Yan Xuetong on Trump and US-China Relations
"Populism is gaining strength in both countries, fanning the flames of jingoism."
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Some in China love to hate him, but at 72, Yan Xuetong's (阎学通) voice continues to carry significant weight among Chinese strategists and foreign policy experts. Today’s edition collates his views on the future trajectory of US-China relations and the global political landscape following Trump’s return to power later this month.
Wishing you all a very happy New Year,
Thomas
The Scholar
Name: Yan Xuetong (阎学通)
Date of birth: 7 December 1952 (age: 72)
Position: Dean of the Institute of International Relations, Tsinghua University.
Previously: Researcher at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) from 1982-1984 and 1992-2000.
Research focus: International relations
Education: BA Heilongjiang University (1982); MA University of International Relations (1986); PhD University of California, Berkeley (1992)
For a more detailed overview of Yan’s career, interests, and publications, see here.
OVERVIEW OF YAN XUETONG’S VIEWS ON TRUMP AND US-CHINA RELATIONS (12.2023-12.2024)
Sources: Foreign Affairs (Dec 2024), Zhinews (Dec 2024), Tsinghua Debate (Oct 2024), SCMP (July 2024), The Paper (Dec 2023)
(Illustration by OpenAI’s DALL·E 3)
1. US-China Relations Under Trump
Trump is poised to escalate the hard-line approach towards China that characterised his first term in office.
This is likely to involve deeper economic decoupling, heightened military pressure on China and impulsive actions that are sure to anger Beijing.
US-China relations are thus set to deteriorate further—albeit not as sharply as they might have under a Kamala Harris presidency.
Compounding this trend, escalating populist, nationalistic and jingoistic rhetoric on both sides risks fostering greater animosity between Chinese and American citizens.
Yan: “It may become harder to improve bilateral relations as cultural and social pressure keeps the countries at loggerheads.”
A key distinction from his first presidency is that his administration will now be dominated by younger "right-wing extremists", devoid of Cold War-era experience and espousing an even more aggressive stance towards Beijing.
Although engagement with Washington will remain a priority for China’s leadership, it does not preclude retaliation when deemed necessary.
However, if Trump imposes higher tariffs on Chinese imports, Beijing will have limited retaliatory options.
Yan: “If [Washington] restricts imports of Chinese products, China can only impose a certain degree of restrictions on American products.”
2. Advantages of Trump’s Return
On the plus side for Beijing, Trump shows little interest in ideological or human rights issues and is likely to be less inclined to “intervene in China’s domestic affairs” or subvert its current political system.
His “political isolationism” and “economic protectionism” could create rifts within America’s alliance network, prompting allies to balance more carefully between China and the United States.
Although China's international relations may not improve over the next decade, Beijing will benefit from the expected deterioration of US foreign relations.
Yan: “China’s [international] relations may not necessarily improve. But as the US’ strategic relations with other major powers will be undermined, the strategic balance between China and the US will become less favourable to the US.”
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has caused substantial geopolitical and economic harm to China, with repercussions likely to endure “for years”.
For instance, East Asian and developed countries have moved closer to the US, increasing both military and economic risks for China.
Beijing’s controversial stance on the conflict has also given India a prime opportunity to position itself as the rightful leader of the Global South.
Trump’s desire to end the war in Ukraine is thus closely aligned with Beijing’s own interests.
Although cooperation is possible in this domain, the West often overestimates China’s influence over Russia. If Europe and the US together cannot rein in a small country like Israel, how can they expect China to do so with Russia?
Yan: “How can China influence Russia to make any major policy changes? This is impossible.”
3. Domestic Economy Comes First
Like Xi, Trump’s attention will be focused primarily on strengthening the domestic economy, thus reducing the likelihood of a military clash or even a proxy war between the US and China.
Unlike Harris, Trump is less concerned about maintaining America’s global hegemony.
Although accidents may occur in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, there is no risk of their escalating into a full-blown war.
Yan: “China is not about to draw up a timetable for reunification with Taiwan when it is concerned primarily with its own GDP growth.”
The outcome of the great power rivalry between the US and China will be determined not by ideology, but by technological progress, economic strength and government efficiency.
Yan: “In the next four years, the relationship between China and the United States will not only be one of diplomatic competition but also a competition between the two countries in implementing domestic government reforms.”
4. The World Tomorrow: Anti-Globalisation, Populism and Protectionism
Decoupling, de-risking, “internal circulation” and the flouting of international norms are all symptoms of the current wave of “anti-globalisation” (逆全球化).
At present, there is no driving force capable of reversing this global trend, which is set to persist for the next two to three decades.
Security and economic risks are rising. China must adapt to a world in which countries are adopting protectionist policies, are less inclined to cooperate with one another and in which Washington’s rivalry with Beijing will continue to hurt Chinese interests.
The impact of populism and protectionism across the world will be felt most strongly from 2030 onwards.
5. Next 10 Years: China Unlikely to Surpass America
The economic and military disparity between the two countries is unlikely to change much over the next ten years. It could even widen over the next five years.
Yan: “In terms of defence spending, the US spends over US$900 billion per year. China spends less than 30 per cent of that. The US is also involved in wars and is amassing combat experience. So in the next five years, it is less possible for China to narrow the gap with the US in military strength.”
Yan: “During this period [2024-2034], I don’t think there is a big prospect of China closing the gap in strength with the US. But it is possible to stop the gap from widening.”
For China to start closing the gap with the US, one of the keys will be in limiting the negative effect that the current “anti-globalisation” wave will have on the country’s developmental and foreign policy goals.
Beijing should also shift its diplomatic focus primarily to its neighbourhood and strive to foster friendlier relations with countries in and around its periphery.
6. Towards Bipolarity, Not Multipolarity
Within the next ten years or so, the economic and military disparity between the US and China, on the one side, and the rest of the world, on the other, will have continued to widen.
We have entered a bipolar world order dominated by the US and China, not a multipolar one.
China’s oft-used expression of “The East is rising, the West is declining” is at best too vague and at worst untrue. It is nothing more than “wishful thinking” on the part of those who use it.
China and many other countries, including the US, may promote multipolarity, but this is merely “a wish, not a reality.”
The role of smaller countries and multilateral organisations in shaping tomorrow’s world will probably continue to decline.
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