From Grey-Zone Intimidation to Control: Gao Zhikai’s Path to Reunification (Part 2)

"I have always been convinced of this: when China launches a military operation to bring about reunification, the United States will not send troops."

This is the second part of Gao Zhikai’s interview with the online news outlet Guancha. Part One and a summary of the key points are available here.

NO ONE CAN STOP US FROM ENTERING OUR OWN TERRITORY — TAIWAN, PROVINCE OF CHINA (PART 2)
Gao Zhikai (高志凯)
Published by Guancha.cn on 2 April 2025
Translated by Paddy Stephens

Question 4: On the mainland stepping up efforts to crack down on Taiwanese espionage, as well as other measures it can take to counter “pro-independence activities”.

Gao Zhikai: I have a few thoughts on how to further promote cross-Strait relations and ultimately achieve reunification.

Firstly, my understanding is that statistics relating to the economy, population and other data are still compiled separately for the mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau. Although this approach is not without its rationale, I would suggest that we, from now on, begin to establish an integrated statistical system. For example, when calculating the overall size of China's economy, the total should include figures from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.

Internationally, the term “Greater China” [大中华地区] is often used, referring to mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau. I believe the time has come for us to put forward openly and confidently [our own] concept of a “One-China Region” [大中国地区], along with corresponding statistical data and definitions. We should no longer treat the Taiwan region as a separate entity when reporting [national] statistics. Instead, Taiwan’s data should be directly incorporated into our overall national figures. This is of paramount importance. Whether we are measuring our territory, economic development or demographic changes, we must act swiftly and effectively to establish statistics for the One-China Region.

Secondly, we should establish a system for gathering data on the Taiwan authorities and pro-independence figures of all types (be they in government or civil society). Ideally, this should include a scoring mechanism for [these] individuals based on their actions [对个人所作所为打分].

For example, Lai has already crossed several lines, and his actions will not be without consequences. We are monitoring this closely; once the time comes and all the data has been both collected and organised properly, he will be made to pay for his actions [算账]. This can also serve as a [powerful] deterrent for others [威慑力]. As it is said [in the Tao Te Ching] , “Heaven’s net is vast; though wide-meshed, nothing can slip through”. Indeed, ours will be tightly woven, with barely any gaps [这张天网可能非常密集].

At the same time, we should adopt a parallel approach for our compatriots in Taiwan who support reunification: “Your actions will be recorded and recognised. Once national reunification is achieved, the righteous actions you have taken should be rewarded” — creating a clear distinction between commendable behaviour and wrongdoing [予以奖励，实现奖罚].

Whether in advancing reunification or striving to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait while opposing separatism, we must ensure that an increasing number of our Taiwanese compatriots recognise that promoting reunification is the correct course of action. As members of the Chinese nation [中华民族], heirs to a civilisation stretching back 5,000 years, we all share a duty and responsibility to advance this process.

[This is the mindset people should have:] “These days, everything I do is recorded and traceable. When the day of reunification arrives, it will be clear whether my actions were right or wrong, and whether I deserve to be rewarded or punished.” This particular point has already become an urgent priority [当务之急].

Thirdly, I believe there are several things to bear in mind when conducting diplomacy and advancing relations with other countries,. One is the need to define our red lines clearly to prevent any further moves towards “Taiwanese independence”. Another is to develop clear and coordinated strategies—both at home and abroad—so that in the event of any unexpected developments, our position is already established, and no country can feign ignorance or claim that these matters were already settled decades ago. Take, for example, Japan’s recent claim that the 1972 China-Japan Joint Statement [Note: which normalised its diplomatic relations with the PRC and stated that Japan “understands and respects” the PRC’s position on Taiwan] is not legally binding. This effectively amounts to a denial of Japan’s prior acknowledgment of the One-China principle, and it is completely unacceptable [Note: Some legal scholars argue that Japan deliberately phrased this statement to avoid formally recognising the PRC’s claim over Taiwan].

We currently have established diplomatic relations with over 180 countries. The establishment of relations with us is founded on the recognition that “the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China, and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China's territory.” In view of recent statements by countries such as Japan, although they made this commitment at the time of establishing diplomatic ties [with us], I believe we should take measures to reaffirm this point annually when exchanging [official] documents [互换文件时] with these countries.

Internationally, we should take more proactive steps [有更大的作为], rather than merely reiterating our stance. Although the latter is indeed important, recent developments in both the international landscape and the Taiwan Strait demand that we adopt new measures. We should require annual written reaffirmations of their commitment. Failure to do so—thereby breaching the solemn promises made when diplomatic relations were established—must result in appropriate consequences [定要让他们付出相应后果].

At the same time, we must also closely [monitor and] prepare for potential moves that could be made by “Taiwan independence” separatists and their collaborators. In particular, we must prepare for the possibility that the US government may seek to assist the Taiwan authorities’ increased participation in international organisations. We must take steps to block avenues for them to engage in such egregious behaviour.

Question 5: On the risk that anti-CCP and anti-reunification groups in Taiwan are still holding on to the belief that they could switch sides once reunification begins.

Gao Zhikai: I believe that the mainland must take a clearer and firmer stance. Take, for instance, the recent actions by the Taiwan authorities in expelling mainland brides from Taiwan, splitting a family up in the process and other such consequences. Are we simply going to stand by and watch them be driven out? No!

First of all, we must define the nature of such actions. We must make it clear that this behaviour undermines the current peaceful status quo across the Strait. It is a provocation—an egregious act that pushes cross-Strait relations from peace towards hostility. We must stress that such actions will bear responsibility for any eventual hostility between the two sides [为两岸的最终敌对承担责任].

At the same time, we must make clear that once reunification is achieved, any “Taiwan independence” separatists involved in the expulsion of mainlanders will be held accountable and punished. We should begin compiling a list of these individuals — clearly documenting which departments were involved, who was responsible and which individuals signed off on it — and make this information public.

Every expulsion must be treated as a major issue. We must never say, “The mainland is soft, the other side is tough, and there is nothing we can do.” That mindset is absolutely unacceptable.

I have another suggestion. Since we consistently affirm that there is no so-called “median line” in the Taiwan Strait, and that both sides of the Strait constitute Chinese territory — with the waters in between falling under the categories of territorial sea, contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone — then our vessels should absolutely be able to approach the main island of Taiwan [开到台湾岛去]. We could begin by sending uncrewed boats, then civilian vessels, fishing boats and so on. We can clearly state that these vessels are unarmed and the mainland will never fire the first shot — but no force can prevent people, ships, unmanned boats or drones from the mainland from heading towards Taiwan.

Speaking of drones, I believe we should make it very clear to Taiwan that, starting from a certain date, drones from the mainland will begin flying towards Taiwan. Initially, they can operate at high altitudes, and then gradually lower their altitude — from 20,000 metres to 10,000 metres, then to 8,000, 5,000, 1,000 and even 500 metres. We must clearly state that our drones carry no weapons, serve no military purpose, and exist solely to convey one message: both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one country, and our people, ships, aircraft and various other tools are free to move between them. If you dare to fire upon them, you will bear the consequences — we won’t fire the first shot, but that does not mean we won’t fire the second.

From this, I believe it will gradually become tacitly accepted that our unmanned vessels can approach Taiwan, and that our drones can patrol over the island. This will lead relevant parties in Taiwan, as well as the public, to gradually accept this reality. Over time, people in Taiwan will come to realise that they should not support “Taiwan independence”, but should instead voice strong opposition to it.

If any of our Taiwanese compatriots are suppressed by the pro-independence faction or local authorities, then by our standards, that [very fact] is worthy of praise — it shows they [must] have acted correctly, and this] should be recorded and commended. As for the departments or individuals responsible for such suppression, their actions should be clearly documented too. They must bear responsibility, and they will be punished in due course.

I hope that the people on both sides of the Strait come to realise that opposing “Taiwan independence” is the duty of every Chinese citizen. At the same time, drones and unmanned vessels will appear daily, sending a clear and unequivocal message: Taiwan is a part of China. We will come whenever we choose, and no one can stop us from entering our own territory: Taiwan, Province of China.

In an interview once, I debated with a pro-independence activist who argued that there were reasons we should not implement “One Country, Two Systems”. My response was: “If you don’t want ‘One Country, Two Systems’, then be prepared for ‘One Country, One System’!” This message must be clearly conveyed to Taiwan: “One Country, Two Systems” is for your benefit. If you reject it, you will have no choice but to accept “One Country, One System”.

We originally had some preferential policies and arrangements for Taiwan. But if the pro-independence factions insist on rejecting these, then the situation becomes perfectly clear.

Another example is participation in the Olympics or other international sporting events, where it should also be clearly stated that Taiwan is a province of the People’s Republic of China. Only in this way can we eliminate the toxic legacy left by Taiwanese separatists over the years, and ensure the international community recognises the established fact that there is only One China [一个中国的事实].

I recently met the Deputy Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan, who specifically reiterated Azerbaijan’s firm support for the One China principle, [adding] that China also supports Azerbaijan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. He believes this is the foundation of diplomatic relations between our two countries. We must continue to reiterate this point with every country that has established diplomatic relations with China. Ideally, it should be formalised and put in writing, with the other party’s signature and seal, and then confirmed by us. This confirmation should be submitted to the United Nations every year. Since the 1971 resolution on China, more and more countries have voiced support. We must cut off all avenues for ‘Taiwan independence’ forces and shut down the channels through which hostile international actors attempt to support them.

Question 6: Regarding the recent joint statement by G7 foreign ministers, which expressed their “opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion” and voiced support for “Taiwan’s meaningful participation in appropriate international organisations” — and on whether they are attempting to turn Taiwan into a “second Ukraine”.

Gao Zhikai: Firstly, due to the actions of the United States, the G7 has become fragmented. Tensions between the US and several other member states — especially countries like Canada — are intensifying and becoming increasingly public. As a result, I believe that the G7 and the organisations it is involved in, such as NATO, are already deeply divided over the war in Ukraine, perhaps irreconcilably so. As a result, they have had to find an issue on which they could still reach a consensus. And what did they ultimately settle on? The Taiwan issue.

I believe the recent statements made by the G7 are rooted in a deeper context and reflect major changes in the international environment — which is why they are now using the Taiwan issue as a point of leverage. On the other hand, their claim to “oppose any [unilateral] attempts to change the status quo across the Taiwan Strait by force or coercion” actually constitutes a blatant interference in China’s internal affairs, prompting strong condemnation from China. At the same time, we should emphasise again that Lai’s seventeen-point strategy has already altered the nature of cross-Strait relations.

Previously, the two sides of the Strait enjoyed peaceful relations. People could come and go as they wished, mainlanders and Taiwanese were free to marry one another, and both talent and logistics could flow from the mainland to Taiwan and vice versa. In 2024, trade between Taiwan and the mainland exceeded $200 billion, with Taiwan enjoying a surplus of over $80 billion [Note: this is according to figures reported by CGTN]. If Taiwan were to lose all trade with the mainland, it would face an overall trade deficit, given its trade with other countries and regions. [Note: Cross-Strait trade figures diverge sharply by source. On Taiwan’s own numbers, even if all trade with the mainland (and Hong Kong) disappeared, the island would still register a small overall surplus. On PRC Customs numbers the bilateral surplus is big enough that, if those figures are grafted onto Taiwan’s global totals, Taiwan would fall into deficit.].

Viewed from this perspective, who is truly changing [the nature of] cross-Strait relations? Who is placing hostility at the heart of the relationship [把敌对作为主旋律]? Who is branding the mainland as a “hostile foreign force”? Clearly, it is the “Taiwan independence” faction — it is Lai Ching-te! I believe we must make this clear to the international community and formally notify the G7 of who is actually altering the situation! We must not wait until tensions in the Taiwan Strait escalate further and spiral out of control before making this known. By that point, it may already be too late.

We must seize the opportunity to strike hard while they are on the back foot [痛击落水狗]. Now that Lai Ching-te has revealed his true colours, we must crush his every move [既然赖清德已经把他的尾巴露出来了，我们就要紧紧抓住不放，把他的尾巴打烂、打断], leaving these Taiwanese separatists no more room [to stir up further trouble].

Question 7: On how the Trump administration really views Taiwan and its goals in the rearmament of the island.

Gao Zhikai: I believe that by closely observing President Trump’s position on Taiwan, several conclusions can be drawn. First, the United States is trying to force Taiwan’s semiconductor industry — especially TSMC and similar companies — to relocate to the US. Trump has publicly announced that TSMC had not only agreed to invest $100 billion in the US, but later even raised that figure to $200 billion. And this is by no means the end; in future, he might well continue to demand even greater investment from TSMC and Taiwan into the US.

In addition, the United States has also announced that the Taiwanese authorities have agreed to invest nearly 50 billion US dollars in the construction of an undersea natural gas pipeline project in Alaska [Note: No official Western or Taiwanese sources reviewed confirm a US $50 billion commitment. Any eventual stake by Taiwan’s state-owned CPC Corp. is expected to be under half of the project’s estimated US $44 billion cost]. None of the projects [Taiwan has invested in] is likely to be completed in the next few years, and some may never be. Moreover, once the investments are made, the return on investment remains highly uncertain.

Therefore, the Trump administration’s aim is to wring every last drop it can out of Taiwan—forcing TSMC to relocate to the US and become “USMC”, while taking [as much of] Taiwan’s money [as possible] to the United States. What they fail to mention is that the bulk of Taiwan’s current foreign exchange reserves were accumulated over decades of peaceful cross-strait trade, and now they are pressuring Taiwan to invest these decades’ worth of reserves into the US.

Furthermore, I believe President Trump is completely different from former President Biden. On four or five occasions, when Biden was asked whether the United States would send troops if something were to happen in the Taiwan Strait, he answered "Yes, we would send troops." Although the State Department and the Department of Defence later walked back these remarks, it was clear that Biden was engaging in "strategic ambiguity”.

Trump, on the other hand, has not engaged in this kind of strategic ambiguity. He has said repeatedly, and explicitly, where Taiwan’s value lies. More recently, he has said that if Taiwan wants protection from the United States, it must pay for it—demanding that Taiwan raise its defence budget to 10% of its GDP and purchase as many American weapons, equipment, hardware, software and related systems as possible. The aim is clear: to bleed Taiwan dry [榨干台湾的血] and seize its wealth.

I have always been convinced of this: when China launches a military operation to bring about reunification, the United States will not send troops. Why is that? Just think—why would America let its soldiers be wounded or even die to defend so-called “Taiwan independence”? That would be no different from dragging the United States into another country’s civil war.

No one understands the current status quo and history of the Taiwan Strait better than the United States. Whether in the 1930s and 40s, after 1949, during the Korean War, throughout the Cold War, or in key moments such as Kissinger’s visit to China in 1971, President Nixon’s state visit in 1972, and the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979—over these decades, who knows more than the US, apart from China itself?

And yet, the United States continues to feign confusion, playing the game that is strategic ambiguity. Now, it has gone even further, adopting the position that Taiwan should bring all of its money to the United States—even its foreign exchange reserves.

Recently, the US has even proposed a plan for 100-year non-redeemable government bonds, with the condition that holders may not transfer them. It is very likely that they will pressure Taiwan to first invest $100 billion, then $500 billion, or even $1 trillion in these non-transferable, interest-free bonds. Isn’t this essentially a move to wipe out the wealth Taiwan has accumulated over decades?

Therefore, I believe the US is pursuing its own selfish agenda. It wants to treat Taiwan as a proxy, extracting economic value from it as quickly as possible—first forcing the core, high-value assets over to the US, and then demanding payment from the Taiwan authorities. If the Taiwan authorities still want “protection” from the United States, then they will have to pay for it—turning the US into a kind of mercenary force [雇佣军].

But I must emphasise again and again that China’s determination to uphold its national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to achieve national reunification, is unconditional and unwavering. This is categorical and non-negotiable. Therefore, no matter how the United States attempts to reframe the issue or use Taiwan for its own ends— which is ultimately for its own gain and self-interest—none of this can change the inevitability of China achieving reunification.

The Author

Name: Gao Zhikai (高志凯)
Year of birth: 1962 (age: 62/63)
Position: Vice-President, Centre for China and Globalisation (CCG); Guest Professor, School of Law, Soochow University
Previous roles: Translator, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (where he worked for Deng Xiaoping and at the UN) (1983-89); Senior positions at Morgan Stanley, CICC, Daiwa Securities and CNOOC; China Policy Advisor at the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission (1999-2000)
Other: According to his biography, Gao has produced hundreds of internal reports for various ministries and senior officials on topics ranging from diplomacy and public security to the economy and public welfare—some of which have received written comments (批示) from Xi Jinping himself.
Research focus: Generalist
Education: BA Soochow University (1980); MA Beijing Foreign Studies University (1982); MA-PhD Yale University (1993)
Experience abroad: United States (1980s and 1990s)

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