Trump Tracker: Perspectives from China's Scholarly Elite (#1)
Six leading voices on Trump, US-China relations and Taiwan: 1. Wu Xinbo; 2. Da Wei; 3. Zheng Yongnian; 4. Yuan Zheng; 5. Jia Qingguo; 6. Zhang Hua
It has been an eventful month since Donald Trump’s return to the Presidency, making it difficult to keep up with developments, let alone the reactions of Chinese commentators. Yet, given the scale of potential shifts in U.S.-China relations this year, staying on top of these dynamics is more important than ever. That’s why we are launching a dedicated “Trump Tracker” alongside Sinification's usual offering.
This tracker will provide a regular assessment of how Trump’s policies and rhetoric are perceived in China and how they may be shaping Chinese strategic thinking. In addition to highlighting key scholarly works on U.S.-China relations under Trump, it will feature topical analysis, track reactions to specific U.S. policy developments, and identify emerging themes that offer insight into future Chinese responses.
Taking the temperature: cautious, but quietly confident
Chinese commentators have expressed cautious confidence about Trump’s return, but not optimism. They note that he has been softer on China than expected, but nobody anticipates smooth sailing ahead.
Many commentators highlight competing China factions within the administration, placing Trump in the MAGA camp rather than among the Cold War hawks. For these analysts, the MAGA faction signals a transactional China policy driven by domestic priorities. Some credit domestic economic concerns for China’s temporary reprieve, but none are complacent about where MAGA-driven China policy may lead.
Confidence stems from an enduring “East rising, West declining” narrative, as well as the observation that China has spent the eight years since Trump’s first accession to power developing a toolkit and strategy to resist US trade pressures.
The extent to which this confidence is merely performative is debatable. The mantra of China’s inevitable rise has been repeated so often that it has become an internalised truth. Whether it aligns with reality is another question, though in 2025, China does appear better positioned to weather the storm than in 2016.
China prioritises careful use of asymmetric responses in trade war
Beijing’s response to Trump’s 10% tariff on Chinese goods on February 4th was markedly more targeted and sophisticated than its initial reactions during the first round of the trade war in Trump’s first term.
Beyond imposing 10% and 15% tariffs on a small but strategic selection of U.S. products, China added two American firms to its Unreliable Entity List, launched an antitrust probe into Google and imposed export controls on key raw materials.
China’s retaliation aligns with the “asymmetric warfare” approach advocated by influential scholars, such as Wu Xinbo (吴心伯), director of Fudan University’s Institute of International Studies (see below), in response to Trump’s use of the “tariff stick”.
Once again, cautious confidence defines the prevailing strategy – strategic patience paired with targeted, asymmetric responses. Asymmetric responses might involve further export restrictions – Wu Xinbo suggests drones – and additional action against U.S. firms.
Chinese analysts generally view Trump as a rational actor unlikely to risk the inflationary pressures of steep tariffs on China and express confidence in China’s retaliatory tools, provided they are deployed tactically.
China to build bridges as Trump burns them
Unsurprisingly, exploiting Trump’s disregard for the U.S. alliance system emerges as a key recommendation. Writing shortly before Trump’s inauguration, Yuan Zheng (袁征), deputy director of CASS’s Institute of American Studies, predicted: “The European Union, Japan, South Korea and other allies will accelerate efforts to improve relations with China to cope with the ‘Trump shock’.”
In Europe, the “Trump shock” has upended the transatlantic relationship, dramatically reshaping the European calculus on China and providing an opening for Beijing. Wang Yi’s proposal at the Munich Security Conference to “synergise” China’s Belt and Road Initiative with the EU’s counter-connectivity strategy, Global Gateway, no longer seems as far-fetched as it did just months ago.
Likewise, the idea of reviving the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment – frozen after Chinese sanctions on EU lawmakers – is once again gaining traction.
Some commentators question the permanence of the rift between Europe and the United States. Chinese University of Hong Kong professor Zheng Yongnian (郑永年) astutely observes, “Trump is not against Europe – he is against the Europe led by the current centrist and left-wing governments”, suggesting that U.S.-Europe relations could improve if right-wing populism continues to rise in Europe.
It is still unclear what Beijing makes of the new world order
Most commentators doubt that U.S.-Russia peace talks will lead to lasting peace, though some, perhaps naively, see the prospect of European stability as a potential catalyst for closer EU-China ties.
Likewise, few believe Trump can execute a “reverse Nixon”, isolating China through a rapprochement with Russia. Yet, it remains an open question how much of this confidence is genuine and how much is performative.
The consensus holds that U.S.-China strategic rivalry is structural and enduring, regardless of who is president. However, recent commentary has entertained the possibility of a U.S.-China détente within a reconfigured world order – one analyst likens it to a “Three Kingdoms” scenario, with the U.S., Russia and China each controlling distinct spheres of influence.
Like everyone else, Chinese intellectuals are still grappling with the pace of rapid geopolitical change. The prevailing mood is one of cautious observation—an acknowledgment that events appear to be unfolding in China’s favour, yet with a clear understanding that Beijing must be prepared for all contingencies.
It remains uncertain what role China will assume in the emerging post-liberal world order that Trump is accelerating. In our future Trump Trackers, we will explore possible answers to this question and keep you informed of Chinese reactions to Trump’s America.
Jacob Mardell
Executive Summary
Chinese analysts are quietly confident about the trajectory of U.S.-China relations under Trump but remain extremely wary.
MAGA-driven policy has left China out of the firing line for now, but this reprieve is not guaranteed.
The “East rising, West declining” narrative remains strong among commentators.
They highlight that China has developed a comprehensive toolkit for handling trade pressure since 2016.
It is unclear whether this confidence is performative or genuine – likely a mix, with real belief in China’s advantages.
As long as Beijing continues its policy of strategic patience and asymmetric responses, Chinese scholars believe their country will be able to withstand U.S. pressure.
China’s February 4th retaliation to Trump’s 10% tariffs follows the pattern of “asymmetric warfare” advocated by Chinese experts.
Further asymmetric responses may include expanding export restrictions (e.g., on drones) and increasing pressure on U.S. companies.
Several experts stress the need to avoid a tit-for-tat escalatory spiral with the U.S., thereby reducing economic strain on China.
Trump’s dismantling of the U.S. alliance system is seen to create opportunities for Beijing.
Support for an EU-China rapprochement is notable – top foreign policy official Wang Yi proposed aligning the Belt and Road Initiative with the EU’s connectivity plans, and discussions on reviving the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment have resurfaced on the sidelines.
Some scholars note that EU-U.S. relations under Trump will depend on the balance between liberal centrists and far-right forces in Europe.
Most commentators doubt the prospect of U.S.-Russia peace talks or the likelihood of Trump executing a “reverse Nixon” and aligning with Russia to counter China.
The consensus remains that U.S.-China strategic rivalry is structural and enduring, though some do not rule out the possibility of a détente with Washington in the post-liberal world order that Trump is shaping.
Today's edition continues with a carefully curated selection of insights from six Chinese scholars on Trump, U.S.-China relations and Taiwan. The analyses covered in our January 20 post have been updated.
1. Wu Xinbo
Name: Wu Xinbo (吴心伯)
Year of birth: 1966 (age: 58/59)
Position: Director of the Institute of International Studies and Director of the Center for American Studies, Fudan University
Sources: Phoenix (Feb. 2025); Observer (Dec. 2024); Jiemian News (Nov. 2024),
1. Warmer Beginning Than Expected
Since his election victory, Trump has taken a softer stance on China than during his first term, emphasising cooperation on global issues and expressing interest in visiting China. There have been several positive signals:
Wu: "His initiative to request a call with President Xi is one such [positive] sign, and allowing TikTok to continue operating in the US would be another. If he follows up with a visit to China within the next three months or so, that would be another significant indicator. So, for now, let us be patient and observe what happens over the next three months.”
The fate of TikTok can, to some extent, serve as an indicator of the future trajectory of US-China relations.
2. Threats and Outlook
Trump’s ability to impose tariffs on China will be more constrained than it was during his first term. Inflation remains a serious issue in the US, which he knows the Democrats will make sure to capitalise on.
But Trump’s pressure on Beijing may extend beyond tariffs and trade, including exhorting American companies in China to redirect their investments to the US, urging Beijing to resume purchasing US Treasury bonds, and pushing for the appreciation of the renminbi.
Extreme China hawks (对华极端鹰派) in Trump’s new administration will make sure to push for economic, scientific and “people-to-people” decoupling from the PRC. They are also determined to escalate US-China tensions on security-related issues, particularly regarding Taiwan.
Wu: “As a result, Sino-US relations will experience significant fluctuations (大幅度波动) in the next four years, with escalating tensions, intensified confrontation (对抗加剧), and possibly even a major crisis (重大危机).”
The hawks are also poised to advocate for reduced diplomatic engagement and a decline in exchanges between the two countries.
The likelihood of the US Department of Justice reviving its 2018 “China Initiative” to combat economic espionage and prosecute potential Chinese spies is high.
In its attempt to uphold its hegemony, the US’s approach towards China is set to become even more vicious (穷凶极恶)).
3. China’s Approach
China’s main task in the next four years in its relations with the US is to minimise losses (止损).
Wu: “It will not be not to expand cooperation or seek stability, because both are impossible tasks [不可能的任务]. In the coming years, we must instead focus on minimising losses and preparing for worst-case scenarios.
The space for US-China cooperation on global issues will be greatly reduced.
Given Trump’s scepticism towards climate change, the two will not be able to work together on this major potential area for cooperation.
Since a direct tariff-for-tariff response would have limited impact on the US, Beijing is exploring “asymmetric tactics” (非对称博弈) by restricting exports of rare earths and key goods such as drones and drone parts. Additionally, it may launch anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations into American companies, particularly semiconductor firms, to protect China’s rapidly advancing chip industry.
Chinese analysts should no longer view the United States through a liberal lens but instead through a conservative and realist one, as Washington is now driven primarily by unvarnished national interests.
Wu: “We used to view the US as a diverse, inclusive and open society, and as a country that adhered to multilateralism in international affairs, promoting global cooperation and handling international issues through [established] rules and mechanisms.”
Wu: America’s retreat (收缩) into protectionism and unilateralism “is bound to impact its alliance system. With Trump’s election, US allies, from Asia to Europe, have felt a sense of unease [阵阵寒意]. This is precisely why its allies have recently turned to China [往中国跑] as a backup plan [留点后路].”
Having remoulded the Republican party in his image, Trump will now try to reshape the federal government to ensure his political legacy.
Wu: “It is clear that Trump is grooming Vance as his successor. We must pay attention to the ‘Trump system’ under construction.”
Wu: “Over the next ten years, domestic divisions and conflicts within the US will further intensify. As for US-China relations, I believe the two countries will continue to drift apart [渐行渐远]. The US is determined to decouple from China in many areas, but when will a balance point be reached [达到一个平衡点]? This, I'm afraid, will depend on China's own development. China needs to reach a new stage—one where Americans feel that strengthening ties with China is necessary for their own interests. Thus, the future of US-China relations should not be left to the US; rather, it depends on China’s own development. That is the key.”
2. Da Wei
Name: Da Wei (达巍)
Year of birth: 1973 (age: 51-52)
Position: Director, Centre for International Security and Strategy (CISS); Director, Department of International Politics, Tsinghua University; Assistant Dean, Department of International Relations, Tsinghua University
Sources: China Review News (Feb. 2025); China Review News (Feb. 2025)