to.

5. Trump’s return may strain America’s international relations, but the West will not fracture, and the US alliance system in East Asia remains strong.

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6. US soft power is in long-term decline, driven by democratic dysfunction at home, unpopular policies abroad and Washington’s growing disregard for international law.

7. Still, the emergence of a global "anti-US alliance" is unlikely, and “contrary political systems” have yet to prove more attractive.

8. Despite its waning soft power, America’s hard power continues to grow.

9. The US and China are pulling further ahead as the world’s two uncontested superpowers. America’s long-term growth potential matches China’s, and the balance of power between them has yet to be fundamentally altered.

10. Russia, by contrast, faces increasingly constrained economic prospects and diminishing overall strength.

The Scholar

Name: Wang Jisi (王缉思)
Date of birth: Nov. 1948 (age: 76)
Position: Boya Chair Professor Emeritus, School of International Studies, Peking University
Formerly: Founding President (2013-2022), Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Peking University; Dean (2005-2013), School of International Studies, Peking University; Director (2001-2009), Institute of International Strategic Studies, Central Party School; Director (1993-2005), Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)
Other: Member of the Foreign Policy Advisory Committee of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008-2016)
Research focus: US foreign policy; US-China relations; Security in East Asia
Education: BA-MA Peking University (1978-1983); Worked as a sent-down youth in Inner Mongolia and Henan during the Cultural Revolution (1968–1976), before returning to Beijing to resume his studies in 1978.
Experience abroad: University of Oxford (1982-83); UC Berkeley (1984-85); University of Michigan (1990-91); Claremont McKenna College (2001) etc.

PROSPECTS FOR U.S. DOMESTIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN TRUMP’S SECOND TERM — AN INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSOR WANG JISI (EXCERPTS)
Wang Jisi (王缉思)
Published in Contemporary American Review, Vol. 9, No. 1, on 15.03.2025
Translated by Paddy Stephens
(Illustration by OpenAI’s DALL·E 3)

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N.B. The following excerpts have been selected for conciseness. Readers are encouraged to read the original article in full.

1. American Society’s Deepening Afflictions

Among the most striking changes I have observed in American society in recent years are worsening inflation, increases in crimes such as theft and robbery, and a general decline in the standards of ethical behaviour [社会道德水平].

Another notable change I have perceived is the rise in anti-foreign sentiment among Americans, although it has not reached the level of xenophobia directed at people of a specific race or country.

If Sino-American relations continue to deteriorate — and the US makes even more accusations against China of hacking, political infiltration, espionage and the like — negative perceptions of China and Chinese people within American society will further intensify. This will impact on the working and living conditions of people of Chinese descent [华人] and [increase] the willingness of those Chinese citizens studying or working in America to return to China.

2. Trump’s Foreign Policy Approach

When it comes to international affairs, I have so far seen no evidence that Trump is following any kind of plan, or indeed that he actually has one. Of his recent foreign policy statements and territorial claims, some are just bluster intended to conceal his true objectives, while others reflect his genuine views.

We should pay less attention to what he says and more to what he does. Trump approaches diplomacy like a real estate deal, where the seller starts the negotiation by demanding an unrealistically high price, and the buyer negotiates it down. He has opened negotiations by threatening to annex Canada or Greenland, or to reclaim the Panama Canal, and then negotiates from that position. This strategy comes at minimal material cost and tends to garner domestic support.

As for damaging the United States’ international reputation and soft power, these are not matters that concern him.

The dizzying changes in Trump’s foreign policy since he took office reflect a lack of international perspective and diplomatic experience. His strategic direction is chaotic and incoherent, lacking long-term planning or systematic policy thinking, and is often reactive and improvised in response to immediate developments.

3. Ukraine, Russia and the Limits of US Influence

I would avoid describing [the Russia–Ukraine Conflict] as a “proxy war”, because Russia is directly engaged in the fighting, and it is rather far-fetched to characterise Ukraine as a US or European proxy.

Whether and how the United States can end the Russia–Ukraine conflict quickly does not depend solely on Trump’s personal views; it also hinges on the positions of the American political elite, public opinion, and the reactions of key European countries.

Over the past three years, the United States has provided Ukraine with consistent diplomatic support and military aid. Trump will not be able to do a complete U-turn on this policy, nor will he be able to persuade EU countries to stand idly by in the conflict.

The tensions between the United States and Russia today — which date back to the US-Soviet rivalry of the Cold War — are longstanding and deep-rooted. They cannot be resolved simply by a deal between Trump and Putin.

Going forward, Ukraine’s hopes of reclaiming its lost territory will become even more faint. Russia’s strength [力量] will be severely depleted and, in the long term, its economy will struggle. There is some hope for a temporary ceasefire between the two sides, but a lasting and comprehensive solution is nowhere in sight.

4. Strains and Resilience in the US Alliance Network

Compared to the Biden administration, the US and Europe will probably become more divided [面临更多分歧] during Trump’s second term, particularly on issues such as international trade, defence spending and climate change.

At the same time, European countries have differing attitudes towards the United States. Although the Trump administration is indeed attempting to divide Europe, this does not mean that the Western world will completely fragment [走向四分五裂].

Despite subtle changes in the domestic politics of Japan and South Korea, the United States' alliance system in East Asia remains solid. Meanwhile, India’s foreign policy is becoming increasingly independent. Striving to avoid making enemies as far as possible, it is unwilling to "take sides" between China and the United States.

5. Prospects for American Soft and Hard Power

In recent years, America’s soft power has been steadily declining—a trend likely to persist over the long term. That soft power rests chiefly on two pillars: first, the appeal of its political system, values and way of life; and second, its global reputation and influence.

Domestically, America’s democratic politics has encountered serious problems, and few countries today view the US political system as a model to emulate. However, this does not mean that contrary political systems are becoming more attractive.

America’s handling of the Middle East conflict, marked by an overly pro-Israel bias, has been widely unpopular. More recently, Trump’s threat to “occupy Gaza” has caused huge public outcry.

With the Trump administration’s withdrawal from international organisations such as the WHO and Paris Agreement — and as Trump himself disregards international law and the principle of sovereignty by making territorial claims over Canada, the Panama Cana and Greenland — American soft power will clearly be undermined.

However, although the United States under Trump has taken the lead in undermining existing international rules and order, it has not prompted a unified response from the international community. Other countries are acting individually, and there is no realistic prospect of forming an "anti-American alliance".

Once American hegemony has cast aside moral taboos and broken through domestic constraints, its government may well take actions previously deemed unimaginable.

In my 2003 article The Logic of US Hegemony, I quoted the [1968] critique made by American historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. of American society’s tendency to glorify violence. Schlesinger even described the American people as “the most frightening people on this planet” because the country’s domestic and international abuses had failed to awaken the conscience of its leaders.

The America I know is a country whose conventional conduct abroad has been far from benevolent. Although American elites are at times capable of profound self-criticism, in matters of foreign relations, they tend to be extremely united, nationalistic and domineering [霸道].

The US under Trump seems more intent on making other countries fear American hard power rather than respect its soft power.

Although America’s soft power is declining, its hard power continues to grow. The country’s total economic output, economic quality as well as scientific and technological development remain far ahead of Europe, Japan, Canada, Australia and other Western countries and regions.

Although the Western world’s overall share of the global economy has declined markedly over the past two decades, the United States’ share has remained relatively steady at around 25%. This indicates that America’s economic weight within the West is still increasing.

It is only when compared with China that America’s hard power appears to be in relative decline. Both the US and China are becoming more powerful compared with other major powers. India would be one exception, but it is unlikely to match either China or the US in the short term.

However, we now need to reassess the strength of China and the United States comprehensively. These are the world’s two largest economies, and the ratio between their GDPs continues to fluctuate within a certain range.

When analysing sector by sector and comparing the technological capabilities of China and the US in areas such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence and robotics, a complex and uneven picture emerges that demands detailed research and analysis.

In my view, China and the United States are the two most powerful countries in the world, but the balance of power between them has not yet undergone a radical shift [尚未发生颠覆性变化]. There are no clear signs that the US has less long-term potential for growth [发展后劲] than China. The impact of Trump’s reforms during his second term on America’s overall strength remains to be seen.

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