Taiwan: Wei Leijie’s Case for a "Once-in-a-Century" Deal with Trump
"It is better to endure the inevitable short-term pain of reunification than to subject national rejuvenation to the endless torment of delay and the uncertainty of an indefinite future."
Wei Leijie (魏磊杰) is not a name Sinification’s readers will recognise from the usual bench of PRC “Taiwan hands”. A professor of law at Xiamen University—better known for his work on the politics and sociology of law, comparative legal culture and the rule of law under CCP leadership—Wei has published little on cross‑Strait relations. Yet his institutional affiliation matters. Xiamen University houses one of the mainland’s flagship Taiwan‑focused research ecosystems, and China’s debate on cross-Strait dynamics has been drifting steadily towards legal and normative engineering: further cracking down on “Taiwan independence” advocates, expanding “administrative enforcement” through grey-zone tactics or sketching pathways for post‑reunification governance. In that context, it is perhaps unsurprising that a law scholar steps into a field traditionally dominated by political scientists and international relations specialists.
Wei’s essay picks up and develops some of the major threads running through Sinification’s 2025 coverage of cross-Strait relations. Earlier this year, CASS’s Zhang Hua (张华) assessed what a second Trump presidency means for Taiwan; SIIS’s Yan Anlin (严安林) defended strategic patience, while still calling “peaceful reunification” plausible within five to ten years; CCG’s Gao Zhikai (高志凯) outlined a hardline progression from grey-zone pressure to effective control, including the prospect of a “coup from within” orchestrated by pro-Beijing forces inside Taiwan; and finally UIR’s Zhong Houtao (钟厚涛) advocated exploiting crises and advancing a discourse‑warfare strategy built around 破–立–转 (“expose, establish, transform”).
Wei expands on, and occasionally radicalises, elements of all four. Like the vast majority of his peers, he adheres to the politically correct position that peaceful reunification is both the most desirable and the most likely outcome; like Gao and Zhong, he calls for a hard-edged approach centred on intensifying deterrence, coercion and territorial encroachment. Where he diverges perhaps most sharply is in his reading of Washington: unlike Zhang, Wei casts Trump 2.0 as a genuine “once‑in‑a‑century opportunity” to strike a grand bargain over Taiwan—an assessment predicated on the somewhat fragile assumption that Trump possesses, and will continue to wield, sufficient institutional authority to deliver such a deal—should he choose to pursue one—either now or after next year’s uncertain midterm elections.
Key Points
Cross Strait relations hinge on overlapping “triangular” domestic politics in Washington, Taipei and Beijing, plus the external US-Taiwan-China “tripartite” dynamic, with the overall US-China relationship still decisive for Taiwan’s fate.
Lai Ching-te and Trump’s presidencies have reset the cross-Strait political equation: Taiwan’s pro-independence trajectory is becoming increasingly entrenched, yet Trump’s return revives the prospect of an epoch-defining grand bargain with Beijing.
With Taiwanese identity continuing to strengthen, the illusion of maintaining a sustainable cross-Strait "status quo" has faded, leaving peaceful reunification or conflict as the only realistic trajectories.
Sequencing “national rejuvenation” before “reunification” is not viable; continued delay worsens Taiwanese separatism, thus Beijing should accept short-term pain to avert perpetual strategic limbo.
Trump’s profit-centric worldview, coupled with unified Republican control over Congress, gives Beijing a “once-in-a-century” opening to negotiate, while US willingness to fight an expensive Taiwan war continues to ebb.
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Three openings underpin that opportunity: Trump prizes deals over ideology; increased presidential authority overshadows resistance from Congress and leading China hawks; and a shifting Indo-Pacific balance of power spurs “Taiwan abandonment” debates in Washington.
Beijing should adopt a “hitting-a-cow-across-the-mountain” strategy: continuing to use low-intensity, low-cost isolation of Taipei to pressure Washington into taking the lead in restarting cross-Strait talks.
Beijing should expand the “Kinmen Model” to assert effective control over Taiwan’s surrounding waters and airspace, gradually advancing “administrative reunification” while building the capacity to impose a full blockade without triggering direct military conflict.
Globally, China should exploit geopolitical realignments and waning US influence to embed explicit One-China clauses and omit “peaceful” language from international agreements, ensuring that the option of reunification by force enjoys broader diplomatic cover.
Beijing should replace the 2005 Anti Secession Law with a comprehensive “National Reunification Law”—permitting post-reunification political realignments, clarifying the rights of Taiwanese citizens and codifying harsher penalties for anti-PRC activities to maximise deterrence.
The Author
Name: Wei Leijie (魏磊杰)
Year of birth: 1981 (age: 43/44)
Position: Professor, School of Law, Xiamen University
Research focus: Politics and sociology of law; comparative law; civil law; legal theory
Education: LLB-LLM Henan University (1999-2006); PhD in Law Shanghai Jiaotong University (2011)
Experience abroad (visiting scholar): National Chengchi University in Taiwan (2008, 2017); Tilburg University in the Netherlands (2009-2010); Ghent University in Belgium (2015-2016)
LOW PROBABILITY THAT THE TAIWAN ISSUE WILL CONTINUE TO BE DRAGGED OUT
Wei Leijie (魏磊杰)
Published by China Review News Agency (中国评论新闻网) on 22 June 2025
This post was put together by Ailsa Brown
(Illustration by OpenAI’s DALL·E 3)
N.B The following is a condensed overview of Wei Leijie’s article. Readers are encouraged to refer to the original article for the full text.
1. “Triangular” and “Tripartite” Dynamics
An assessment of cross-Strait relations must be grounded in an understanding of the “triangular” (三角) and “tripartite” (三边) dynamics.
The “triangular” dynamic refers to domestic politics in the US, mainland China and the so-called “domestic politics” of Taiwan.
The “tripartite” dynamic refers to US-China relations, US-Taiwan relations and cross-Strait relations.
Domestic political dynamics often shape and drive foreign policy, a principle that remains highly relevant to understanding developments surrounding Taiwan.
The key to resolving the issue over Taiwan continues to lie in the US-China relationship.
2. Developments in Domestic Politics
Since 2024, there have been two major changes in the realm of domestic politics.
First, in Taiwan, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), led by Lai Ching-te, secured the presidency for a third consecutive term.
Second, in the US, Trump has been re-elected.
If the trend towards pro-independence in Taiwan is not curbed, the movement will become increasingly entrenched, and Taiwan and the Mainland will continue to drift further apart.
However, as a result of Trump’s re-election, a deal with mainland China on the status of Taiwan —possibly through the publication of a fourth Joint Communiqué—can no longer be ruled out. [Note: The “Three Communiqués” are key official statements issued by the United States and the People’s Republic of China in 1972, 1979 and 1982 which established diplomatic relations between the two countries and outlined their respective positions on Taiwan.]
Together, these developments will have a substantial impact on the future of the Taiwan Strait issue. A reassessment of the issue is thus necessary.
3. Three Potential Trajectories
The notion of “maintaining the new status quo” (新现状维持论) has gained broad support across the West and in Taiwan. However, this is unsustainable.
This is primarily because Taiwanese society is advancing steadily towards “independence”.
Wei: “After years of separatist indoctrination and media manipulation within Taiwan, ‘Taiwan independence’ has already taken root in the subconscious of the public.”
As a result, it is no longer possible to expect “internal forces within Taiwan”(台湾岛内势力) to choose reunification voluntarily.
There are now three potential trajectories for cross-Strait relations:
Peace (i.e. peaceful reunification) (和)
War (战)
Prolonged stalemate (拖)
Of these, peaceful reunification is the most likely outcome, war the second most probable and continued deadlock the least likely.
4. The Link Between “Rejuvenation” and “Reunification”
One line of thought argues that China should maintain strategic patience, focus on addressing domestic problems and avoid confronting the US over Taiwan prematurely.
According to this view, if the timing on cross-Strait reunification is misjudged, it could derail the broader objective of National Rejuvenation (中华民族的复兴大业).
Once national rejuvenation is achieved, this camp argues, the Taiwan issue will resolve itself naturally—like fruit that ripens and falls of its own accord (瓜熟蒂落，水到渠成).
However, due to the “vicious cycle of self-reinforcement” currently taking place within Taiwan—where pro-independence sentiment shapes electoral politics, leading to repeated victories for the DPP, which in turn deepens public resistance to reunification—it is increasingly difficult to believe that the situation can continue to be postponed indefinitely (继续“拖”下去).
As a result, it is not possible to wait passively for reunification to occur naturally.
A reassessment of the sequencing between “rejuvenation” and “reunification” is thus necessary.
Wei: “It is better to endure the inevitable short-term pain of reunification [through peaceful of forceful means] than to subject national rejuvenation to the endless torment of delay and the uncertainty of an indefinite future.”
5. Trump is an Opportunity
A deadlock vis-à-vis Taiwan currently exists: war would now be an unbearable burden for all three parties involved in this issue, yet negotiation appears politically unfeasible.
Wei: “The Taiwan issue is currently the only flashpoint that could trigger a direct military conflict between China and the US.”
However, as Taiwan is not among Trump’s top priorities, the likelihood of a cross-Strait military clash may be decreasing.
Trump’s re-election has created an opportunity to break the cross-Strait political deadlock, as a negotiated resolution of the Taiwan issue between China and the US is now more feasible.
Trump’s return to office has created space for negotiations. As Taiwan’s former Secretary-General of the National Security Council, Su Chi, has stated: the probability of US-China talks on the Taiwan issue is now 30-40%, up from 10% under Biden.
Wei: “For mainland China, this is a once-in-a-century opportunity [百年一见的大机遇]. Trump represents a chance—one that must be seized.”
Wei: “For mainland China, which is more worth its while: ‘buying Taiwan’ or ‘taking up arms for it’ [“买台湾”与“打台湾”哪个更为合算]? The answer is clearly the former."
The mainland must calculate its moves carefully. It cannot act rashly, but neither can it afford to stall.
There are three key reasons why Trump presents a strategic opening for US-China negotiations on Taiwan, and three strategic dimensions through which peaceful reunification could still be fostered. These are outlined below.
6. Strategic Opening – Reason One: Profit Over Ideology
Trumpism (特朗普主义), which is rooted in national conservatism, will continue to shape and dominate American politics even beyond Trump’s four-year term.
Trump shows no attachment to America’s founding ideals, moral standards or ideological principles—nor any commitment to upholding international norms.
Trump’s actions are guided by interest, not principle, suggesting a pragmatic indifference to ideological or systemic differences.
Although Trump still views China as America’s main strategic rival and remains committed to suppressing it, his approach resembles a business rivalry—driven by calculation rather than by a life-or-death struggle with an “evil communist empire” (邪恶共产帝国).
As Richard Bush and Ryan Hass argue themselves, Trump may well approach Taiwan in transactional terms.
With regards to Taiwan, Trump is probably more interested in selling arms to the island than in deploying troops to it.
7. Strategic Opening – Reason Two: The (Limited) Role of Congress
The US Congress maintains a consistently anti-China tone.
However, its influence on the US’s Taiwan policy is limited; in practice, the president enjoys broad autonomy in foreign policy decision-making
With the Republican Party in control of both chambers of Congress, Trump now holds consolidated executive and legislative power—representing a peak moment of presidential authority.
He can therefore advance his domestic and foreign policy agenda with minimal institutional resistance.
Moreover, Trump has shown little interest in increasing security assistance to partners unless there is a clear return on investment.
Therefore, China hawks such as Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Adviser Michael Waltz are unlikely to be able to impose their “pro-Taiwan” logic on Trump.
Wei: “In other words, decisions regarding America’s response to a Taiwan Strait crisis will ultimately rest solely in Trump’s hands.”
8. Strategic Opening – Reason Three: Military Balance in the Indo-Pacific
In the US, a “new Taiwan abandonment theory” (新弃台论) and a “balancing theory” (制衡论) have emerged.
The new Taiwan abandonment theory holds that a war with China over Taiwan would be too costly, as recently argued by Jennifer Kavanagh and Stephen Wertheim in Foreign Affairs.
The balancing theory maintains that the US should focus on balancing military power in the Indo-Pacific, rather than attempting to maintain US hegemony in the region.
Although these are not mainstream views in America, they align with those of several key figures in Trump’s camp.
For example, Elbridge Colby, then the nominee for Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, emphasised that America’s core interest in the Indo-Pacific is to prevent Chinese dominance. He warned that any military conflict with China would most likely be inconclusive, come at a tremendous cost and leave US forces depleted.
The new Taiwan abandonment theory and the balancing theory have emerged in response to the growth of Chinese military power.
It was only after the Soviet Union’s total nuclear arsenal surpassed that of the US that Washington began to treat Moscow as a peer and to discuss global affairs on an equal footing.
The same applies to Taiwan: Trump’s team is now gradually moving towards “a strategy of seeking peace”.
9. Peaceful Reunification – Preparation One: Putting Pressure on Washington
If Trump adopts a strategy of “delay” and refrains from playing the “Taiwan card” (台湾牌), how can Beijing continue to move towards reunification?
Although Taiwan is, in principle, a matter of China’s internal affairs, any outcome would be more effective if the United States exerted pressure on Taiwan to come to the negotiating table.
There is now a recognition among mainland leaders that relying on pro-reunification forces within Taiwan is futile.
Instead, Beijing has turned to the tactic of “hitting a cow across the mountain” (隔山打牛)—that is, pressuring the US to bring about change in cross-Strait relations.
If Trump hopes to be nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize, he should compel Lai Ching-te to negotiate, as he did with Zelensky.
In the triangular relationship between China, the US and Taiwan, the continued application of low-intensity “isolation” (隔离) strategies against Taipei remains the lowest-cost, highest-return option for exerting pressure and compelling negotiations.
Wei: “The greater the pressure placed on the DPP authorities, the greater the pressure the United States will feel [to begin talks].”
10: Using the Kinmen Model
The mainland should fully implement the “Kinmen Model” (金门模式) to establish a new Taiwan Strait paradigm under unilateral mainland control.
Under this model, the coast guard exercises “administrative enforcement power” (行政执法权) and conducts “non-military operations” (非军事行动).
This would deny Washington a clear legal or strategic justification for intervention. If the US were to deploy military forces, it would thus be Washington—not China—initiating hostilities.
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) flyovers around Taiwan serve primarily psychological and security purposes. By contrast, coast guard inspections in Taiwan’s surrounding waters would directly challenge Taiwan’s jurisdiction and governing authority.
In recent encirclement exercises, Beijing has effectively gained enforcement control over all offshore islands near the mainland’s coast [Note: for example, see Joint Sword 2024A exercises].
What remains is merely a formal declaration of sovereignty, which could be achieved by setting foot on the island(s) and establishing localised governance there.
Wei: “Following the examples of Scarborough Shoal and the Diaoyu Islands, the mainland’s coast guard should tighten the noose progressively, bringing all critical waters surrounding Taiwan’s main island [台湾本岛] under effective jurisdiction and control.”
Wei: “This would present a golden opportunity for the mainland to advance ‘administrative reunification’ [行政统一]. [This could involve] revoking fishing rights, stripping [Taipei of its] governance authority over smaller islands, disrupting and severing shipping lanes, as well as blockading ports and maritime routes—thereby gradually bringing Taiwan’s surrounding waters, and even its airspace, under [Beijing’s] effective administrative control.”
This model is similar to the “Beiping Model” (北平模式)—that is, asserting sovereignty to the maximum extent without provoking war.
At the same time, it builds the capacity to impose a full blockade on Taiwan at any moment, allowing Beijing to remain on the brink of war without crossing this threshold.
This lays the groundwork for “using force to compel negotiation” (以武逼谈), or even “using force to compel reunification” (以武逼统).
Will Trump place Taiwan on the negotiating table? He is unlikely to play the Taiwan card, given its low return and high risk.
Therefore, mainland China must take the initiative and set the tempo on the Taiwan issue.
Wei: “China must establish and follow its own fixed tempo—and that tempo should be fast, not slow—in order to place Washington on the back foot.”
11. Peaceful Reunification – Preparation Two: Operating in a Multipolar World
A more pluralistic and fragmented multipolar world order is emerging—one that lacks clearly defined ideological camps and is increasingly driven by national self-interest.
Traditional allies are gradually shifting away from clear alignment with the United States.
China should seize this moment to pursue the “US retreats, China advances” united front strategy (“美退我进”统战策略).
The mainland should take this opportunity to embed the One-China principle into as many bilateral international agreements as possible.
A clear example would be omitting the word “peaceful” from joint communiqués and replacing it with a standard phrase such as: “firmly support all efforts (一切努力) made by China to achieve national reunification”.
According to a 2025 Lowy Institute report, 89 of the 193 UN member states formally recognise the mainland’s sovereignty over Taiwan and support its right to take “all necessary efforts” to achieve reunification.
This implies that, in the event of a mainland military takeover or blockade of the Taiwan Strait, these 89 countries should remain silent; otherwise, they would be violating the commitments made in these joint statements.
Reducing references to peace and increasing assertiveness does not necessarily indicate that the mainland is determined to achieve reunification through force.
In fact, establishing an internationally accepted and unassailable fact that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China under the One-China principle may reduce the likelihood that military action will be necessary.
12. Peaceful Reunification – Preparation Three: A New “National Reunification” Law
Today, the original Anti-Secession Law (反分裂国家法), passed in March 2005, is no longer sufficient.
Cross-Strait relations have undergone fundamental changes, and the DPP now pursues a strategy of “soft independence” (柔性台独), which carefully avoids crossing the red lines outlined in the Anti-Secession Law.
Even within the KMT, support for the “1992 Consensus” (九二共识) is now increasingly in doubt.
In response, the mainland must formulate a more comprehensive and enforceable legal framework.
In June 2024, the Supreme People’s Court and other state bodies issued a legal document outlining criminal liability for those promoting “Taiwan independence”.
However, due to its limited legal authority and scope, this document cannot substitute for a systematic “Law on Safeguarding National Reunification” (维护国家统一法).
Any new legislation should adhere to the following three principles:
The law should explicitly outline the rights of Taiwan residents post-reunification to reduce psychological resistance and ease public concerns. It is likely that Taiwanese residents would retain privileges similar to those granted in Hong Kong and Macau.
Given the DPP’s dominance, other parties may seek to realign with the mainland to regain political influence following reunification. The new law should provide flexibility to accommodate such interest-based realignments.
The law should also include a specific offence of “persecuting [members of] the pro-reunification camp” (迫害统派罪), enabling the mainland to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction, including the ability to try “Taiwan independence” figures in absentia, in order to maximise its deterrent effect.
13: The Timing of Reunification
The future of the Taiwan Strait is not a question of whether to pursue reunification, but when to do so [台海的未来不是继续无休止地讨论要不要统一，而是需要全力聚焦何时统一的问题].
The timing should not be dictated by the likelihood of US intervention or the intensity of pro-independence activity in Taiwan; it should be determined by the mainland’s own sovereign political judgement.
Above all, what the mainland now requires is strategic resolve and political will.
Wei: “Of course, any shift in US policy [towards Taiwan] may take years to materialise, so it is unrealistic to expect Taiwan to become a ‘bargaining chip’ and the central topic of a forthcoming Xi–Trump summit in the near term. At present, the conditions for reunification are still far from fully formed—but they are clearly approaching maturity [“将熟未熟”状态]. Although it remains difficult to predict the likelihood of reunification occurring before Trump leaves office, it is reasonable to expect that the general contours of reunification will become increasingly evident over the next four years. In short, a clear and irreversible trajectory towards reunification will emerge. Regardless of leadership changes on either side of the Strait, we will all be entering the final phase of complete reunification.”
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