Western Ideological Exhaustion and China's Trump Opportunity by Zheng Yongnian

"French President Emmanuel Macron has repeatedly criticised NATO for being 'brain-dead', but it is not only NATO that suffers from this condition—the entire West is in this state." – Zheng Yongnian

Within China, Zheng Yongnian is sometimes viewed as a ‘Western’ academic. Trained in the US, he has long advocated greater opening-up of China’s economy and has expressed scepticism towards claims portraying China’s model as an ideologically superior alternative. His polemical assertion—that the West has not produced any meaningful political ideas since Daniel Bell’s The End of Ideology in 1960—is therefore not made from a position of ideological antipathy.

His main target is the liberalism he associates with the Democratic Party, which he views as a self-corrupting effort to cling to American global dominance. By contrast, he expresses approval of the Trump administration's disregard for ideology and the opportunities this creates for the US-China relationship, a notable shift in tone from his cautious attitude back in February. Zheng argues that by rejecting elite liberal ideology, Trump is sacrificing global hegemony to address the domestic problems caused by liberalism—a perspective that is reminiscent of Pan Wei’s earlier analysis of American populism. Contrary to Cold War-style framings, Zheng does not see current US-China rivalry as a clash of political-economic models. This begs the question: if not ideological models, then what is driving tensions between the two superpowers?

Though evidently reluctant to acknowledge any debt to post-1960s American intellectuals, Zheng’s thinking echoes Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations thesis. Huntington—a scholar with deep influence on modern Chinese political thought (even at the highest levels)—predicted that post-Cold War conflict would stem not from ideological, but civilisational friction. Zheng views the liberal international order as a cover for “white civilisation”, charging US liberals with seeking to impose their values upon other political cultures—in contrast, he claims, to China’s pluralistic civilisation and its “open-source” development model (a nod to DeepSeek). Responding to an article by former Biden official Kurt Campbell, which he reads as promoting “white solidarity” (though Campbell writes no such thing), Zheng can only explain Japan’s inclusion in Campbell’s schema of alliances by suggesting that the country has been “whitened” [白人化].

Zheng proposes that China can offer an open, non-ideological development model applicable to a variety of political cultures—stemming, as he argues elsewhere, from China’s historically pluralist civilisation. Yet, by rejecting universalist ideological visions, he is left only with racial difference and a global zeitgeist of increasingly demarcated civilisational identities to explain current international alignments.

— James Farquharson

Key Points

1. The liberal international order, when first created, was a feat of extraordinary vision by the intellectuals and statesmen who conceived it. Yet since the Second World War, it has served to maintain US hegemony.

2. The ossification of liberalism into an unchallengeable ideology has led to the “brain death” of Western society. As a result, its academic institutions have not produced any meaningful new ideas since the 1960s.

3. The decline of critical thinking fostered by liberal orthodoxy has enabled a series of misguided economic policies—especially those rooted in neoliberalism, which has increasingly divorced society from the economy.

4. By dismantling liberalism both domestically and in his foreign policy, Trump embodies an anti-ideological, anti-elite backlash against the damage liberalism is perceived to have inflicted on Western societies.

5. The Democrats, by contrast, remain committed to liberalism because it sustains an international system rooted in American primacy—helping explain their virulent reaction to what they view as Trump’s recent “surrender” to China in Geneva.

Work with Us – Project-Based, Flexible Commitment
Requirements: HSK6 or equivalent; native English (≠ near-native); strong writing and translation skills; and a solid background in China-related studies/work. Please send your resume to:

6. Washington’s decision to offer trade concessions in Geneva signals the ascendancy of America’s “realists” (the “restrainers”) over the more hardline “now-or-never” faction (the “prioritisers”) within Trump’s administration—a situation unquestionably favourable to China.

7. Though China will not willingly “export” its political model, this moment presents an opportunity for its own development model—one that does not impose a fixed ideology on other societies—to be adopted more widely.

8. Despite (or perhaps, due to) the erosion of the liberal international order and thus its global hegemony, the United States under Trump retains significant structural strengths.

9. Thus, the early deregulation and decentralisation initiatives—championed by figures like Elon Musk during the early Trump administration—have laid the groundwork for innovation in the emerging “Fourth Industrial Revolution”.

10. Although the Chinese model has gained popularity globally, overregulation in China has stifled technological development and deepened economic “involution”. A renewed commitment to opening-up is urgently needed.

The Author

Name: Zheng Yongnian (郑永年)
Year of birth: 1962 (age: 62/63)
Position: Founding director of the Institute for International Affairs and X.Q. Deng Presidential Chair Professor, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
Formerly: Director of the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore (2008-2019); Research director of the China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham (2005-2008); Researcher at Singapore’s East Asian Institute (1996-2005)
Research focus: International relations; Chinese politics and society; Nationalism
Education: BA-MA Peking University (1981-1988); MA-PhD Princeton University (1990-1995)

“THE BEST OF WORST TRUMPS” AND THE FUTURE OF THE GLOBAL ORDER
AND
HOW CHINA CAN CAPTURE THE “TRUMP OPPORTUNITY”
Zheng Yongnian (郑永年)
Two pieces published by Thinking Alone on 16 May 2025 and by the Guangzhou Institute of GBA on 14 June 2025
Translated and put together by James Farquharson
(Illustration by OpenAI’s DALL·E 3)

N.B. The following are excerpts from two recent articles by Prof. Zheng Yongnian. Full texts are accessible via the links in the titles above.

1. The Surrender at Geneva?

The high-level Sino-American economic and trade talks held in Geneva have achieved substantive progress, culminating in the release of the “Joint Statement on US-China Economic and Trade Meeting in Geneva”. The global business and commercial sectors have responded to this with unanimous applause. However, the Western media erupted in denunciation [叫骂], portraying the negotiations as a “comprehensive failure” for the United States and a “complete victory” for China. The New York Times published an article stating, “Tariff Truce with China Demonstrates the Limits of Trump's Tariff Strategy” and The Wall Street Journal opined, “The China deal is more surrender than Trump victory”. Meanwhile, German media declared, “In the tariff negotiations between China and the US, Trump is far from a match for China” and French outlets pondered, “How did China make Trump yield in the trade war?” Headlines of this kind have saturated the Western media in recent days.

By contrast, former US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers struck a tone more representative of business circles. “I think it’s very clear that it’s President Trump who blinked,” he observed. “When you make a mistake, it’s usually best to correct it and retreat, even if it’s a little bit embarrassing.” Yet earlier, when Trump launched his "reciprocal tariff" war, he encountered similar [levels of] condemnation—not only from the media, but also from the business community. Yet earlier, when Trump launched his "reciprocal tariff" war, he encountered similar [levels of] condemnation—not only from the media, but also from the business community.

Trump is likely used to such outcomes. The populist nature of the MAGA movement he represents has already placed him in direct opposition to the American elite. One of Trump’s defining traits is that he acts according to what he believes ought to be done, paying no heed to the criticisms and attacks levelled at him by the Western mainstream media. Unlike traditional American politicians who heavily depend on the media, Trump possesses the means to resist [its influence]. This is because he can use what are essentially his own media platforms to broadcast his views and communicate directly with supporters in real time.

Americans across the political spectrum hold their own varied views of Trump. However, when seen from a [more] lateral perspective—from China and the rest of the world—these resentful reactions convey key information about the real essence of Western liberalism. In the eyes of Western liberals, what Trump has done is nothing short of “surrender” to China. What they find so intolerable about him is that not only has he failed to rescue the tottering [摇摇欲坠] “liberal international order” from collapse, but has rather delivered its coup-de-grace [最后一击]. Since at least the end of the Second World War, the West has relied on this “liberal international order” to dominate the world; should this order disintegrate, the West will no longer be able to maintain its dominance.

Furthermore, the basis of this “liberal international order” is American hegemony; therefore, whenever the United States is challenged—even from within the Western bloc—it always finds ample justification to crush these upstarts. Evidently, the “liberal international order” brought down the Soviet Union as an external challenger while simultaneously suppressing internal challengers such as Japan, Germany and France. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the core task of Western liberalism became bringing down China, which it defined as the new enemy. As a result, liberalism has come to support anything that opposes China and to oppose anything perceived as benefiting it. During Biden’s administration, Biden framed Sino-American relations as a confrontation between “American democracy” and “Chinese autocracy”, and the Western media overwhelmingly [一边倒] supported him. Although the Biden administration’s malicious China policy has not made the US any stronger, from the liberal perspective, any price is worth paying provided it serves the ultimate goal of defeating China. Biden himself believes that China can—and must—be defeated by the West.

2. Liberalism: the West’s Common Enemy

Fighting for an ideology that has already been proven a failure is the most defining feature of Western liberalism today. The current crisis in the West is endogenous. Not long ago, US Vice President Vance travelled to Europe and delivered a stern lecture to the Europeans. Vance argued that Europe’s enemy is not Russia, but its own self. Europeans were furious and viewed the Trump administration as having betrayed Europe. But why stop at Europe? Vance’s view applies equally to the United States itself: its true enemy lies not in China, but within. In both Europe and America, their common adversary is the liberal ideology they have long held dear.

From the classical liberalism of Adam Smith and David Ricardo to the neoliberalism of Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek, Western economic theory has made the same fundamental error: it has severed the nexus between economy and society, treating the economy as an “autonomous” and “independent” domain. This has led to unbalanced development and a profound disequilibrium between a country’s domestic economy and its society. Inevitably, domestic disequilibrium in turn produces imbalances in the international economy. Severe internal disequilibrium gives rise to populism, while external disequilibrium leads to nationalist confrontation between states. Thus, when political leaders externalise [外部化] domestic problems, the result is ultimately international conflict. The First and Second World Wars both demonstrated that once internal populism collides with external nationalism, the inevitable outcome is global conflict.

Despite all this, the West is not prepared to abandon this already failed ideology. The reason is simple: this ideology forms the intellectual foundation of the entire capitalist system and, without it, capitalism would lose its ideological underpinning. Therefore, whenever faced with internal difficulties, Western countries consistently [seek] first to externalise their domestic problems, attributing them to external challenges rather than internal dysfunction. From this perspective, uniting to throttle [绞杀] external challengers is inevitably the ultimate goal of the Western liberal international order. The Western world once united to throttle the Soviet Union, and the United States later throttled Japan through the Plaza Accord. Now, they seek to unite once again to throttle China.

This situation reveals even further the intellectual decline of the West [西方思想的坠落] and the corresponding decline of its associated [liberal] international order. What it reflects is the cultural mindset of Western decline [西方的衰败文化心态]. Although the West still aspires to global dominance, it no longer possesses a “global vision” [全球视野]. Gone is the generation of leaders like Roosevelt during the Second

The international order that we see established post-Second World War was made possible only by the global outlook possessed by the political leaders of that era. Although Germany had been the defeated party in the First World War and was carved up at the Paris Peace Conference, [that period also saw] the emergence of thinkers such as Keynes, who advocated a long-term perspective and a policy of leniency towards Germany. It was precisely the presence of intellectuals such as Keynes that enabled the post–Second World War international order to be established and gain worldwide acceptance.

Yet what we see today are merely extremely self-serving politicians who confine themselves within rigid ideological cages [把自己关在特定意识形态牢笼之内]. Since the publication in 1960 of The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties by then-Harvard professor Daniel Bell, the West appears to have produced no truly meaningful new ideas. It may [actually] be more accurate to interpret Bell’s notion of “the end of ideology” as “the ossification of ideology [emphasis added]”. What passes for “ideas” today were for the most part produced before the 1960s. From the perspective of ideology, this phenomenon is not difficult to explain: once people imprison themselves within a particular ideological framework, independent thought is no longer necessary; everything can be reduced to ideology. Eventually, the capacity for meaningful thinking is lost altogether. In recent years, French President Emmanuel Macron has repeatedly criticised NATO for being “brain-dead”, but it is not only NATO that suffers from this condition—the entire West is in this state.

3. China’s “Trump Opportunity”

So, what can China do? Personally, I believe that China is facing a “Trump opportunity” [特朗普机遇]. The disintegration of the so-called “liberal international order” may, in fact, be a positive development for China [Note: Zheng has grown far more sanguine about Trump, striking the opposite tone here to his perspective in February this year and in his piece that we covered last year, which warned of the risk of a "'fascist' foreign policy" directed against China].

The vision of jointly constructing a global order under the United Nations after the Second World War was an excellent one. However, the “liberal international order” is a thoroughly Western-centric concept, saturated with Cold War thinking. The “Clash of Civilisations” thesis is also part of the narrative underpinning the “liberal international order” [Note: Zheng is mistaken here—in fact, the main point of Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilisations” thesis is that western liberalism and economic models cannot be seen as universally applicable or acceptable].

The religious radicalisation of the Middle East is related to the imposition of this so-called “liberal international order”. During the Bush Jr. administration, the US sought to implement American-style democracy in the Middle East. Yet how could a country like Afghanistan possibly embrace such a model? When Middle Eastern countries felt the pressure of a “clash of civilisations”, they could only turn to more radical forms of religion. For any country—including Europe and the US itself—secularisation and rationalisation require internal impetus and cannot be imposed by external forces.

Now, with Trump declaring that he no longer wishes to act as the leader of alliances, we ought to support him. Recently, the Trump administration’s interactions with Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries have been highly significant. At the very least, they indicate a clear departure from the previous US foreign policy emphasis on human rights and democracy under Trump’s presidency. Trump discussed only money with Middle Eastern countries, marking a major shift. During his visit to the Middle East, he openly criticised previous US administrations for “giving lectures on how to live” to the region.

The disintegration of the “liberal international order” is an unquestionable benefit [绝对的好事] for China. We do not oppose Western democracy, but it is not universal; every country must find a political system suited to its own civilisation, culture and national conditions. The existence of the old “liberal international order” is the greatest obstacle to any improvement in China–US relations. If, like Biden and the Democrats, one immediately frames China–US relations as “democracy versus autocracy”, then there can be no “deal-making”—only confrontation.

Trump, however, is different. After taking office, he did not place democracy at the centre of his agenda. Under Biden’s presidency, the US held a “Summit for Democracy” every year [with the exception of 2022], whereas Trump has yet to hold one, and I do not believe he ever will. As such, Trump carries no ideological burden. Some have observed that exchanges between China and the US may now simply become transactions between the renminbi and the dollar. Ideology cannot be traded, but money and goods can. Trump’s visit to the Middle East has likewise demonstrated that he has abandoned the traditional practice of exporting ideology on a global scale.

4. The Democrats vs the Republicans on China

At present, both the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States are highly aligned in their China policy, both adopting hawkish and hardline positions. However, one must make further distinctions within America’s hardliners and the Trump administration. Whether within the United States or Trump’s government, there exist two factions—though both are hardline in nature:

• One faction believes this is America’s final chance to defeat China—a "now-or-never" moment. In other words, if they forgo this opportunity, there will never be another. This faction’s stance is exceedingly hardline [Note: the “prioritisers”].

• The other faction, represented by Trump and Vice President Vance, consists of realists. They acknowledge the reality of China’s rise and believe that defeating China is impossible. On this basis, they maintain that the United States can only engage in open competition with China [Note: the “restrainers”].

The fact that an agreement could be reached in Geneva this time indicates that, at least for now, the realist faction is in the ascendancy. This is advantageous for China.

If the Democrats return to power, it will be far more troublesome. Kurt Campbell, former Assistant Secretary of State, recently published an article in Foreign Affairs, proposing various new alliance strategies for the United States to contain and encircle China. I would summarise this as a "White Solidarity" [白人大团结] strategy:

• The first circle consists of the Anglo-Saxon countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand).

• The second circle is the European Union.

• The third circle even includes Russia—also seen as part of white civilisation [Note: Kurt Campbell does not in fact profess himself in favour of a “reverse Kissinger” strategy in his article].

• The fourth circle consists of countries like Japan, which have effectively been “whitened” [白人化] [Note: Taken fairly, Kurt Campbell does not actually propose a strategy of concentric circles, but rather a system of regional partners. That Zheng would believe otherwise is more indicative of his general perception of US foreign policy under Biden—perhaps influenced by the “small yard, high-fence” policy].

Therefore, if Trump were to govern for eight years, it would not necessarily be a bad outcome for China. We must recognise that, whether we like it or not, Trump and the forces he represents will remain our counterparts in the years ahead.

5. Constructing a Global Order: Now and Then

More importantly, although the United States remains powerful today, it is no longer in the same dominant position it held in the aftermath of the Second World War. America’s rise to global leadership after the Second World War owed something to luck. At the time, the European nations had exhausted themselves in mutual slaughter during the war and lacked the capacity to build a new world order, while other countries had yet to develop.

The US became the world’s largest economy in the 1890s and began involving itself in world affairs after the First World War. It reached its zenith after the Second World War, when the European powers themselves invited America to assume global leadership.

Today, things are very different. Which country or region would willingly invite the United States to take the lead? Russia, Europe and China certainly would not. The post-Second World War Bretton Woods system emerged from a conference convened by the British economist John Maynard Keynes and the US Treasury official Harry Dexter White—it all seemed so easy. Today, things are far more difficult.

Yet difficulty brings opportunity. China is already the world’s second-largest economy, holds a significant seat at the table, and enjoys the support of many countries—a favourable international environment. Domestically, we hold even greater advantages. By capitalising on our internal strengths, we can secure broader and more substantial space on the international stage. But how should we do this?

6. The Essence of US-China Competition

Next, we need a clear understanding of the essence of the competition between China and the United States. Neither country can defeat the other, but competition is unavoidable.

So, what exactly are China and the United States competing over? In my view, the main point of contention is not the ideological or systemic competition that people have long emphasised. Western democracy is currently undergoing a very difficult period. Under the Trump administration they are no longer promoting American-style democracy abroad, reducing pressure on other countries.

Particularly with China, our own system has over the years demonstrated its advantages and become increasingly attractive to developing nations. Hence, systemic competition between China and the United States is not in and of itself the critical point; the competitive dynamic lies in influencing other countries. That said, we do not seek to export our political system.

Nor is the key aspect of China–US competition military in nature. Both countries are nuclear powers and will not easily go to war. Even if a conflict were to break out over the Taiwan issue, it would likely remain a conventional war under the shadow of nuclear deterrence.

In my view, the core competition between China and the United States lies in the “Fourth Industrial Revolution”.

7. Global Models in the Era of the “Fourth Industrial Revolution”

So, what is the “Fourth Industrial Revolution”? There is a popular formula, stating: (biotechnology + artificial intelligence) × energy = the “Fourth Industrial Revolution”.

Biotechnology focuses on human physical health and longevity, while artificial intelligence is concerned with the human brain. Both these fields require vast amounts of energy.

The United States has already begun its deployment in this space. In terms of approaches to the “Fourth Industrial Revolution”, several major models exist globally.

The US Model:

After Trump came to power, there were two particularly significant reforms championed by Elon Musk. The first was deregulation [去监管], and the second, decentralisation [分权].

When it comes to the internet and artificial intelligence, the United States imposes minimum regulation. At the federal level, there is still no regulatory framework in place for artificial intelligence. During Biden’s presidency, a presidential executive order [was issued regulating artificial intelligence], but Trump revoked it as soon as he took office.

If the United States embraces deregulation while China, Europe, India and other countries do not, then many technologies will naturally gravitate towards the United States. Decentralisation involves the devolution of power to local or state governments. The dynamism of American society has never stemmed from government, but rather from capital and enterprise.

To use Marxist terminology, the United States has no fundamental issues with its economic base or productive forces; the main problems lie in its superstructure and relations of production. The United States is undergoing a period of adjustment, but adjustment requires revolutionary change. In any case, the United States has already established a wholly development-oriented model for the Fourth Industrial Revolution.

The European Model:

Without reform, this model has no future. Europe lags behind [处于落后的地位] in internet technology and artificial intelligence.

A European friend of mine received EU funding for a research project on artificial intelligence. When I asked which aspect the project focused on, he replied that it was AI ethics. I remarked that Europe hasn’t even developed its own AI, and yet it's already studying AI ethics. This is precisely the root cause of Europe’s current backwardness.

It’s like trying to dictate how a child should grow up before it is even born—and as a result, the child never gets born.

The “Comprehensive Openness and Effective Governance” Model:

This model is exemplified by Asian countries such as Singapore and Vietnam, nations with relatively small economies that would struggle to lead in technologies like artificial intelligence. Nevertheless, they are striving to seize this developmental opportunity through a strategy of comprehensive openness combined with effective governance [全面开放，有效管理].

Whether in Singapore or Vietnam, governments allow the free entry of various Western social media platforms. However, their governance remains effective, and no major incidents have occurred.

The China Model:

This model could also be described as “overregulation and underdevelopment” [监管过度，发展不足]. It is not that we are entirely closed off; rather, we are open to a limited extent, whereas our governance knows no bounds.

This has led to a situation of overregulation and underdevelopment. There is ample evidence to suggest that due to overregulation in China, many technologies struggle to be translated into real economic activity, ultimately failing to materialise on the ground.

It is widely recognised that we are currently facing certain challenges in our economic growth trajectory, such as sluggish momentum and signs of severe “involution” [内卷]. “Involution” refers to a situation in which economic growth [sectors] remain too small, leading to intense competition over [existing] economic stock.

READ MORE