Growing China-India Rivalry as viewed by CIIS Expert Lan Jianxue
Growing China-India Rivalry as viewed by CIIS Expert Lan Jianxue
According to Lan, India has been trying to curtail China’s influence within multilateral platforms such as the G20, BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
China recently confirmed that its leader Xi Jinping would not be attending this weekend’s G20 summit in New Delhi, a first for a Chinese president. His absence has been interpreted by some analysts as a snub to India.
Earlier this year, Sinification shared the views of a regular Chinese commentator of Indian affairs and researcher at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS), Liu Zongyi (刘宗义), who believed that India would be seeking to “stabilise” relations with Beijing in order to secure its support for the upcoming G20 summit. In his words:
“Ultimately, the G20 summit cannot be a success without China's active participation. Even though the West lavishes praise on India and even though India presents itself as the so-called poster child of developing countries and the leader of the South, it will most certainly not succeed without China's support … In this context, my sense is that the Indian leadership wants to stabilise Sino-Indian relations and then host a successful G20 summit.”
Viewed from this angle, New Delhi evidently didn’t do enough to secure Beijing’s backing (not that it necessarily ever planned to).
Today’s post is a summary of a recent piece by Lan Jianxue (蓝建学), the director of the department for Asia-Pacific Studies at the Beijing-based China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) – one of China’s top think tanks. In this article, Lan gives his analysis of the gradual souring of Sino-Indian relations in recent years, which may provide some further clues as to Xi’s no-show this weekend. Direct quotes have been put in italics, the rest is my paraphrasing of Lan’s arguments. The subtitles and ordering of his views are my own.
As with so many of the pieces shared in this newsletter, this account remains one-sided. For those of you who are new to this newsletter, please be sure to understand that Sinification’s goal is to provide Chinese perspectives, not a balanced account, nor my own views, on international affairs. I repeat this so as hopefully to avoid the many critical (to put it mildly) messages that I received following Sinification’s publication of Liu Zongyi’s commentary in January.
In a Nutshell
Modi’s government has abandoned India’s cautious approach to foreign policy and has turned towards Realpolitik and an increasingly anti-China stance.
The Sino-Indian border clash of 2020, which plunged relations to their lowest point in over thirty years, was the “inevitable consequence” of this shift.
Since then, New Delhi has launched a “government-wide”, “comprehensive” and “vengeful” strategy against Beijing that pursues “de-sinicisation” and decoupling from China in the political, economic, military and societal spheres.
The negative impact that India is now having on some of China’s core interests (e.g. Taiwan, Tibet, the South China Sea) and on the Indo-Pacific region as a whole is becoming increasingly obvious.
India currently has four key international objectives: 1. assuming the role of a global power; 2. becoming the leader of the Global South; 3. acting as the bridge between West and South; 4. asserting its hegemonic influence over the Indian subcontinent and its surrounding seas.
India is also trying to thwart China’s rising influence within multilateral platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), BRICS or the G20, and is increasingly aligning itself with positions held by the West.
With US-China rivalry rising, New Delhi is keen to exploit these divisions for its own economic and geopolitical benefit. It has therefore become a willing participant in Washington’s containment strategy towards China.
As a result, part of India’s policymaking elite now see maintaining a certain amount of tension with Beijing as a way of deepening their ties with Washington and, more generally, the West.
Tensions between Beijing and New Delhi are set to grow and the “emotional volatility” of both Indian and Chinese public opinion will remain “one of the major challenges facing India-China relations” for years to come.
Nevertheless, both countries still have an interest in stabilising relations with one another so as not to jeopardise their own development goals. To do so, Lan recommends “expanding the space for strategic ambiguity” that can be found between “hostile confrontation” and the dwindling areas of Sino-Indian “friendly cooperation”.
The Author
Name: Lan Jianxue (蓝建学)
Year of birth: 1977 (age: 45/46)
Position: Director of the department for Asia-Pacific Studies, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS)
Formerly: Deputy head of the Political Section at the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in India (2011-2013)
Research focus: China-India relations; South Asian affairs
Education: BA Peking University (2001); MA Peking University (2004); PhD Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (2009)
CHANGES IN CHINA-INDIA RELATIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD (SUMMARY)
Lan Jianxue (蓝建学)
Source: International Studies (国际问题研究) Vol. 3 – May 2023
1. Introduction:
The Sino-Indian border clash of June 2020, in which dozens were killed, plunged relations to their lowest point in over thirty years.
India’s aspiration towards becoming a great power has long suffered from a “China complex” [中国情结], in which the PRC represents both India’s main reference point and its main obstacle in this quest. Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has been deeply influenced by the ‘anti-Pakistan and anti-China’ stance of its parent organisation, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). Since 2020, most of India’s political forces have been playing up the threat posed by China while downplaying that posed by Pakistan.
“India is one of the few emerging powers that can match China in both size [体量] and rank [级别]. It is also a neighbouring country with which China has territorial disputes and structural geo-strategic contradictions.”
The negative impact that India is now having on some of China’s core interests has become increasingly obvious.
2. India’s Shift Towards Realpolitik:
With the increasing support and encouragement of the West, Modi’s government has abandoned its cautious approach towards foreign policy and begun to pursue India’s geopolitical interests more assertively.
The worldview of India’s current leadership has been deeply influenced by the realist thinking of the ancient Indian polymath Kauṭilya (also called Chanakya), who held that:
Neighbours are natural enemies, while the neighbours of my neighbours are potential allies.
All states seek to accumulate power and war is often the best means of doing so.
Big fish eat little fish [大鱼吃小鱼]. Only the strongest states survive.
“[Now,] according to S. Jaishankar [i.e. India’s current Minister of External Affairs], the global strategic environment has been undergoing significant changes in recent years. In a multipolar world made up of friends and foes, balances of power and conflicting values, India has to emphasise ‘India First’ and abandon its earlier course of ‘political romanticism’ in favour of ‘a realist stance characterised by more risk-taking and creativity’ when taking part in international affairs. India has emerged as one of the world's leading economies and its ability to assume greater responsibilities has become more evident.”
“[Still according to S. Jaishankar,] India should revisit its tradition of non-alignment, ‘shift towards Kauṭilyan realpolitik, demonstrate its determination and sense of responsibility [on the international stage], while emphasising the importance of alliance (Sama), compensation (Dana), force (Danda) and deception (Bheda) as ways of dealing with political challenges’. ‘In a more nakedly self-interested world, where each country acts according to its own needs, India cannot afford to allow other countries to have veto power over its policy options. There is [also] no evidence to suggest that preserving India's global image of modesty will be rewarded by political entities that are inherently power-hungry. Realism will prevail. Even among partners, there will always be a struggle for better trading conditions.’ ”
“Under the influence of ‘Kauṭilyanism’, Modi's government pursues diplomacy characterised by ‘the primacy of power and balance of power’. It stresses that India should make good use of the global strategic environment, identify clearly and advocate effectively its own interests, and engage with different target countries using different strategies: ‘engage [结交] with the United States, manage and control [管控] China, cultivate [培养] Europe, reassure [安抚] Russia, draw in [引入] Japan, attract [吸引] neighbours, extend [India’s] neighbourhood and expand the group [of states] that are traditionally supportive of India.’ [New Delhi should also] ‘actively take on global responsibilities and display India's distinctive character’.”
Note: In the above three paragraphs, Lan appears to be quoting from S. Jaishankar’s recent book, “The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World”. However, these quotes seem to be more akin to a loose amalgamation, if not Lan’s own interpretation, of different passages from this book. Granted, the Chinese also use quotation marks as we might use italics to signal emphasis, but the ambiguity remains nonetheless. However, what I found interesting here was not so much the accuracy or not of these “quotes”, but what they said about the conclusions that Lan had derived from this book. I naturally encourage readers who want an unadulterated rendition of Jaishankar’s views to read The India Way (particularly chapters one and two).
3. India’s Four International Objectives:
Assume the role of a global power.
Present itself as the leader of the Global South, distinguishing itself both from the US and China, and even exclude the PRC from the Global South camp [将中国排除在“全球南方”之外].
Act as the key node linking the West with the Global South and become, what S. Jaishankar has described as, a “South-Western power”.
With an approach akin to America’s Monroe Doctrine, continue to make South Asia and the Indian Ocean into India’s exclusive sphere of influence.
4. The Impact of New Delhi’s Grand Strategy on China:
“The Galwan Valley incident was the inevitable consequence of the adjustments made to India's foreign strategy and policy towards China in recent years. It was also the culmination of the downward spiral taken by the Sino-Indian relationship. Since then, India has further adjusted its strategy and policies towards China. It has launched ‘government-wide’ and ‘comprehensive' [全领域] policies that are vengeful, confrontational and [seek to] decouple [from China] in the political, economic, military and diplomatic spheres. This has exacerbated the [already] dangerous trend towards ‘decreasing the effects of cooperation, aggravating the [bilateral] rivalry, and allowing Sino-Indian relations to be transformed uncontrollably’.”
India is also trying to thwart China’s rising influence within multilateral platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), BRICS or the G20, and is increasingly aligning itself with positions held by the West.
In the past, non-alignment, South-South cooperation, sustainable development and improving global governance were just some of the “bright spots” and “growth points” that Sino-Indian relations used to enjoy. Nowadays, New Delhi is more intent on highlighting its differences with Beijing and is attempting to sideline China from the Global South camp.
Furthermore, the widening developmental gap between India and China has meant that their identities [身份认同] and interests are becoming increasingly different.
“In recent years, during SCO and BRICS summits, Sino-Indian ‘competition’ [互别苗头] has become more prominent, at the risk of [letting] the two major cooperation mechanisms that are SCO and BRICS [become] ‘dysfunctional’ [失能] and ‘ineffective’ [失效] from within.”
5. Opportunism, Decoupling and de-Sinicisation:
“Under the superimposed effect of global geopolitical tensions and surging Hindu nationalism at home, the foreign security team of Modi’s government has adopted the philosophy of 'the greater the risk, the greater the reward' [风险越大、收益越大] with regards to China. Its China policy has a very strong tinge of opportunism.”
Sensing the current trend towards the West’s de-risking from China, New Delhi is keen to present itself as the ideal candidate to replace China in global supply chains.
In addition to encouraging foreign multinationals to shift their supply chains from China to India, New Delhi is also “de-sinicising” (去中国化) the country in a number of discriminatory ways. [It has:]
“[Launched a] ‘digital crackdown’ (数字打压) against China: Under the banner of ‘safeguarding national security’, the Indian government has blocked hundreds of Chinese apps, deliberately delayed the approval process for Chinese mobile phone parts from brands such as Xiaomi and OPPO, and confiscated huge assets belonging to Chinese companies such as Xiaomi.”
“Restricted Chinese investment and equipment: The Indian government has introduced a foreign investment policy that discriminates against Chinese investment, imposed tariffs on Chinese solar cells and equipment, issued ‘domestic guidelines’ requiring India's state-run telecommunication companies to reject Chinese equipment, and banned the import of power generation, transmission and distribution equipment produced in China.”
“Boycotted Chinese goods and services: India is using the so-called ‘rules of origin’ to block [围追堵截] Chinese goods and services.”
“Deliberately stymied people-to-people and cultural exchanges between the two countries and waged a war of public opinion against China: India's foreign ministry has long been unduly cracking down on Chinese journalists and its education department has been reviewing Sino-Indian educational cooperation programmes such as the Confucius Institutes … [Furthermore, the Srivastava Group] uses the Indian news agency Asian News International (ANI) to whitewash and disseminate false information to defame China and Pakistan.”
“Manipulating issues that are of central concern to China, such as those related to Tibet and Taiwan, sowing discord in China's relations with close neighbours such as Nepal, Bhutan and Sri Lanka, and doing its utmost to discredit China's cooperation initiatives, such as the BRI.”
“India's above actions are aimed at forcing China into making concessions on the border issue and restoring post-Galwan [i.e. where the border clash of June 2020 took place] China-India ties to the ‘status quo’ as defined by India. This will certainly have a counterproductive and unpredictable effect both on India's own interests and on the long-term development of Sino-Indian relations.”
6. The Impact of the United States on China-India Relations
With US-China rivalry rising, New Delhi is keen to exploit these divisions for its own benefit. It has therefore become a willing participant in Washington’s attempt to contain China.
“India has been strengthening its military and defence ties with the United States, and has to some extent already become a quasi-military ally of the US. Though still wary and suspicious [戒备猜忌] of the US, India's military and political authorities have weighed the pros and cons and have gradually given ‘strategic priority’ to checking [牵制], if not containing [遏制], China, [thereby] accelerating its pro-US [stance] in the fields of security, defence and strategy.”
“In future, the US will continue to suppress and contain China on all fronts, while India will further accommodate its actions. Both countries are set to reinforce each other's China-related strategies. This trend will continue to encourage India's tendency towards risky displays of strength and raising its asking price with China, [thus] making it more difficult for both countries to manage their differences. [This may] even lock them into a state of long-term confrontation [长期对抗状态]. Part of India's policy[-making] elite even sees ‘moderate tension’ [适度紧张] between China and India as a lubricant [润滑剂] for deepening India's strategic cooperation with Washington and America’s alliance system. [It therefore] hopes to maintain China-India ties in such a state. As the United States gradually penetrates India's strategic culture and foreign policymaking, India's strategic autonomy will inevitably be eroded. In the long run, India may continue to ‘Japanise’ [日本化] and ‘Britainise’ [英国化] itself. The negative impact [that this would have] on the strategic stability of the Asia-Pacific region cannot be ignored.”
7. Prospects & A Way Forward:
“China-India ties are now more vulnerable to third-party interference or even subversive damage and the volatility and fragility of bilateral relations have become more pronounced. As the two countries' overseas interests continue to expand, it is inevitable that there will be more overlapping interests and friction between both sides. Competition in such areas as energy resources, markets, institutions and development models will inevitably follow.”
“As a result of their unique historical background and lack of mutual understanding, relations between China and India are highly vulnerable to the influence of the media and public opinion. Emotional volatility is one of the major challenges facing India-China relations in the long term.”
However, both countries have an interest in stabilising relations with one another so as not to jeopardise their greater goal of “national rejuvenation”. Both Beijing and New Delhi are also keen to encourage the emergence of a multipolar world order and to “safeguard a generally stable and predictable international order”.
“And in spite of the Indian government's moves towards the so-called ‘decoupling’ and ‘de-risking’ from China, practical cooperation in the fields of trade and investment continue to be the ballast of the China-India relationship and is the key link binding the interests of the two countries together.”
“Moreover, India’s economy remains a lot more dependent on the Chinese market than China is on the Indian market. If New Delhi were to impose economic sanctions on Beijing, its economy would suffer much more than China’s would.
There is a [also] growing mismatch between India's strategic interests and those of its business community, and a clear lack of consensus within the Indian government on how to deal with the Sino-Indian border issue. Unlike India's Ministry of Defence or Ministry of External Affairs, its Ministries of Commerce, Railways and Science and Technology are reluctant to undermine relations with China due to economic interests.”
“In future, China will go through a process of ‘rediscovering India’. It must abandon its stereotypical impression of, and set ways of thinking about, India and make appropriate adjustments to its long-standing strategic thinking and policies towards it.”
“China and India need to explore new modes of interaction in this new era. Against the backdrop of [their] escalating rivalry, China and India [need to] preserve or tap into common or shared interests and expand the space for strategic ambiguity [战略模糊空间] between friendly cooperation and hostile confrontation.”
Growing China-India Rivalry as viewed by CIIS Expert Lan Jianxue
"If New Delhi were to impose economic sanctions on Beijing, its economy would suffer much more than India’s would."??
more than China's would?