US Midterms | Xi-Biden | Indo-Pacific | China's Global Image

Nov 17, 2022

Dear All,

This week’s edition of Sinification looks at the following topics:

US midterms: Chinese experts analyse the likely impact of the US midterm elections on US foreign policy and US-China relations.
Xi-Biden: Chinese scholars react to Joe Biden and Xi Jinping’s first face-to-face meeting as heads of state during the G20 summit in Bali
Indo-Pacific: CASS expert Ye Hailin calls for a more offensive response to the US’s Indo-Pacific Strategy.
China’s global image: Wang Yiwei details how China should regain control of its global image.

US Midterms: Chinese experts analyse the likely impact of the US midterm elections on US foreign policy and US-China relations (PART 1)

Last Friday, an online seminar entitled "The US 2022 Midterm Elections – Prospects and US-China Relations" was co-organised by The Chinese Association of American Studies, Peking University and the Guangdong-based think tank Intellisia (海国图智研究院). More than ten leading international relations scholars were asked to share their views on the election results and their implications for US domestic politics and foreign policy. The following quotes, which show that opinion in China is still divided, are not direct quotes but summaries of these views provided by Peking University’s Institute for Global Cooperation and Understanding:

Zhu Feng (朱锋) – Director of the Institute of International Studies at Nanjing University:

“Looking at the future of US-China relations, if the Republicans regain a majority of seats in the House of Representatives and if the Republican House Leader McCarthy becomes the next Speaker of the House, tensions between the US and China over the Taiwan issue may escalate again.”

Huang Jing (黄靖) – Director of the Institute of American and Pacific Studies at Shanghai International Studies University

“The impact of the midterm elections on US-China relations has been largely negative … in vying for support domestically and competing for the moral high ground, both the Democrats and the Republicans will become tougher on China.”
“The Biden administration will gradually lose its rational attitude towards China in order to seek re-election and avoid Republican attacks on Biden for kowtowing to China. With a lame-duck Biden entering the election early, one can expect an increasingly tough attitude towards China over the next two years. This will also establish a model for the next [US] president.”
“Although the future may look grim, there is still room for manoeuvre. First, the Biden administration is a weak administration, with serious factional struggles and an externally strong Republican Party. Therefore, although the [government’s] stance will tend to be clear, its capacity to implement [policies] will be limited. This will continue the current situation of ‘shouting fiercely, but doing little, and getting even less actually done’ [喊的凶，做的少，做到的更少].”

Zhang Wenzong (张文宗) – Deputy director of the Institute of American Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR):

“These midterm elections will have a relatively small impact on US foreign policy … The main impact will be that, if the Republicans are able to take control of the House of Representatives, they may use congressional legislation and other means to push the Biden administration into becoming increasingly tough on China, thereby reducing the Biden administration's ability to manage conflicts on relevant issues. It is also inevitable that both parties will play the ‘China card’ in the forthcoming 2024 elections. Competition to be tough on China may not be driven by the will of either party, but by the US’s strategic will and political climate.”

Song Guoyou (宋国友) – Deputy Director of the Centre for American Studies at Fudan University:

“With the Republican Party having now won [a majority in] the House of Representatives: first, the Biden administration has already fallen into a ‘mini lame-duck’ stage and is unlikely to make significant progress on the domestic front. Thus, the focus of the Biden administration could shift to seeking a breakthrough in diplomacy and seeking a diplomatic legacy so as to establish a place for itself in history. Second, the Democratic Party's policy preferences on values and ideology will face more obstacles. The Republicans will adopt a more pragmatic stance on such issues … China needs to seize the opportunity of the summit meeting to help Biden build the diplomatic legacy he wishes to leave behind, particularly by seeking cooperation with the US on the issue of climate change.”
“In the face of the US's powerful discourse-shaping and issue-setting capabilities, China should both guard against being led astray by the US and think of ways of setting more constructive issues in US-China relations.”

Sun Bingyan (孙冰岩), a lecturer at Peking University’s School of International Relations:

“US policy towards China is [already] firmly established. These mid-term elections will not fundamentally change this. The elections will only make a grim situation even grimmer.”
“Biden's approach to China is on the one hand to compete with China, but on the other to manage this competition. McCarthy's future strategy is to obstruct Biden on domestic issues and to force the Biden administration to be tough on China while undermining its management of orderly competition [with China] … On the legislative front, the Republicans will focus on the US defence industry’s supply chains and will push for the decoupling of the US’s rare earth and new energy industries from China.”
“On the whole, US-China relations could slip into a state of hostility on one side and management on the other.”

Zhu Wenli (朱文莉) – Professor at Peking University’s School of International Relations:

“At the diplomatic level, US foreign policy will not change as a result of the outcome of these midterm elections.”

Sun Chenghao (孙成昊) – Assistant Research Fellow at Tsinghua University’s Centre For International Security and Strategy:

“In terms of the impact on US diplomacy, if Biden is ‘hamstrung’ in Congress, this will probably exacerbate the concerns of America's European allies about [Washington’s] military aid to Ukraine. Thus, the academic community should pay attention to the impact of the midterm elections on the crisis in Ukraine.”

Jia Qingguo (贾庆国) – Member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) Standing Committee and professor at Peking University’s School of International Relations:

“For the Biden administration, the ‘lame-duck’ [outcome] is a foregone conclusion. It will be difficult for the Biden administration to achieve anything on domestic issues for at least some time to come. This suggests that the Biden administration will probably focus more on international issues in the coming period.”
“The midterm elections could be both good and bad for US-China relations. On the one hand, the Republican Party's control of Congress will be detrimental to China. The Republican Party places heavy emphasis on security issues and will do anything to achieve its security goals, while more of its legislators are racist and consider the US-China relationship to be a zero-sum game which is not conducive to the development of US-China relations. On the other hand, as the Biden administration is more restricted at home, it may turn its attention abroad and do more for China-US relations. Biden, on the other hand, has considerable political experience and is more pragmatic on many issues. He could change some of the hard-line policies carried over from the Trump era and work with China on such issues as trade conflicts, the creation of ‘crash barriers’ and climate issues.”

US Midterms: Chinese experts analyse the likely impact of the US midterm elections on US foreign policy and US-China relations (PART 2)

The following is a continuation of the above commentary, but published by the influential Beijing-based think tank China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). Its authors are: Zhang Fan (张帆), Li Zheng (李峥), Gao Yang (高阳), Shao Xinyu (邵薪羽) and Kou Tianrui (寇恬瑞).

“The backlash against the ‘Trump phenomenon’ has increased. The Republican Party adopted the strategy of ‘Trump without Trump’ for this election. In other words, it still uses [such tactics as] spreading ‘hate politics’, arousing a sense of crisis among voters and attacking the weak spots of opponents as its main political strategy. This strategy was effective in stirring up public discontent with the Democratic Party but failed to increase voter turnout among Republican voters themselves.”
“These midterm elections will have a significant impact on the political and social landscape of the United States. The struggle between both parties will become fiercer and internal divisions will become more complex. Political polarisation and political chaos will continue to be the main feature of US domestic politics for some time to come.”
“After the mid-term elections, the US’s foreign policy will, on the whole, retain a relatively high degree of continuity. However, in specific areas [unknown] variables do exist.”
“The crisis in Ukraine: Generally speaking, there is a relatively large bipartisan consensus regarding Ukraine. However, after the new Congress takes office, the US government will encounter greater resistance to its assistance to Ukraine.”
“US-Europe relations [the authors don’t make it clear if they mean ‘US-Europe’ or ‘US-EU’ relations. ‘美欧’ can be translated both ways]: With the Russo-Ukrainian conflict dragging on, US-Europe relations will face greater challenges after the elections. Once the Republicans take control of the House of Representatives, they will continue to pressure the Biden administration to demand that NATO allies take on more defence responsibilities. Conservative forces within the Republican Party are in agreement with right-wing forces in Europe on border security, national identity and minority rights. The two sides may increase their support for one another.”
“[The US’s] Asia-Pacific policy: After the elections, the core of the US’s strategy will continue to focus on the Asia-Pacific. The Biden administration will continue to strengthen its alliance system and partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region, consolidate small multilateral mechanisms such as the US-UK-Australia trilateral security partnership (AUKUS) and the US-Japan-India-Australia quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), and may possibly draw in countries such as South Korea, New Zealand and Vietnam. In the economic sphere, the US will continue to defend its dominant position in trade and technology rule-making and will continue to advance the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) so as to create an exclusive and values-based production and supply chain network in the region. With regard to the military and security[-related issues], the US will continue to strengthen bilateral defence partnerships with allies and deepen multilateral military cooperation.”
“China policy: Given the general bipartisan consensus on policy towards China, the general tone of the US’s China policy will not change significantly after the elections. China will still be seen as [Washington’s] ‘top strategic competitor’ and as its ‘most serious geopolitical challenge’. However, … the Republicans are expected to strengthen their anti-China stance further in the new Congress, introducing more anti-China bills in areas such as trade, science and technology, human rights, ideology, and Taiwan-related issues. Extreme anti-China legislators like Rubio will further heighten anti-China public opinion at the federal and local levels. In the area of science and technology, congressional Republicans will promote the ‘decoupling of science and technology’ further and may link this issue to ideology and human rights. If he takes over the chairmanship of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, anti-China Congressman Michael McCaul will continue to push for greater congressional oversight of the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), requiring the agency to provide licensing data on its recently released rules for advanced computing chips, supercomputers and semiconductor manufacturing equipment, aimed at protecting US technology from Chinese encroachments.”
“On the Taiwan front, after the Republicans take control of the House, they may incorporate the more aggressive provisions contained in the original House version [of the Taiwan Policy Act] in Taiwan-related legislation.”

Xi-Biden meeting: Chinese scholars react to Biden and Xi’s first face-to-face meeting as heads of state during the G20 summit in Bali

Below is a selection of Chinese scholars’ reactions to Monday’s meeting between US president Joe Biden and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali. These follow China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s own comment that, “This meeting was both a continuation of exchanges up to now, and augurs a new starting point”:

Wang Dong (王栋) – Professor, School of International Relations, Peking University:

“As always, the US has made many commitments, but the key is implementation … Of course, we shouldn't expect too much. After all, the US’s strategic bias against China has already become a fixed mindset. It is not that easy to adjust in the short term … But overall, this meeting between heads of state is committed to finding the right way forward for China-US relations and not allowing the 'spiral of hostility' between China and the US to escalate.”

Diao Daming (刁大明) – Associate Professor, School of International Relations, Renmin University of China:

“[The meeting] was of great significance and its role in helping stabilise relations between the two countries goes without saying … This face-to-face exchange will, to a certain extent, help repair the relationship between the two countries … Strengthening communication in all areas will help to resolve existing problems. The extent to which these problems might be solved will depend on actions, though mainly actions by the US.”

Zhang Tengjun (张腾军) – Deputy director of the Asia-Pacific Research Institute of the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS):

“During this summit, Biden again said that a stable and developing China is in the interests of the United States and the world. The US respects China's political system, does not seek to change it, does not seek a new Cold War, does not seek to oppose China by strengthening its alliances, does not support ‘Taiwan's independence’, does not support ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan’, and has no intention of entering into conflict with China. The U.S. has no intention of entering into conflict with China, no intention of trying to ‘decouple’ from China, of obstructing China's economic development or of encircling China. As the saying goes, ‘hear what he says and observe what he does’ [听其言，观其行].”

Shen Yi (沈逸) – Professor of international politics and director of the Centre for International Cyberspace Governance at Fudan University:

“Both sides nevertheless reached some agreements … [such as] the need for the diplomatic teams of both sides to maintain strategic communication, conduct regular consultations and normalise exchanges … Dialogue and coordination between [US and Chinese] economy teams on macroeconomic policy, trade and other issues achieved during this meeting between US and Chinese heads of state, can be seen as a significant step forward or a positive sign of progress.”
“There is, of course, reason for limited optimism arising from this meeting. This optimism is reflected by the fact that the US has also finally realised that the issue [of US-China relations] has reached a level where substantial improvements are needed … So how will the future unfold? We can focus on a number of important issues brought up during this meeting, such as the Taiwan issue, and we will have to wait and see whether or not the US’s commitments will be consistent with its actions.”

US-China: CASS expert Ye Hailin calls for a more offensive response to the US’s Indo-Pacific Strategy.

The following excerpts are from an article well worth reading in full entitled “The Flawed Logic of the US’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and China's Response”. Its author, Ye Hailin (叶海林), is a respected Chinese international relations expert and the current deputy director of the Institute of Asia-Pacific and Global Strategy Research at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). Before becoming a researcher, Ye served in China’s police force, followed by a two-year stint at the Chinese embassy in Turkey. In this article, Ye argues that the US’s Indo-Pacific strategy contains inherent weaknesses that his country should be exploiting and that China should be much more on the offensive in its response. He concludes by providing his government with a set of policy recommendations:

“An analysis of the aims and tactics of the US’s Indo-Pacific Strategy reveals that not only is there a serious mismatch between what the US can spend on the Indo-Pacific Strategy and its expected returns, but there is also a huge discrepancy between the US’s current overall power [i.e. it has declined] and its ability to pay … This will severely limit the effectiveness of the US’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and provides China, as the weaker party, the opportunity to respond effectively to, and hedge successfully against, the challenges posed by the US’s Indo-Pacific Strategy.”
“China forms one of the most important parts of today’s world economic system. To exclude it would be tantamount to creating a new economic system. The cost of doing this would be so high that not only would most of America's allies not be able to afford it, but the US itself would not be able to do so either. Secondly, there is the cost of maintaining this strategy. To confront China as a bloc [i.e. together with its allies], the US would have to continue to increase substantially its already massive annual defence budget of US$800 billion and convince its allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region, and even in the Indo-Pacific region, to spend significantly more on defence also. Moreover, the US would have to open up significantly its market to its non-Chinese trading partners in order to meet their needs for industrial upgrading [which Ye argues the US is not prepared to do].”
“In summary, the US wants to enjoy all the dividends generated by China’s containment – whatever its strategic guise – while trying to make its partners participating in these efforts bear the costs. Strategically speaking, this will be very difficult to achieve.”
“Through its ever intensifying Indo-Pacific Strategy, one can sense both the anxiety and disappointment of the US as it becomes increasingly aware of its inability to stop China's rise and also the arrogance and conceit of a strongly ethnocentric and civilisationalist [带有强烈种族和文明中心主义色彩] US foreign strategy. Accordingly, when engaging with the US, China should both be aware of the unchangeable hegemonic mindset of the US’s strategy towards China and let go of the illusion that positive adjustments in the US’s policy towards China can be achieved through accommodation and compromise. [China should] also appreciate the other facet of hegemonic states: they may be threatening in manner but are cowardly at heart. Hegemonic states have always been superstitious about the logic of power. The stronger China becomes and the more it dares to use its strength, the weaker the US’s resolve will be to contain China, especially its resolve to engage in a protracted ‘all-out confrontation’ with China irrespective of the cost.”
“At present, the US is increasingly fearful of losing its hegemony and anti-China sentiment is spreading domestically. [Thus,] the offensive character of the US’s China strategy is bound to intensify significantly.”
“The US’s military, economic power, cultural influence and ability to rally supporters internationally are not sufficient to carry out its task of comprehensively containing and suppressing China.”
“In recognising the nature of the US’s strategy towards China, China should respond to the Indo-Pacific Strategy [currently] being implemented by the US government with a more confident mindset. As long as China perseveres in its struggle, dares to struggle, and maintains strategic reciprocity, and even if there is still a power gap [between the two sides], it is still possible [for China] successfully to resist the overall pressure exerted by the US’s Indo-Pacific Strategy.”
“China should avoid giving the United States and other countries the false impression that it is prepared to make significant adjustments to its strategy in order to improve US-China relations.”
“When there is a conflict and friction between the US and China, China's counter-attack should be strong and sustained, not just in order to signal our stance but also to inflict real damage on the US and its allies. If we don’t strike back, so be it. But if we do, we must strike back effectively. Even if we take into account the fact that the current discrepancy in power between China and the US is still significant, China is nevertheless capable of inflicting substantial damage on the US and its allies in some areas and for some [specific] matters such as tracing the origin of COVID-19, Australia's war crimes in Afghanistan, etc. Maintaining the necessary level of force and intensity will help China to increase its [strategic] space in the great power game that opposes it to the US at the same time as relieving the pressure of public opinion in the US and other western countries.”
“While battling with the US on multiple fronts, China should maintain channels of communication between the two sides, so that once the US adjusts its policies and changes its statements and practices, China can make corresponding adjustments and reach a ‘truce’ with the US on specific issues. However, it should be noted that the prerequisite of this ‘truce’ is that the US ends such confrontation first. China should not, for whatever reason it may have, take the lead in making these adjustments while the US continues to confront [us].”

“In accordance with the above principles, China could consider doing the following in response to the US’s Indo-Pacific Strategy:”

“First, in terms of strategy and diplomacy, China should target the US’s Indo-Pacific alliance system, based on the principle of using power to divide and break up … The assessment that the relationship between China and the US is key to China [being able] to manage its surrounding region is correct. But the central point is not how many benefits China can offer to its neighbours. China should recognise that whether it is hardcore US allies such as Australia and Japan, pragmatic and opportunistic countries such as India, or Southeast Asian countries [simply] looking on from the sidelines, the decisive factor in their shifting [sides] between China and the US is not [so much] how much China can offer them, but which of China or the US has the upper hand in the region.”
“Second, in the field of security … China should, on the one hand, demonstrate its willingness to use military force by enhancing the construction and use of its military forces, making clear to the US China’s bottom line of being prepared to go to war over the unification of the motherland, China’s territorial integrity and other core interests. [China should also] clearly convey to the US that [finding] a solution to the issue of Taiwan is imperative and that the timing and choice of the approach belongs to China and should shatter the US's illusionary attempt to intimidate China by "Ukrainising" Taiwan. On the other hand, we should intensify the suppression of various forces within China that either worship or fear the US, do away with [清除] the US’s so-called ‘pawns’ that are out to contain China and, in the context of defending ourselves against the threat of the US’s new war model, understand the importance of getting rid of [清除] the ‘spokespeople’ of US interests.”
“Third, in the field of science and technology … we should prepare ourselves for a complete break in high-tech cooperation … In future, the US will certainly continue to intensify its high-tech blockade against China, the means of which will be increasingly unrestricted by currently existing international mechanisms … China needs to prepare for the continued strengthening of US technological measures aimed at isolating [our country] by building a ‘de-Americanised’ Chinese high-tech industrial chain, relying primarily on our domestic market, while proactively exploring China-led and US-free regional cooperation networks in overseas high-tech markets.”
“Fourth, in the economic sphere … We should vigorously encourage the implementation and upgrading of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), promote China’s accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and to the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) and start the construction of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area 3.0 as soon as possible.”
“Fifth, in the field of China's external communication, we should have the courage to take the initiative in conveying China's views and clarifying our stance. At present and for some time to come, ideological competition will become the focus of Sino-US rivalry. China should meet this [challenge] head-on. On the one hand, we should use the US’s discourse system to expose the US's double standards, severely criticise the US and its allies using international channels of communication on issues such as the COVID-19 epidemic, racial conflicts, overseas war crimes etc., and publicly call for these countries to be held accountable. On the other hand, we should deepen our public diplomacy efforts focusing in particular on China’s neighbouring countries in the Asia-Pacific, emphasising the commonalities between Chinese culture and the cultures of most countries in the Asia-Pacific, spreading the values and ideology of the Asia-Pacific’s community of common destiny, and using Eastern ethics to explain China's [various] initiatives such as the BRI.”

China’s global image: Wang Yiwei details how China should regain control of its global image.

The last article in this week’s edition is a long read by the prolific Wang Yiwei (王义桅) entitled “The ‘China paradox’ in the Wests’s discourse system”. In this paper, Wang emphasises the need to both break and remold the West’s image of China and highlights fundamental “cognitive differences” that he claims distinguish Chinese people from Westerners.

Wang’s background: He is currently the vice president of the Academy of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in a New Era, the director of the Centre for European Studies and the Jean Monnet Chair professor at Renmin University of China. He once served as a diplomat at the Chinese Mission to the European Union from 2008 to 2011. Wang is probably best known in the West for his nationalistic and regular political commentary in both English and Chinese. The following is largely in keeping with this:

“Since the outbreak of COVID-19, the phenomenon of the ‘China paradox’ in the West’s discourse system has become increasingly evident: the more successful China is, the worse its international image seems to become; the more active China is in helping the world, the more sceptical voices there seem to be; the more China's hard power increases, the more its soft power seems to decline.”
“The global fight against the epidemic has exemplified the fundamental differences in Chinese and Western ways of viewing life (生命) and existence (生活), the state and the individual, altruism and self-interest, order and freedom. The ‘China paradox’ contained in the West’s discourse system stems from the fact that more or less the whole world has been colonised by the West, with China being the only exception in the Western-dominated international discourse system.”
“We can correct the West’s worldview, correct its view of China and gradually overcome the Western discourse system’s ‘China paradox’.”

“What is the Western discourse system’s ‘China paradox’?”

“For a long time now, there has been a phenomenon called the ‘cognitive China paradox’ [认知中国悖论] brought about by the West’s discourse system: foreigners (especially Westerners) like Chinese history and culture but not contemporary China; they like contemporary China but not contemporary Chinese politics; they like contemporary Chinese politics but not the Chinese government; they like the Chinese government but not the Chinese Communist Party.”
“In a word, they recognise traditional Chinese culture and approve of China's economic development, but they just do not approve of the Chinese [political] system.”
“The first paradox … In China, any problem is caused by [China’s political] system and by the CCP … For the West, if China does a good job in fighting the epidemic, that is how it should be because you are an authoritarian state; [but] if the epidemic hasn’t been brought under control, that was inevitable because your system does not respect human rights. The situation is, as a Western proverb goes, ‘Damned if you do and damned if you don't’.”
“The second paradox … if you are like me, I am worried; if you are not like me, I am also worried … Converting infidels (‘others’) to be like ‘us’ has been a consistent goal of Western ideological diplomacy from the time of the missionaries until now. What is even more worrying for the West is that not only has China not been westernised, but the rest of the world has increasingly [begun to] admire and emulate the Chinese system.”
“The third paradox: the Chinese people are good, the Chinese Communist Party is bad … The CCP has always represented the fundamental interests of the broadest number of people, has always stood together with them through thick and thin and through life and death. The CCP has no special interests of its own.”

“The fight against the epidemic reflects ten major cognitive differences between China and the West:”

“The first is the divergence of views regarding the epidemic itself. The biblical story of Noah's Ark says that man is born sinful and that God punishes those who are sinful through floods, wars and epidemics. Today's epidemics are [thus] a form of natural selection, which will ease the burden of social welfare. The Anglo-Saxons even advocate collective immunity. The logic behind this is social Darwinism … The Chinese [for their part] stress that epidemics are caused by an imbalanced relationship between man and nature.”
“The second is the divergence of views regarding life (生命) and existence (生活) … Westerners, especially Americans and particularly young people, would rather risk endangering their lives than not be able to live freely, which is inconceivable for the Chinese. This is because Westerners view life differently from the Chinese.”
“The fourth is the divergence of views on the [right] way to fight the epidemic. This reflects a cultural clash between the individual and the state, freedom and order, and self-interest and altruism. The West envied the results of China's fight against the epidemic, but could not stand the way in which China fought it … [The West is] afraid to learn, cannot learn and fears comparison.”
“The fifth is the response to the shock triggered by the epidemic … Historical research has revealed that during a plague scare people would do two things: first, they would dance the dance of death together; and second, they would blame the Jews for introducing the virus. Today, this type of situation has returned, only the Jews have been replaced by the Chinese.”
“The epidemic has [also] caused unprecedented concern in the West that global supply chains are too dependent on China … The ‘China threat’ has turned into a type of ‘China phobia’.”
“The tenth is the aversion to China's epidemic aid … If China does not provide any assistance, it is accused of being irresponsible, and if it does, it is said to be atoning for its sins or using its anti-epidemic assistance to fill the vacuum left by the absence of US leadership.”

“The way to break the ‘China paradox’:”

“China's extraordinarily long and, crucially, uninterrupted history is as inconceivable [for Westerners] as the idea that the Roman Empire may not yet have disintegrated. This is the underlying reason why the West keeps questioning us about Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong and Taiwan.”
“Only by combining socialism and [Chinese] traditional culture into a secular ethic will the great rejuvenation [of the Chinese nation] be able to transcend the narrow bigotry and dichotomous thinking that comes with having a single god … This is why China is redefining socialism, [It is] the ‘sinification’ of socialism, not the ‘socialisation’ of China.”
“In order to transcend the ‘China paradox’ of the West’s discourse system, it is necessary to correct the West's perception of the Chinese Communist Party. This is currently a major issue for Chinese public diplomacy. There are three major historical tasks:”
“The first is to transform atheism into a secular culture and to achieve a great reconciliation between Chinese and religious civilisations.”
“The second is the transformation of [our] revolutionary doctrine into a community of common destiny emphasising that the proletariat and the bourgeoisie will, at this stage, in fact coexist for a long time and will need to face certain challenges together (e.g. environmental protection).”
“The third is the restoration of Marxism to the pinnacle of human thought. Xi Jinping's Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era is the Marxism of the 21st century. It is currently spearheading human intellectual creativity.”
“Telling the story of the Chinese Communist Party, telling the story of China being a civilisation rather than a nation-state and telling these stories well are a prerequisite for winning the battle between Chinese and Western narratives.”
“The Chinese Communist Party is a civilisation pretending to be a political party.”
“In the past, to help [promote] China’s modernisation, we would emphasise the integration of the CCP with the country’s revolutionary foundations. Today, we have to place more emphasis on [the Party’s] integration with traditional culture and globalisation, with the CCP as the cornerstone of both domestic and global governance … [It] already transcends the concept of a political party. It even transcends China and represents a new form of human civilisation.”
“In short, to change the West’s perception of China, we must reshape its worldview and its [own] view of the West. [We must] transcend humanism with human-centred thought [以人本主义超越人文主义], transcend universal values with common human values as well as build an autonomous system of knowledge and an inclusive discourse system. Only then will we be able gradually to overcome the Western discourse system’s ‘China paradox’.”

Finally, I would like to recommend two complementary posts that look at a recent opinion piece by Wang published in China’s Global Times and entitled “Do not distort Chinese diplomacy’s ‘fighting spirit’ [or ‘spirit of struggle’]”, in which Wang expounds on the meaning of "daring to struggle and being good at struggling" (敢于斗争、善于斗争), as called for by Xi during last month’s 20th Party Congress. The first post is by Tuvia Gering in the most recent edition of his excellent Discourse Power: