What China Expects of Lula and Brazil as Viewed by CASS Analysts
What China Expects of Lula and Brazil as Viewed by CASS Analysts
"Especially in the context of escalating competition between major powers, Brazil should become a partner that China actively strives to win over."
Dear Everyone,
Brazil’s president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, will be arriving in China today (Tuesday). His visit will last four days culminating in a meeting with Xi in Beijing on Friday.
Correction: Contrary to previous reports, Lula will be arriving on Wednesday, not Tuesday.
The recent return to power of an “old friend” of China’s was widely welcomed by Chinese analysts. This is perhaps unsurprising given his predecessor’s record of being an “anti-globalist” [反全球主义者, see below], of breaking with Brazil’s traditional embrace of multilateralism and of occasionally voicing “anti-China” [反华] rhetoric.
Today’s excerpts are from a lengthy piece by six researchers from the Institute of Latin American Studies, which is part of the prestigious Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). I focus here on their analysis of why Lula’s Brazil matters to China and what they recommend Beijing do in order to strengthen its ties with Brasilia.
SUMMARY
Lula’s Brazil is seen as having fundamental political differences with the US.
Under Lula, Brazil's diplomatic focus is expected to be reoriented towards the Global South and, most importantly, away from the US.
Furthermore, Brazil’s interests, “de-emphasis of ideology” and approach to global issues are said to be often aligned with China’s.
Brazil is viewed as an important partner in promoting globalisation, reforming the current international order and bringing about a multipolar world.
Beijing should therefore strive to “win” Brasilia over as a reliable partner and “support it” in opposing “hegemonism and foreign power politics” (i.e. in opposing the US).
Beijing should support Brazil’s desire to play a greater role in global affairs.
Beijing should convince an already BRI-friendly Lula to “participate in” (understand “sign up to”) the Belt and Road Initiative.
The BRICS should of course remain an important platform for China-Brazil and South-South cooperation.
The development of economic cooperation will continue to be “the key factor determining Latin America's attitude towards China”. In this respect, China is shown to be at an advantage when compared with the US.
Beijing should also provide “unequivocal support” for Latin American integration, strategic autonomy and “self-strengthening”.
Lead author
Name: Zhou Zhiwei (周志伟)
Position: Director of the Centre for Brazilian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS).
Research focus: Brazil and China-Latin America relations.
Education: BA Hunan Normal University (1999); MA Hubei University (2002); PhD University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (2009).
Experience abroad: Visiting scholar at the Institute of International Relations, University of Sao Paulo (2007-2008) and at the Institute for Strategic Studies, Federal University of Fluminense (2012-2013).
BRAZIL'S STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT AND STRATEGIC CHOICES — THE OUTLOOK OF BRAZIL'S INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOLLOWING LULA’S RETURN
Lead author: Zhou Zhiwei (周志伟)
Co-authors: Chai Yu (柴瑜), Gao Cheng (高程), Zhang Yong (张勇), Wang Fei (王飞) and He Luyang (何露杨)
(February 2023)
Introduction
“Since the beginning of the 21st century, Brazil's international strategy has been characterised by distinct phases. Under the rule of the Workers' Party (particularly under Lula’s presidency from 2003 to 2010), ‘active and assertive’ and ‘seeking autonomy through diplomatic diversification’ were distinctive features of Brazil's national strategy [Note: embedded links correspond to the references used by the authors]. However, under Bolsonaro's presidency, Brazilian diplomacy shifted towards anti-globalism [反全球主义] and ended up in a situation of international isolation. It is clear that the fundamental reason for this huge difference stems from the significant disparity between the two presidents' worldviews and strategic thinking. More specifically, Lula emphasised globalism and multilateralism as important paths for Brazil to enhance its international engagement and extend its national interests, while Bolsonaro saw globalism as a ‘political conspiracy’. It follows that Brazil's international strategy after Lula's return will be fundamentally different from that of the Bolsonaro period. However, in the midst of a century of global upheavals and a deep restructuring of the international system, Brazil's new international strategy is bound to include new key elements. This means that Lula's international strategy for Brazil after his return will also be somewhat different from that of his first two terms.”
Lula’s vision of the world is compatible with China’s
“Brazil is a developing country that has the ambition [to become] a great power. Its diplomatic tradition and values are characterised by multilateral cooperation and a de-emphasis of ideology [去意识形态化]. It [also] differs from the US in terms of its geopolitical rivalries and developmental characteristics.”
“As a matter of fact, the mainstream view among Brazilian strategists is that Brazil does not belong to the West and that the only way forward is to strengthen cooperation with emerging powers such as China.”
“Furthermore, multilateralism is also widely regarded as being ‘the path most conducive to Brazil's involvement in global governance’ and is an important diplomatic tradition for the country.”
“With Lula's return to power, Brazil's diplomatic autonomy will be significantly strengthened. Its diplomatic priorities will [move away] from its periodic ‘alliance with the US’ and return to its tradition of South-South cooperation. This [will] provide favourable conditions for China to deepen its strategic partnership with Brazil.”
The importance of Brazil for China
“Overall, the importance of Brazil in the next phase of China's overall foreign strategic layout lies in five main areas [Note: four were listed as follows]:
Brazil is an important partner for China in [its attempt] to maintain international peace and development, counter the trend towards de-globalisation and build both a new type of international relations and a community with a shared future for mankind.
Brazil is an expanding market [through which] China can plan a new pattern of its opening up to the outside world, boost its ‘dual-circulation’ model, jointly build the ‘BRI’, and ensure the security of its supply of strategic resources (food and energy).
Brazil and China can [also] learn from each other in terms of achieving sustainable development, avoiding developmental problems and improving the effectiveness of domestic governance.
Brazil is a supporting force for China's efforts to reform the global governance system, promote ‘Chinese proposals’ and increase the effectiveness of China’s international communication [国际传播].
Policy recommendations
“In light of this, China can draw on the following four key ideas in particular when carrying out its diplomatic work with Brazil:”
“First, attention should be paid to Brazil's core interests at the regional and global levels. According to the general logic of international relations, the development of relations between countries should be based on the convergence of both sides' interests. Moreover, the extent to which interests are aligned is a key factor in determining how functional bilateral relations are. China and Brazil‘s core interests do not conflict with one another and both countries wish to win the other's support for their respective core interests. With Lula's return, Brazil's core interests will shift from [an emphasis on] ‘integration into the Western system’ of the Bolsonaro era to ‘the search for a breakthrough in [Brazil’s] international identity’. In order to achieve greater strategic autonomy, Brazil will display clearer policy objectives, such as the shaping of [Brazil] as a regional power, the development of regional integration, its quest to be a representative of developing countries, its role as a facilitator of the North-South dialogue, and so on. Such needs do not directly interfere with China's [own] international strategy. Thus, China should actively support Brazil in playing a more important role at the regional and global levels and support it as well as other Latin American countries in opposing hegemonism and foreign power politics.”
“At the beginning of the 21st century, Brazil's Workers' Party government played an active role in [helping] coordinate the negotiation of Iran’s nuclear [deal], the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks and the crisis in Syria. During the 2022 election campaign, Lula also expressed the idea that ‘Brazil would play a mediating role in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict’. This in itself is a perfect illustration of Lula's international strategic thinking. As a ‘fellow traveller’ in [the push to] reform the international system, China should support Brazil's positive role in international affairs.”
“In addition, Lula's government is expected to attach greater importance to the issue of gaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and [thus] intensify its PR efforts with major powers, including China. This ‘accession’ issue will probably become an important topic in our bilateral dialogue [with Brasilia]. In fact, China and Brazil have the same policy orientation on the issue of reforming the UN and there is room for closer collaboration. For example, the [joint] declarations issued after each of the BRICS summits have all explicitly expressed support for Brazil, India and South Africa to play a more important role within the UN. China can therefore continue to use the BRICS as the main platform for talks on the ‘accession’ agenda of these three countries.”“Second, the return of Lula should be used as an opportunity to strengthen policy coordination and consolidate strategic mutual trust. Lula and his Workers' Party are more closely aligned with China in terms of their values and worldview. This is also the area in which the structural differences between Brazil and the US are most pronounced. At a time of rising US-China competition, Brazil and Latin America's ‘left turn’ provides a relatively good opportunity for China to deepen Sino-Brazilian and Sino-Latin American cooperation and get rid of US interference.”
“In the next phase, China can step up its multilayered diplomatic efforts with Brazil and strengthen the coordination of its standpoints with Brazil on such issues as China-Latin America cooperation, China-US competition and global affairs, [in order to] maintain jointly a favourable environment for bilateral and multilateral cooperation.”
“At the same time, China should provide unequivocal support to Brazil and Latin America’s aspiration for [greater] independence, their joint efforts towards self-strengthening [独立自主和联合自强], and to Latin American integration.”“Third, [we should] continue our highly effective bilateral economic cooperation [with Brazil] and push for [推进] Brazil's participation in the Belt and Road Initiative. The ‘dividends’ generated through cooperating with China are the key factor determining Latin America's attitude towards China. Since the beginning of the 21st century, economic relations between Brazil and China have withstood severe challenges such as the international financial crisis and the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic and have always maintained a highly productive pace of cooperation.”
“At present, economic and livelihood issues are the biggest challenges for Lula's government. Thus, strengthening economic cooperation with China is bound to become a top priority for Brazil. Of the 25 countries in Latin America that have established diplomatic relations [with us], Brazil is one of the four that have not yet signed a BRI cooperation agreement with China. The main reason has been the prolonged political turmoil in Brazil since 2016. In recent years, Lula and the Workers' Party have been highly supportive of the BRI and have expressed their desire to join it. [They have also] announced policy ideas to develop a long-term cooperation plan with China. In this context, China could take the initiative to promote bilateral dialogue on the Belt and Road Initiative and work towards bringing Brazil into cooperating with the BRI [努力促成巴西加入 “一带一路” 合作].”“Fourth, [we should] strengthen global governance cooperation and consolidate the perception of there being a common identity between China and Brazil. At the level of international strategy, reforming the current international order and achieving a multipolar international landscape are the most obvious ‘similarities’ [同类项] between China and Brazil and the correlation of interests between the two sides has clearly been reinforced. Global governance cooperation is a ‘growth point’ for deepening Sino-Brazilian cooperation. [As previously discussed,] Brazil’s diplomatic tradition and values are characterised by multilateral cooperation and by their de-emphasis of ideology. [Moreover,] Brazil also has developmental and structural differences with the US. All of this has resulted in a greater convergence of interests and standpoints on global issues between Brazil and China.”
“Besides, among developing countries, Brazil and China have more comprehensive and multi-dimensional cooperation mechanisms, and their participation in international multilateral mechanisms enjoys a higher degree of consistency. In view of this, China could strengthen its policy coordination with Brazil on major global issues during Lula's presidency. Especially in the context of escalating competition between major powers, Brazil should become a partner that China actively strives to win over in its diplomacy [巴西应成为中国外交积极争取的合作伙伴]. In response to US hegemony, Lula has consistently emphasised the principle of equality between countries, criticised US unilateralism and interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, and lashed out at the US’s approach of ‘decoupling’ to contain other countries. This shows that there is also quite a lot of room for cooperation and coordination between China and Brazil at the level of [their] relations with the US.”