Xu Jilin on Sexuality, Boredom and Political Apathy Among China’s Youth (Part 1)

"I have noticed that the younger generations lack such deep feelings for things; they are no longer interested in the grand narratives of the 'polis', nation and so on."

Xu Jilin (许纪霖) is one of China’s most prominent historians and public intellectuals (in the non-pejorative sense), renowned for his work on modern Chinese intellectuals, thought and culture. A longtime professor at East China Normal University in Shanghai, he has been a leading figure in efforts to bridge the divide between China’s three main intellectual camps: the Liberals, the New Left and the New Confucians. A self-professed “liberal”, he advocates for what he calls “small government, big society” (小政府，大社会)."

The following interview by Tencent Research Institute provides a fascinating account of Xu's perspective on the profound generational changes currently unfolding in China. It is based on his latest book published last month, “前浪后浪” (Waves of the Past and Future), which explores the intellectual journey of modern Chinese thinkers amid historical upheavals, drawing parallels with the existential struggles currently faced by China’s youth (those under 35).

Xu’s particularly candid and thoughtful account of Chinese society portrays China’s younger cohorts as fundamentally different to their predecessors. Contrary to so many accounts describing Chinese nationalism as “rising”, Xu depicts at least the “post-90” (90后) and “post-00” (00后) generations as politically apathetic Epicureans with little interest in “red culture”, Beijing’s “grand narratives” or even the fate of the Chinese nation.

I have not read Xu’s book and therefore cannot speak to his research methodology. However, given the difficulty these days for researchers to conduct nationally representative surveys on even marginally sensitive issues in China, I assume his conclusions on China’s youth rely mainly on anecdotal evidence and his own personal experience. If so, this should serve as a reminder of the limitations of these observations, despite Xu’s evident perceptiveness and erudition.

In a country that relentlessly promotes national unity, positive energy and patriotic fervour, I suppose it should come as no surprise that this interview was censored soon after its publication. China often wonders why the West seems unable to accept it entirely as the “responsible great power” it has for so long aspired to become. Trump and his administration’s naked approach to power politics will only exacerbate this frustration. Yet the answer is obvious, though so difficult to address in China. While haughtiness, insecurity and the occasional undertones of xenophobia surely exist in the West’s reaction to China’s meteoric rise, a political system that is so opaque and intent on suppressing anything that might threaten its hold on power or hinder its quest for national greatness inevitably breeds suspicion, if not outright rejection.

Thomas

Key Points

1. China's youth represent a fundamentally different generation from those that preceded them.

2. They have little connection with the “red culture” of China’s recent past and have lost the nationalistic and idealistic fervour of older cohorts.

3. They care more about their individual rights, self-centred interests and emotional needs than they do about China, politics or any of their country’s “grand narratives”.

   1. Xu: “[They are] a generation of Epicureans, living for themselves and pursuing their own happiness and well-being.”

4. Yet their lives are characterised by a “sense of emptiness” and a “profound ennui”.

5. This is a relatively normal reaction to the uncertainties that arise when people begin to fear that their country has passed its heyday and may be in decline.

   1. Xu: “It is as though a great ship were about to sink. Those onboard have dived into the sea, each person grabbing a lifebuoy for himself and swimming off on his own. This represents a huge change.”

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6. Their general apathy is closely tied to their reluctance to form deep emotional ties with others.

7. China’s youth tend to live “on the surface” and “in the moment”, seeking instant gratification and avoiding emotional pain.

8. Their romantic relationships are often characterised by fleeting encounters and what are now called "situationships".

9. Born in the 1990s and 2000s, this cohort largely missed out on the opportunities and dividends of China’s economic boom and now bears the brunt of inflated house prices, a shrinking job market and industrial overcapacity. Yet, little is done to support them.

10. For this reason, they deserve the country’s sympathy, encouragement and understanding. As China’s future, they should be valued, not condemned.

N.B.: Part two of this interview will be published shortly.

The Author

Name: Xu Jilin (许纪霖)
Year of birth: March 1957 (age 67)
Positions: Professor and Zijiang Scholar, East China Normal University (ECNU); Deputy Director of the Institute of Modern Chinese Thought and Culture (under the Ministry of Education), ECNU
Research Focus: China’s modern and contemporary intellectual history; 20th and 21st century Chinese culture
Education: BA East China Normal University (1978-1982)
Other: Owing to the Cultural Revolution, the university entrance exam was still suspended when Xu graduated from high school in 1975. As a result, he was sent to work in the countryside as part of the “Down to the Countryside” movement. He began his bachelor's degree in 1978 after the exam was reinstated.
Experience abroad: Australian National University (2000); National University of Singapore (2000); Harvard University (2001-2); University of British Columbia (2004); University of Tokyo (2005); Taiwan’s Academia Sinica (2008); France’s École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (2009); and Japan’s Aichi University (2010).