Why China Should Have Distanced Itself from Russia Over Ukraine

"Russia does not have the capacity to shelter China from the wind and rain."

Today’s edition begins with an introduction by Prof. Feng Yujun (冯玉军). Feng is the deputy dean of Fudan University’s Institute of International Studies and the director of both its Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies and its Centre for Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Studies. If you have been following this newsletter, you will also know that he has been one of China’s most outspoken critics of Russia since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. — Thomas

The Russo-Ukrainian war has already been going on for two whole years. The points I made in the following interview shortly after the outbreak of the war have largely stood the test of time. Over the past two years, commentaries pertaining to the Russo-Ukrainian war have abounded in China and opinions have varied greatly. This reflects not only differences in methodology and the types of data used, but also differences in the ways of today’s world and the morals of our time.

The Russo-Ukrainian war is a major event of global and historic significance in the post-cold-war era. How we view and respond to this dramatic upheaval has a bearing on the security of the world, the fate of China as a nation and the wellbeing of its 1.4 billion people.

When we look at this war and the dramatic changes that are currently taking place globally, we must adhere to a correct view of the world, a correct view of history and uphold the right values. We must also abandon all types of old and poisonous conspiracy theories, reject great power state-centrism as well as the concepts of Lebensraum and spheres of influence, and do away with the idea that we live in a world guided by the law of the jungle and zero-sum games.

Feng Yujun

Summary

1. People have not paid sufficient attention to whether Russia’s war in Ukraine is a just or unjust one. The moral nature of this war is bound to affect its outcome.

2. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine contravenes some of the United Nation’s most fundamental principles and the idea that NATO’s potential expansion into Ukraine could justify this so-called “special military operation” is simply wrong.

3. Moscow’s actions should be seen as part of a much broader strategy to rebuild its former empire and spheres of influence. They should also be viewed as an attempt to hedge against the potential shocks that the fourth industrial revolution and green transition are set to have on Russia’s economy.

4. Russia has become a second-rate country, which is in no position to protect China from the turbulences of international politics. Moreover, China is in no need of such a big brother or little brother.

5. Russia is in any case a fickle and interest-driven partner, which will be more than happy to shift its allegiances at the next given opportunity.

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6. Moscow has an interest in exacerbating US-China tensions so as to alleviate some of the pressures that it currently faces.

7. China should remember that the Soviet Union’s collapse did not lead to the negative consequences that some had predicted. On the contrary, US-China relations ended up improving and Beijing was relieved of a major security concern across its northern border.

8. To see the Russo-Ukrainian war as a strategic opportunity for China would be wrong. Such opportunities derive from clearly articulated strategies and do not simply fall into one’s lap like pennies from heaven.

9. Beijing must prevent the West and other parts of the world from transferring their dissatisfaction with Russia onto China. China’s approach to this war could have an impact on its future development and influence in the world.

10. China should ensure that it stands on the right side of history.

The Author

Name: Feng Yujun (冯玉军)
Year of birth: 1970 (age: 53/54)
Position: Deputy dean of the Institute of International Studies, director of the Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, director of the Centre for Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Studies, Fudan University
Formerly: Analyst at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) from 1994 to 2016
Research focus: Russia and the Soviet Union; China’s international strategy and great power relations; Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)
Education: BA Hebei University (1991), MA Jilin University (1994), PhD China Foreign Affairs University (2001)
Experience abroad: Two years in Russia and half a year in Japan as a visiting scholar

REVISITING CHAIRMAN MAO ZEDONG'S "ON PROTRACTED WAR" IN THE LIGHT OF THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT (EXCERPTS)
Feng Yujun (冯玉军)
Source: Interview conducted by Phoenix. First published on 11 March 2022.
Translated by an ATA-certified linguist

“A phenomenon that deserves careful reflection has emerged where Chinese domestic discourse has predominantly focused on the outcome of this historically significant post-Cold War conflict, emphasising the strengths and weaknesses of the different parties and [the dynamics of] great power rivalry. However, aspects such as international law, justice and righteousness are often overlooked. Many still adhere to a belief system grounded in power politics and the law of the jungle. Yet, this conflict highlights [the fact] that righteousness and justice are crucial determinants in the eventual outcome [of this war], not just military strength. It seems many have forgotten Chairman Mao’s insightful comments in On Protracted War about the decisive factors in war outcomes, [which emphasised] not just military might, but also political and economic strength and, most importantly, the nature of the war itself – whether it is just or unjust.”

“Clarifying the roots of the conflict is essential. According to Moscow, NATO's five rounds of eastward expansion posed a significant security threat, necessitating countermeasures. However, several points need clarification here.”

“Regardless of its historical origins, Ukraine became an independent sovereign state following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Under international law, Ukraine has the right to choose its foreign policy and development paths independently. Any fictitious pretexts such as ‘Ukraine joining NATO poses a security threat to Russia’ cannot justify military aggression against Ukraine.”

“Furthermore, resolving differences and disputes between States through direct military aggression contradicts the basic principles of the United Nations Charter.”

“Russia's launching of a military operation against Ukraine is by no means an isolated incident, but an important part of its strategy to rebuild its empire.”

“What is Russia's objective? First, to restore the Russian Empire and rebuild a geopolitical space in Eurasia dominated by Russia from east to west. Second, to force the USA and NATO to alter the security order that has been shaped in Europe since the end of the Cold War. Third, to offset the systemic challenges posed to the Russian economy by the new industrial revolution, new energy revolution and global energy transition by creating geopolitical tensions.”

“Europe has finally awakened to Russia's aggressive and subversive [颠覆性] military actions, with France and Germany largely abandoning their previous approach of seeking compromise by appeasing Russia.”

“There is now a view that, with the United States stepping up its pressure on China, China and Russia must join forces to counter US pressure. [According to this view,] if Russia were to fall, the US would then focus all its energy on China. [But] we need to analyse this issue from both an objective and a subjective level as well as draw wisdom from historical experience.”

“Objectively, China's GDP is now ten times that of Russia’s, its research and development investment is [also] ten times that of Russia’s, its military expenditure is five times greater and its GDP per capita also exceeds Russia's. With the exception of its strategic nuclear forces, Russia today has to a considerable extent effectively become a second-rate country. It can be said that Russia does not have the capacity to shelter China from the wind and rain [俄罗斯没有力量为中国遮风挡雨]. On this issue, China should have full strategic confidence and carefully evaluate the costs and benefits of Sino-Russian cooperation for both countries. China has always pursued an independent and peaceful foreign policy, has never engaged in bloc politics and does not need any kind of ‘big brother’ or ‘little brother’.”

“Subjectively, is Russia willing to shelter China from the wind and rain? Russia, a nation with over 300 years of imperial diplomatic tradition, fully believes in the principle that ‘there are no permanent friends, only permanent interests’ in international relations. Many times in history it has quickly changed course, abandoned alliances and torn up contracts. Only when conflicts and tensions between the United States and China intensify, can Russia alleviate its own pressures. In 2019, Russian leaders stated publicly that Russia wanted to be the ‘smart monkey’ that watches the tigers fight from the sidelines. Recently, Russia has been taking advantage of the strategic competition between the US and China, frequently adopting strong measures internationally to accelerate the restoration of its empire.”

“Historically, I clearly remember China's strategic response after the Eastern Bloc's collapse and the Soviet Union's dissolution. Addressing the concerns at that time of many people in China, who worried that the United States would definitely intensify its comprehensive strategic containment of China following the Soviet Union's dissolution, Comrade Deng Xiaoping specifically emphasised the need to ‘keep calm, calm and again calm, and quietly immerse ourselves in practical work to accomplish something — something for China.’ He also had the foresight to propose the strategic guideline of ‘observing calmly, securing our position, coping with affairs calmly, hiding our capabilities and biding our time, being good at maintaining a low profile, never claiming leadership, and doing some things’. It was under the guidance of this strategic guideline that China responded appropriately to the dramatic changes in the Eastern Bloc. It not only achieved a smooth transition from its relationship with the Soviet Union to one with Russia, but also succeeded in turning around Sino-US relations through a series of proactive measures. In fact, it was the dissolution of the Soviet Union that removed a long-standing security pressure that China had been facing. [This] allowed it to focus more energy and resources on economic construction, [thereby] achieving its economic take-off and a continuous improvement in the living standards of its people through reform, opening-up and full integration into the existing international system. I believe that [our] diplomatic strategy of 30 years ago still holds significant historical lessons for China today.”

“In the context of China-US-Russia relations, the US’s current strategy towards China is composed of three dimensions: cooperation, competition and confrontation. Accordingly, the US views China as a partner, competitor and adversary all in one, not merely as an adversary. China has not invaded other countries, and its international image differs from that of Russia. Russia's actions in overturning regional and international order through warfare have led to opposition from many countries, including the United States. In this situation, we absolutely must recognise the flexibility [that exists] within the three dimensions of US-China relations and not simply regard China and the US as irreconcilable enemies. We should promote US-China interactions based on the ‘three principles’ of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation, jointly expanding cooperation, managing competition and avoiding confrontation, so that US-China relations can be put back on the right track as soon as possible. We must prevent dissatisfaction with Russia from the US, Europe and other countries around the world, including neighbouring countries, from being transferred to China. At the same time, we should adhere to the fundamental principles of ‘non-alignment, non-confrontation and non-targeting of third parties’ in China-Russia relations, tap into the endogenous dynamics of Sino-Russian relations and maintain long-term friendly relations between the two countries.”

“With the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, there is an oversimplified view that China is again facing a rare strategic opportunity. However, strategic opportunities are always created on one's own initiative, not simply bestowed from above. Formulating clear strategies and implementing targeted policies under a clear understanding of international strategic trends are essential for creating strategic opportunities. This war has a significant bearing on China's future development as well as its position, influence and role in the world. At this critical moment of significant change, all departments and all members of the public should gain a deep understanding of the essence of President Xi Jinping's thoughts on ‘standing on the right side of history and the side of human progress, working tirelessly for the lasting and peaceful development of the world and for the building of a community with a shared future for mankind’. [We] should all earnestly put these crucial principles into practice and resolutely avoid being [forced] into different camps [被阵营化].”

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