Yan Anlin on the Drawbacks of a Timetable for Taiwan
"It is likely to take another 5 to 10 years to achieve full reunification, as we are still in a phase of quantitative change, rather than having reached a qualitative shift."
Yan Anlin (严安林) ranks among China’s foremost Taiwan experts. As he likes to note himself, he was the first person in mainland China to earn a Ph.D. in Taiwan studies, has been regularly consulted by Beijing for policy advice and served as a close aide to Wang Daohan (汪道涵)—Beijing’s representative during the landmark 1993 cross-Strait talks.
Yan is also highly adept at addressing both domestic and international audiences. Given his background and connections, it is hard to imagine his granting any “tell-all” interview on Taiwan that would stray from messaging closely aligned with the PRC’s interests. His latest paper—Research on Discourse Construction and Practical Strategies for International Communication Concerning Taiwan-related Issues, published last December—demonstrates as much.
Far from making Yan’s insights worthless, this is simply a reminder that much—though by no means all—of what he says in public is probably subject to careful calibration. One could argue the same of most mainland-based international-relations scholars, particularly those who work in think tanks with close government ties, yet few subjects are as politically sensitive and tightly managed as Taiwan.
With this in mind, Yan’s interview with Amber Wang of the South China Morning Post seems crafted to deliver two main messages: to the international community, a further reassurance that Beijing is unlikely to move militarily against Taiwan in the near term; to the Taiwanese, a renewed warning that Beijing’s patience is waning and that the window for voluntary negotiations is closing rapidly. Both points are encapsulated in his comment that “the Beijing authorities do not have a specific timetable for reunification, but we do feel a sense of urgency” and in his headline-grabbing statement that “full reunification” is “likely to take another five to ten years to achieve”. If shared at home, the same remarks would similarly help temper public expectations while reaffirming Beijing’s unwavering resolve.
One point that merits caution is the notion that Beijing lacks a deadline for (re)unification. Leading analysts on both sides of the Strait have long highlighted the link Beijing draws between its goal of “national rejuvenation” by 2049 and completing (re)unification with Taiwan. As Xi Jinping told the 19th Party Congress in 2017, "Achieving complete national reunification is an inevitable requirement for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (实现祖国完全统一，是实现中华民族伟大复兴的必然要求)”. By anchoring the two goals together (as his predecessors also did), Xi leaves the future Party leadership little room to keep postponing the issue.
Key Points
Cross-Strait (re)unification is likely to occur within the next five to ten years through peaceful means.
Despite a growing sense of urgency, Beijing is unlikely to have set a definitive timeline for this objective.
Although some in China may argue that publishing a timetable would provide clearer strategic direction, others emphasise the risks involved in committing to a hard deadline.
Disagreement also persists over which political framework should govern Taiwan—a decision that may depend on whether (re)unification is achieved peacefully or by force. Beijing’s blueprint for the island therefore remains a work in progress.
I will be in Beijing and Shanghai for much of May. If you would like to connect — whether to exchange views or simply say hello — please feel very welcome to reach out.
The determining factor for cross-Strait (re)unification continues to be the extent to which China’s hard and soft power can continue to grow.
Trump's position on Taiwan remains uncertain, but two things are relatively clear: he is averse to war and unlikely to “abandon” Taiwan.
So far, Washington’s support of Taiwan has been “low-key and balanced with considerations for Beijing”.
Although the risk of conflict across the Taiwan Strait has been increasing since Tsai and now Lai came to power, Beijing is confident that the forces opposed to Taipei declaring independence—including the US—far outweigh those supporting it. Moreover, China now has the means to prevent such a scenario.
The Scholar
Name: Yan Anlin (严安林)
Born: Dec. 1962 (age: 62)
Position: Senior Research Fellow, Director of the Academic Committee and former Vice President, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS); President, Shanghai Institute for International Strategic Studies (SIISS)
Other: Part-time researcher, Taiwan Research Centre, Xiamen University;
Research Focus: Taiwan and cross-Strait relations
Education: BA Nanjing University (1980–1984 ); MA-PhD Nanjing University (1987–1992)
Experience Abroad: Not specified
BEIJING ADVISER YAN ANLIN ON WHY A TIMETABLE FOR TAIWAN REUNIFICATION HAS DISADVANTAGES
Yan Anlin (严安林)
Interview by Amber Wang of the South China Morning Post (21 April 2025)
Many thanks to the SCMP for allowing Sinification to reproduce this interview.
(Illustration by OpenAI’s DALL·E)
SCMP: What is your assessment of the current state of cross-strait relations and the historical progress towards reunification?
Yan Anlin: In my view, we are still in the early stages of building momentum towards complete reunification, which can be seen as a preparatory phase.
It is likely to take another five to 10 years to achieve full reunification, as we are still in a phase of quantitative change, rather than having reached a qualitative shift.
However, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that – if [Taiwanese leader] William Lai Ching-te and other forces advocating Taiwan independence push matters to the extreme – peaceful reunification becomes no longer feasible, which is when the situation might escalate rapidly.
When I say it will take five to 10 years, I’m referring to peaceful reunification. I believe it would be very difficult to achieve sooner than that.
SCMP: Does that mean Beijing has a timetable for reunification?
Yan Anlin: I think the Beijing authorities do not have a specific timetable for reunification, but we do feel a sense of urgency.
Having a timetable can be beneficial – it provides a clear target and enables step-by-step planning. However, the downside is that some aspects of cross-strait reunification are beyond our control, such as international factors, so it comes with both advantages and challenges.
Back in the late 1990s, then [Communist Party] general secretary Jiang Zemin did consider the idea of establishing such a timetable. Hong Kong had returned to China in 1997, with Macau to follow in 1999, leaving Taiwan as the only remaining issue in achieving full reunification.
In June 1998, during a meeting with then US president Bill Clinton, Jiang said: “Frankly speaking, the Taiwan issue cannot be dragged on indefinitely. There must be a timetable”.
There have been internal disagreements over whether to set up a specific timetable. Some argue that if the conditions are not yet ripe, such a timetable could become problematic, as our power might not have reached the required level.
We currently have the capability to prevent Taiwan independence – to ensure it does not succeed. However, we do not yet possess the kind of capability where we can achieve reunification whenever we choose to.
SCMP: The Central Committee of the Communist Party said in their resolution for the sixth plenum of the 19th party congress in 2021 that, on reunification, “time and momentum are always on our side”. What is your understanding of this assertion?
Yan Anlin: We believe that time is on the side of reunification, not Taiwan independence, and we are quite confident in this belief.
Ultimately, it comes down to the balance of power. This power, however, is not just about hard power, it also includes soft power, institutional influence, and various other factors.
When comparing the cross-strait power dynamic, the mainland’s strength is steadily surpassing Taiwan’s.
One significant external factor affecting reunification is the balance of power between China and the United States. We acknowledge that, at present, the US is stronger than us, which is the main reason reunification has not yet been achieved.
However, over the long term, we must recognise the reality that the gap between China and the US is narrowing, and we are gaining ground more quickly.
SCMP: But how do the views of Taiwan’s younger generation affect the mainland’s goal of achieving peaceful reunification?
Yan Anlin: We do recognise that the number of young people in Taiwan who support reunification is not increasing, but rather decreasing, which is undoubtedly linked to Taiwan’s pro-independence education.
However, I don’t believe this necessarily means that young people in Taiwan want independence or wish to establish a “Republic of Taiwan”. The reluctance to reunify and advocating for Taiwan independence are two distinct concepts.
This is why promoting cross-strait youth exchanges remains important. We also acknowledge that the hope for national reunification lies with the younger generation.
Former Taiwanese leader Ma begins historic mainland China trip voicing hopes that ‘peace can come’
That said, reunification is a major national and state issue and cannot be entirely determined by the will of a single portion of the population.
Therefore, while young people’s views are significant, if they support reunification, the likelihood of peaceful reunification becomes much greater. However, if a portion of the younger generation remains opposed to reunification, the mainland could face greater resistance, potentially lengthening the process.
SCMP: Last year, you predicted that after William Lai assumed office, cross-strait relations would enter a high-risk period though it wouldn’t escalate to military conflict. Has your viewpoint changed now, especially considering Lai’s recent announcement of 17 strategies targeting the mainland?
Yan Anlin: I don’t believe my viewpoint has changed significantly.
However, we must acknowledge that Lai’s recent “17 strategies” targeting the mainland and his designation of the mainland as a “foreign hostile force” have had a very negative impact on cross-strait relations, particularly in terms of exchanges.
Many Taiwanese people may now be reluctant to engage in exchanges with the mainland, fearing they could be accused of colluding with the “enemy”.
At the same time, we must recognise that the primary aim of these “17 strategies” is to support the large-scale recall campaign primarily targeting the [opposition] Kuomintang lawmakers, while consolidating Lai’s own power and mobilising his Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) political base ahead of the 2026 local elections in Taiwan.
The “17 strategies” also signal that Lai’s administration may lean towards a more extreme pro-independence stance. However, this doesn’t mean he has already taken that path, as I believe some of the “17 strategies” may prove unfeasible to implement.
There is also the possibility that these strategies could lead to a potential military conflict between the two sides. It will depend on what the Lai administration will do next. The risk of military conflict cannot be ruled out.
SCMP: The mainland’s Anti-Secession Law states that the government may resort to “non-peaceful means and other necessary measures” to achieve reunification under three specific circumstances. So, how close, specifically, are Lai’s 17 strategies to triggering this use of force by Beijing?
Yan Anlin: It’s getting close, but whether the situation truly crosses the line will depend on the actions that follow – especially the handling of the so-called 10 national security-related law revisions by Taiwan’s legislature.
Lai’s speech on March 13 – in which he outlined these strategies and carried the theme of “resisting China” – combined with the large-scale recall campaign and the proposed revisions to national security laws, is part of a “three-in-one” strategy aimed at consolidating his political power.
These actions are highly provocative in terms of cross-strait relations. They challenge the mainland’s bottom line and test its patience.
That said, I believe it’s difficult to make an objective judgment based solely on Lai’s rhetoric. What truly matters is not what he says, but what he does.
What gives us some degree of confidence is that the forces opposed to “Taiwan independence” far outweigh those supporting it. Even the US government does not support Taiwan independence.
Does Lai really have the courage to become a [Ukrainian leader Volodymyr] Zelensky-like figure in the Taiwan Strait, serving as a proxy of foreign anti-China forces to spark a war? I seriously doubt he possesses that kind of resolve.
From this perspective, we still believe there is hope for peaceful reunification, and it remains a goal that we must continue to pursue.
SCMP: How do you assess US President Donald Trump’s Taiwan policy and its impact on the cross-strait situation?
Yan Anlin: Trump has not yet systematically articulated his policy on Taiwan. I believe the bottom line of Trump’s Taiwan policy is to avoid direct US involvement in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. In other words, Trump does not want a war there, as it would run counter to his “Make America Great Again” agenda.
However, I don’t think Trump would abandon Taiwan, because supporting Taiwan is politically correct for the US government, rather than being a personal issue for him.
In his meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, Trump stressed the importance of maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait, which could be seen as interference in China’s internal affairs. Similar statements were made in the Group of Seven foreign ministers’ declaration, reflecting a continuation of America’s Taiwan policy.
However, this does not mean Trump’s Taiwan Strait policy has fully taken shape. There is still considerable uncertainty and, looking ahead, I believe the risks he poses to cross-strait relations are still significant.
Washington’s Taiwan policy is essentially subordinate to its broader China policy. Within this framework, the Trump administration’s Taiwan Strait policy has involved actions such as facilitating the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) to invest another US$100 billion in its American plants in the US and approving US$870 million in military aid to Taiwan. However, these actions have largely been low-key and balanced with considerations for Beijing.
Trump’s arms sales to Taiwan could ultimately surpass those under Joe Biden, as Trump is driven by business interests and expects Taiwan to pay for its own protection.
SCMP: What is your view on TSMC’s announced increased chip investment in the US? What impact does this have on Taiwan’s industries and cross-strait relations?
Yan Anlin: It’s impossible for TSMC to completely relocate its operations to the US, and the shift of the semiconductor industry would require a process. Even if there were a decision on a full transfer during Trump’s presidency, it would be difficult to achieve during his four-year term.
The DPP policy has been to fully comply with Trump’s pressure, which is detrimental to Taiwan. The reason Taiwan’s economy is still holding up is largely due to semiconductors and TSMC. Without TSMC, I think Taiwan could face industrial hollowing, which would also hurt its position in regional economic integration.
If TSMC were to move all of its operations to the US, Taiwan’s strategic importance would decrease further. From this perspective, Lai is effectively selling out Taiwan.
SCMP: You recently attended a symposium in Beijing marking the 20th anniversary of the Anti-Secession Law. Do you think the meeting sent a stronger, more hardline message regarding Taiwan?
Yan Anlin: The symposium sent a very important message: our major policy on Taiwan remains “peaceful reunification” and “one country, two systems”. This basic stance has not changed.
We will absolutely not use non-peaceful means to achieve reunification until the very last moment because both sides of the Taiwan Strait are Chinese. However, if Taiwan independence advocates persist in pursuing their separatist agenda, we may take decisive measures.
SCMP: Since Lai took office, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has conducted at least three large-scale military exercises around Taiwan. How should we understand Beijing’s considerations behind these military drills, and does this pose a greater risk to the Taiwan Strait?
Yan Anlin: Some people may believe that the PLA’s military exercises have become too frequent, but we should recognise that the reason for this is that Taiwan independence has become a real threat.
Prior to [former US House speaker] Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, the PLA’s exercises were quite restrained. However, due to [Lai’s predecessor] Tsai Ing-wen’s collusion with Pelosi, the PLA was forced to take countermeasures, with drills aimed at opposing Taiwan independence. The military drills have become natural and even normalised nowadays.
In reality, the risk of conflict between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is rising. No one can guarantee that there won’t be accidental escalation, but from the mainland’s perspective, we remain committed to peaceful reunification and will only take decisive measures as a last resort.
The PLA exercises are certainly not intended to bring risks to peace in the Taiwan Strait, but to reduce the risk of conflict in the Taiwan Strait. What brings risks to the Taiwan Strait are the separatist activities of the “Taiwan independence” forces headed by Lai, as well as the interference of external anti-China forces in the Taiwan issue.
SCMP: Has there been any new approach or strategy from the mainland regarding Taiwan in recent years? How do we assess the progress and effectiveness of cross-strait “integrated development”?
Yan Anlin: The core strategy remains focused on peaceful and integrated development between the two sides, gradually building strength and preparing to advance the reunification process. There has been no significant shift in this fundamental approach.
Other key elements, such as complete national reunification in the process of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and firmly opposing Taiwan independence and external interference, are all valuable lessons accumulated over many years.
If we are to speak of new approaches in recent years, the emphasis has been on deepening integrated development, along with continuous improvements to Beijing’s integrated development policies. However, integration is a long-term process that requires time.
During the eight years of Tsai’s administration and now with Lai in office, integration has been a one-sided effort.
By “one-sided”, I mean that we cannot push for integration in Taiwan, rather, we invite Taiwanese people to come to the mainland to engage in the integration process. This is the current limitation.
Meanwhile, the DPP has staunchly opposed integration, which has further complicated the situation. At present, the mainland’s integration efforts are confined to Fujian province, with no nationwide roll-out yet.
The DPP exerts tighter control over cross-strait exchanges, and, in some respects, this can be likened to a form of ‘green terror’.
As a result, the effects of integration are still quite localised, and we remain in the early stages of the process, which is also completely normal. Therefore, it cannot be said that the integration process has fully succeeded, nor can we expect to immediately enter a phase of peaceful reunification. This is likely to take more time.
SCMP: In 2019, President Xi Jinping proposed exploring a one country, two systems model for Taiwan. What progress has been made in terms of research and development of this proposal?
Yan Anlin: Academic research on the Taiwan plan has entered an intensive and detailed phase. However, there are internal disagreements within the scholarly community. Most scholars still believe the framework should remain one country, two systems, but there’s now an opinion that the manner of reunification – whether peaceful or through force – could determine the final shape of the post-reunification arrangement. That’s one area of divergence.
Another contentious point is whether Taiwan’s military would be retained. Many of the current proposals suggest that it may not be possible for Taiwan to keep its armed forces. Additionally, Taiwan’s de-sinicised education system would definitely need to be reformed.
At present, the Taiwan plan is still under unilateral study and discussion on the mainland – by both academics and the government. It has not yet progressed to cross-strait negotiations. But ultimately, any implementation of the plan will require such negotiations. So far, neither Taiwanese scholars nor the general public have been involved in shaping this proposal.
In my view, the earlier both sides begin negotiations, the better it will be for Taiwan. Early talks would give Taiwan more bargaining chips, and it may be able to secure broader rights. If negotiations only begin as a last resort, Taiwan is likely to be in a much weaker position.
SCMP: In your opinion, if reunification is achieved through force, would Taiwan be turned into a regular province rather than a special administrative region like Hong Kong or Macau?
Yan Anlin: In my opinion, that’s impossible. Once the two sides are reunified – especially under the “two systems” Taiwan plan – Taiwan would definitely become a special administrative region. That’s beyond question, though the name might not be exactly “Taiwan Special Administrative Region”.
For example, if the people of Taiwan wish to retain the term “Republic” [Taiwan’s official name is “the Republic of China”] in some form, then perhaps a name like “Taiwan Republic Special Administrative Region” could be negotiable.
SCMP: Do you personally think the governance model for Taiwan would be more flexible than Hong Kong’s?
Yan Anlin: I believe it would definitely be more flexible. For example, Taiwan already participates in some international organisations, and that participation may not only continue after reunification but might actually expand.
I also believe elections in Taiwan will absolutely continue. It’s impossible that elections would be cancelled after reunification. However, those elected wouldn’t be called “president,” and the constitution of the Republic of China possibly would not remain in place in its current form.
SCMP: You worked closely for many years with Wang Daohan, the former president of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS). What lessons can we draw from Wang’s talks with his Taiwanese counterpart in the 1990s in terms of today’s cross-strait relations? And has institutionalised consultation between the two sides reached a deadlock?
Yan Anlin: The 1993 Wang-Koo talks in Singapore – with Wang representing ARATS and Koo Chen-fu representing Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) – were a prime example of pragmatic cross-strait engagement.
At the time, Taiwan’s “Three No’s” policy [no contact, no negotiation, no compromise] restricted direct official interaction with the mainland. So, both sides created semi-official organisations – essentially “white gloves” – to shake hands and handle concrete issues arising from growing cross-strait exchanges. The talks were grounded in mutual respect and a “seeking common ground while shelving differences” approach.
After Tsai took office in 2016 and refused to recognise the 1992 consensus, the political foundation for dialogue between ARATS and SEF collapsed, leading to today’s stalemate. In this sense, yes – institutionalised negotiations are currently at an impasse.
That said, on matters directly affecting people’s livelihoods, there’s still room for pragmatic cooperation. For example, issues like mainland residents travelling to Taiwan could still be discussed through smaller, sectoral mechanisms – like the tourism-focused “Mini-Two Associations” [Taiwan Strait Tourism Association and the mainland’s Association for Tourism Exchange Across the Taiwan Strait] – if there is mutual willingness.
However, Lai has shown no intention of reopening such exchanges – including tourism. He seems to believe that increased cross-strait interaction and mutual understanding among people on both sides are detrimental to the pro-independence agenda.
So in my opinion, at least for this year, it is likely to remain very difficult for residents from places like Shanghai and Fujian to travel to Taiwan. But in the long run, I don’t think such barriers can hold.
SCMP: Last year, you wrote an article about leveraging the roles of Hong Kong and Macau to ease travel restrictions for certain DPP figures. Could you explain the rationale behind this approach?
Yan Anlin: Relations between Hong Kong and Taiwan are a crucial part of cross-strait relations and should continue to play an important role. That’s why I suggested that some DPP members, who might be reluctant to visit the mainland including Shanghai, due to the 22 measures targeting pro-independence figures, could travel to Hong Kong and Macau instead.
However, the bigger issue now is that while some DPP members can travel to Shanghai, they are unable to visit Hong Kong [due to regulations in Hong Kong].
Additionally, since the implementation of the national security law in Hong Kong, some DPP members told me that within their party, a cultural tendency had developed where visiting Hong Kong was seen as politically incorrect.
I believe that exchanges between Taiwan and Hong Kong should take the lead – ahead of, for example Taiwan’s exchanges with mainland cities like Shanghai. But unfortunately this isn’t the reality at the moment.
SCMP: You visited Taiwan for academic exchanges in January this year, which is considered a rare example of cross-strait Track 2 dialogue since the pandemic. What was your key takeaway from this trip? Additionally, as the first mainland scholar to obtain a PhD in contemporary Taiwan studies, could you share your insights on the current state and challenges of Taiwan research on the mainland?
Yan Anlin: Our visit to Taiwan was purely for academic exchange as civilian scholars, and this is also the first time I visited Taiwan since the Covid-19 pandemic.
It has been 30 years since my first visit to Taiwan, in 1995, and this time, obtaining entry permission was the most challenging it has ever been. The DPP exerts tighter control over cross-strait exchanges, and, in some respects, this can be likened to a form of “green terror” [a reference to the white terror under which Taiwanese were persecuted by the Kuomintang government during the island’s martial law period].
Reflecting on the trip, I came to realise the critical importance of these exchanges. There exists a significant gap in understanding between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, even within the academic community. Therefore, fostering exchanges is essential for bridging this divide.
Ultimately, the resolution of the Taiwan issue depends on strength [and also] the ability to clearly articulate its benefit
As for Taiwan studies, it requires mainland researchers to conduct fieldwork in Taiwan, spend time there, and engage with various sectors of Taiwanese society to gain an authentic understanding of the situation. Otherwise, our perspectives may remain based on mere conjecture.
I have been involved in Taiwan studies since 1989. Some people jokingly point out that after over 30 years of research, the reunification issue remains unresolved. I tell them that if research alone could solve the Taiwan issue, it would reflect a fundamental underestimation of its complexity.
Ultimately, the resolution of the Taiwan issue depends on strength. The mainland must possess the necessary power; without it, reunification is not feasible.
Reunification also requires the ability to clearly articulate its benefit and to lay out both the steps and strategy, which are closely tied to us researchers and our work, calling for us to seize every moment.
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