The Importance of France and Macron to China
The Importance of France and Macron to China
US-scepticism, Strategic Autonomy and EU leadership
Dear Everyone,
French President Emmanuel Macron has just arrived in Beijing and will be joined by the president of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen. Their three-day visit is an important one, which could have an impact not only on the future direction of EU-China relations but also on transatlantic ties.
Macron is a much-liked figure among China’s Europe watchers. He is generally represented as a well-educated, highly capable and pragmatic leader. “Macron never rejects China in his grand strategy, but rather emphasises cooperation with the PRC,” write Wu Yiwen (武亦文) and Wang Shuo (王朔), two professors at Beijing Foreign Studies University. Macron has also been praised for his reforms at home and, more recently, for standing firm in the face of France’s ongoing pension-reform protests and strikes.
Following his re-election last year, a collective of scholars from Fudan University noted that “Macron's victory is not only significant for the EU, but also key to the future direction of China-EU relations. Between Macron and Le Pen, Macron was China’s favoured candidate. In the current turmoil that has engulfed Europe and Sino-European relations, Macron can provide the leadership and vision needed to stabilise both the EU and China-EU relations.”
As I have discussed elsewhere, Macron and French foreign policy in general are seen as presenting several key attributes that are of importance to China: relative stability, a natural proclivity towards US-scepticism, a large sway over EU reforms and a presumed greater emphasis on national interests as opposed to ‘ideology’ relative to other major western countries. Put differently, France’s main appeal to China’s international relations experts is its potential role in helping prevent a further “Americanisation” of the EU’s China policy and the consolidation of a US-led bloc of countries aimed at stymying China’s economic and geopolitical rise. Strategic autonomy à la française is what China wants for Europe.
Since Angela Merkel’s announcement in 2018 of her intention to step down as Germany’s chancellor, followed by Germany’s traffic-light governing coalition of “China-averse” and “China-friendly” politicians, attention in the PRC has gradually been turning towards France. Despite its economic woes and instability at home, France has increasingly been described as the leading political power in the EU – with the caveat that the war in Ukraine has weakened both France and Germany’s influence in the bloc and allowed pro-US countries to gain a bigger say in European affairs.
Over the past year or so, I have noticed a number of Chinese scholars recommending either explicitly or implicitly that Beijing place more emphasis on its relations with Paris (e.g. see here, here and here). Just this week, Xue Li (薛力) a researcher at CASS’s Institute of World Economics and Politics, wrote an opinion piece arguing that Beijing should focus the core of its diplomatic efforts in Europe on France rather than Germany.
Should some of the above views be shared by at least part of China’s leadership, this might imply that France has a little more leverage with China than what one might at first suppose. Providing Europe’s main advocate of strategic autonomy with a few economic and political gains would therefore make sense in this context.
Today’s edition of Sinification provides excerpts from an article co-authored by Zhang Ji (张骥) and a fellow France specialist Xue Sheng (薛晟). Appearing in Fudan University’s yearly “Report On European Policies Towards China” published a few weeks ago, it discusses recent and future trends in Sino-French relations and provides a somewhat cursory and, at times, rose-tinted analysis of France’s stance on China. Nevertheless, its main arguments remain reasonably mainstream and therefore of note.
Finally, to those of you who might be interested in reading a bit more about how France, Germany and the EU are currently being assessed in China:
1. EU-China Relations and the War in Ukraine: A Reappraisal (March 2023)
2. Chinese scholars look for a new Merkel in Macron (Sept. 2022)
3. Why Chinese scholars are hoping for Macron’s re-election (April 2022)
Sino-French Relations as viewed by Zhang Ji and Xue Sheng
SUMMARY
The EU is shifting from a “German-French” to a “Franco-German” axis.
However, France and Macron are still not strong enough – either politically or economically – to take over the reins of the EU fully.
Economic ties with Paris have been strengthening just as certain disagreements have been rising.
France has continued to support Beijing’s One China Principle whilst voicing more concern over the state of cross-Strait relations.
Macron’s stance towards China is constrained by China-sceptic voices both at home and in the EU. France’s policy towards the PRC has therefore become much more a matter of compromise, to the detriment of Beijing.
The US continues to be the most important factor impacting French foreign policy. France is described as “trying” but currently “unable” to rid itself of this influence.
The “two-sided” or “two-faced” nature of Paris’s relationship with Beijing is therefore expected to continue as is France’s attempts to reduce the dependence of its supply chains on China
There is still plenty of room for Paris and Beijing to strengthen economic ties and cooperation in various fields. China's support is essential, the authors argue, if France wants to continue exercising its soft power in global affairs.
The Domestic and International Backdrop to France’s China Policy in 2022
“At the level of the European Union, the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and the resulting energy and food crises have revealed France's lack of [缺乏: i.e. it is still insufficient] EU leadership in the ‘post-Merkel era’. The divergent attitudes of the Eastern and Western European countries towards the Russo-Ukrainian conflict have led to differing security demands and to growing divisions among them. Eastern Europe's dependence on NATO for its security, particularly after France broke with its principle of ‘strategic ambiguity’ [战略模糊] in the face of the Russian ‘nuclear threat’, has grown even further [愈发严重]. This problem [矛盾: lit. contradiction] will continue until the Russo-Ukrainian conflict is over.”
“Politically, the EU is shifting from a ‘German-French axis’ to a ‘Franco-German axis’. At the same time, the contradictions [i.e. tensions/disagreements] between France and Germany are growing at certain levels. Cracks [in the relationship] are even appearing. [Germany’s] constant compromising on foreign policy, brought about by its governing tripartite coalition, has exacerbated [these] contradictions, with France unable to support [the EU’s] ‘strategic autonomy’ on its own. Although disagreements over such issues as energy, arms and subsidies have been temporarily set aside in the face of the US’s Inflation Reduction Act, the cracks remain.”
“In global politics, France joined the ranks of those imposing sanctions on Russia as a result of the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. However, it has continued to demonstrate its desire to play a mediating role in this conflict. Thus, Macron has not severed his ties with Putin since its outbreak. In order to ensure that France and even the EU can survive the energy crisis brought about by the conflict in Ukraine and in order to secure France’s Mediterranean-based energy strategy, Macron is continuing to adjust his policy towards Africa. Through such measures as the withdrawal of troops from the Sahel, France's recognition of its colonial past and the establishment of a commission [in charge of] examining historical issues, he is attempting to build a new narrative of Franco-African relations, regain French influence in Africa and build ‘partnerships based on equality’ [there].” [Comment: see for example France specialist Zhao Yongsheng’s largely favourable commentary on Macron’s recent trip to Africa]
“The Franco-American relationship, which has the greatest impact on France's [overall] foreign policy, has continued to deteriorate after reaching a low point due to AUKUS. In the face of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, France and the US have diverging interests and attitudes with regards to being firmly ‘anti-Russia’ or not. When it comes to trade, France is increasingly dissatisfied with the US claiming to support multilateralism while pursuing a protectionist and ‘America First’ strategy. Especially after the [US] Inflation Reduction Act was published, the disagreement between France and the United States regarding trade protectionism has become even more serious. On major global governance issues such as the Iran nuclear deal, military presence in the Middle East and the situation on the Korean peninsula, France and the United States have also faced major disagreements due to their divergent interests.”
France’s China Policy: Continuity and Adjustment
“Alongside France’s changing domestic and international environment, its foreign policy in 2022 has also been marked by important adjustments. Especially after the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, bilateral relations with countries such as the United States and Russia continued to grow in importance and became the focus of French diplomacy in 2022. This to some extent led to a decline in the attention [France] paid to its China policy. However, China and France have continued to maintain frequent exchanges at many levels.”
“China and France also maintained close ties in the areas of people-to-people and cultural exchanges as well as third-party cooperation.”
“Sino-French economic cooperation has also maintained a high standard of development. Having exceeded US$80 billion in bilateral trade in 2021, Sino-French cooperation continued to improve steadily in 2022 … The role of economic [cooperation] as a ‘ballast’ in bilateral relations has further increased.”
“As economic ties have continued to strengthen, differences between France and China have nevertheless deepened on certain issues. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has become an important area of disagreement between France and China. First, since the outbreak of the conflict, France has been hoping that, while the EU is unified in its attitude towards Russia, China could also support France's and the EU's stance on Russia by ‘not supporting Russia, or at least not undermining Western sanctions against Russia’.”“The French side has not been able to understand some of China's positions correctly. For example, the statement that there are ‘no limits to Sino-Russian cooperation’ has raised concerns among EU countries, including France, about an alliance between China and Russia.”
“Second, in the ‘post-Merkel era’, Macron has displayed his ambition to play the role of ‘leader of the EU’. The harmonisation of attitudes within the EU has become one of his top policy priorities for the EU. And since the Ukraine conflict, the EU has identified China and Russia as its ideological opponents [对立面]. Macron, despite being friendlier in his attitude towards China, cannot act independently within the EU's discursive system [欧盟话语体系, i.e. within the EU’s policy framework].”“Third, both within France and at the level of the EU, compromise has already become necessary due to Macron's lack of leadership [马克龙领导力的缺乏]. Foreign policy has become the area where he can most easily reach an agreement through compromise. [France’s] China policy has thus fallen victim to this process of compromise.”
“In its relations with China, the American factor remains one of the most important elements influencing Sino-French relations. Despite the huge differences between France and the United States, both at the economic and foreign policy levels, the US [still] wields enormous ideological and defence-related influence over European countries, France included, through the ‘transatlantic partnership’, the ‘values alliance’ and the NATO-based military alliance. [Furthermore,] the ‘pro-US’ stance of the European Commission and von der Leyen as well as of members of the European Parliament has further aggravated the US influence within the EU. The American factor has continued to be an element that France is trying, but is unable, to rid itself of in its foreign policy. Thus, despite its attempts to avoid ‘taking sides’ [‘选边站队’] in the US and China’s strategic rivalry, France still has to take the US's side at the ideological level, while trying to enhance ties with China at the economic level.”
“In addition, China's domestic policies and France's own interests have become important factors influencing France's policy towards China. Since the outbreak of the epidemic, French public opinion has failed to understand properly – and has even publicly vilified – China's COVID-19 policies. This has been detrimental to the normal development of Sino-French relations.”
“Especially since the Russia-Ukraine conflict, during which China was at one point stigmatised by the US and the West as Russia's ‘accomplice’ and faced with possible spillover effects from [Western] sanctions, France chose to ‘diversify’ its supply chains in order to avoid excessive ‘dependence’ on China and ensure the security and stability of its supply chains.”
“Domestically, France has been reflecting on its years of ‘de-industrialisation’ and calls to ‘re-industrialise’ are growing. [Re-industrialisation] has also become part of France's bid to lead the EU's [quest for] ‘strategic autonomy’, with two results:
First, in the field of new energy, France is trying to establish itself as a leader in the field of green energy through ‘self-reliance’ [自力更生] in raw materials and through measures such as the launch of its first lithium mine, just as it is breaking away from [its] ‘dependence’ on China,
Second, the Taiwan issue. Following Pelosi's visit to the island and in order to avoid the impact of tensions in the Taiwan Strait and of a potential ‘armed reunification’ on France's domestic chip supply chain, France has, on the one hand, repeatedly reiterated its support for the ‘One China’ principle. On the other, however, in official documents such as its 2022 National Strategic Review, France has consistently advocated maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait and has opposed a military solution to the Taiwan issue. The so-called ‘democracy card’ that Taiwan has been playing has also received a lot of support from France at the ideological level.”
Sino-French Relations: Outlook for 2023
“2023 will bring both opportunities and challenges for Sino-French relations. Macron is planning to visit China in early 2023. During this visit, Macron is expected to raise French demands on issues such as the economy and trade, environmental protection, financial stability, the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, the situation on the Korean peninsula and the Iranian nuclear deal, expecting greater support from us. There is room to expand Sino-French cooperation further in such areas as trade, environmental protection and finance.”
“Although the possible readjustment of France's policy towards the US has prevented Paris from taking sides and tilting towards the US, France's China policy may continue to be characterised by its two-sidedness [两面性] of recent years. In other words, its economic demands on China will continue to deepen: it will hope that trade and two-way investments will help boost the pace of France's recovery from the COVID-19 epidemic and the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, and [help it] both achieve strategic autonomy and lead the EU in building up sufficient economic power. Politically, however, completely setting aside disputes will not be easy given the current climate of public opinion in the EU and France.”
“In terms of global governance, with China playing an increasingly important role in global affairs, France hopes for increased and more practical cooperation with China. Although there are still concerns in France about our country’s increasing role [in the world], China's support is essential if France wants to exercise its soft power in global governance. As permanent members of the UN Security Council, France and China can also look for the ‘greatest common divisor’ in their bilateral cooperation. France will seek to strike a balance between the so-called ‘regulation’ [‘规训’] of China's global behaviour and development all-round cooperation with China.”
“In the area of people-to-people and cultural exchanges, there is still a lot of room for cooperation between France and China. 2024 will mark the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between France and China. The French will work to create a favourable people-to-people and cultural atmosphere in the run-up to this anniversary through cooperation in such [activities as] the Sino-French Tourism Year etc. With the adjustment of China's epidemic prevention and control policy, the gradual resumption of contacts between people from both countries, especially Chinese tourists going to France, will provide new opportunities for improving the atmosphere among [our] people.”
THE AUTHORS
Name: Zhang Ji (张骥)
Age: 40/41
Position: Deputy director of the School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University.
Research focus: France, the EU and Chinese diplomacy.
Education: BA to PhD at Fudan University (2000-2010)
Experience abroad: Student (2007), then visiting researcher (2008-2009) at Sciences Po in Paris.
Name: Xue Sheng
(薛晟)Age (tentative): 35/36
Position: Associate Researcher, School of French and Francophone Studies, Shanghai International Studies University (SISU).
Research focus: France
Education (tentative): MA (2011) and PhD (2018), Shanghai International Studies University.
Experience abroad: Appears to have spent some time conducting research at HEC in Paris.
In an article published this week, Zhang Jian (张健), director of CICIR’s Institute of European Studies, warns against exaggerating the newly gained influence of these eastern and northern European countries.
Very little information is readily available on Xue. This information was put together using what appear to be his master’s and PhD theses (see embedded links).