Prof. Wang Jisi on Trump and US Foreign Policy (Part 2)
"When the world’s most powerful country abandons its principles and loses any sense of morality, it becomes exceedingly dangerous and may inflict great harm upon the world."
This is the second part of Contemporary American Review’s conversation with Professor Wang Jisi. If you haven’t read Part One, you can find it here.
Key Points
In recent years, the US has increasingly prioritised its own interests, often at the expense of international rules and the concerns of other countries.
Under Trump, strategic competition with China is set to focus even more on trade, finance and technology, and less on human rights, ideology or traditional security concerns.
Nonetheless, he will make sure to leverage ideological, values-based and sovereignty-related issues as bargaining tools against China.
He is unlikely to abandon the US’s One-China policy, continuing military support for Taipei without backing independence.
Although Trump shows little interest in the systemic dimension of US–China rivalry, America’s entrenched bipartisan "Cold War mindset" towards China leaves little room for a significant shift in strategic framing.
• Wang: “At this stage, there is little value in the Chinese side continuing to argue with American officials and scholars over China’s strategic intentions.”
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A complete US-China decoupling remains extremely improbable, as a certain level of mutual interdependence between the two countries is bound to persist.
Trump's objective of “Making America Great Again” implies weakening China—an aim fundamentally at odds with Beijing’s goal of national rejuvenation.
Yet his interest in “making deals” offers China “tactical opportunities” and room for cooperation beyond trade and technology—particularly in the security domain. Dialogue remains key to alleviating tensions.
Today, scholars and analysts on both sides are increasingly wary of visiting each other’s countries, concerned about personal safety and their ability to exchange freely.
The relaxation of visa policies is not enough—think tank and scholarly exchanges require broader institutional and political support.
The Scholar
Name: Wang Jisi (王缉思)
Date of birth: Nov. 1948 (age: 76)
Position: Boya Chair Professor Emeritus, School of International Studies, Peking University
Formerly: Founding President (2013-2022), Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Peking University; Dean (2005-2013), School of International Studies, Peking University; Director (2001-2009), Institute of International Strategic Studies, Central Party School; Director (1993-2005), Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)
Other: Member of the Foreign Policy Advisory Committee of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008-2016)
Research focus: US foreign policy; US-China relations; Security in East Asia
Education: BA-MA Peking University (1978-1983); Worked as a sent-down youth in Inner Mongolia and Henan during the Cultural Revolution (1968–1976), before returning to Beijing to resume his studies in 1978.
Experience abroad: University of Oxford (1982-83); UC Berkeley (1984-85); University of Michigan (1990-91); Claremont McKenna College (2001) etc.
PROSPECTS FOR U.S. DOMESTIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN TRUMP’S SECOND TERM — AN INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSOR WANG JISI (EXCERPTS)
Wang Jisi (王缉思)
Published in Contemporary American Review, Vol. 9, No. 1, on 15.03.2025
Translated by Paddy Stephens
(Illustration by OpenAI’s DALL·E 3)
N.B. The following excerpts have been selected for conciseness. Readers are encouraged to read the original article in full.
6. The Global Impact of Trumpism
In the international sphere, relations between states are generally governed by a form of tacit understanding. There are implicit, commonly-recognised norms, standards and boundaries. States generally manage bilateral relations according to certain basic procedures.
But in recent years, the US has shown a willingness to undermine the Westphalian system, disregarding fundamental principles of sovereignty. When acting in its own interests, it does so with impunity, ignoring international rules or the needs and interests of other countries.
When the world’s most powerful country abandons its principles and loses any sense of morality, it becomes exceedingly dangerous and may inflict great harm upon the world.
The US resembles less and less the image that people around the world have of it. Although most countries continue to observe and seek compromise with the US where possible, there is a growing sense of unease and dissatisfaction with America’s behaviour on the world stage.
Trump’s foreign policy shift aligns with a broader rightward turn in global politics. In Western countries, populist right-wing parties are increasingly becoming mainstream political forces or exerting greater influence.
One phenomenon [worth mentioning] is that many of these right-wing forces abroad share similar ideas [思路] with the Trump administration and are actively seeking its support. In this sense, America’s international influence under Trump may indeed be increasing, along with its potential to disrupt and damage the international order.
In observing today’s world, we need not only an understanding of international relations but also an awareness of wider political shifts. These include growing global wealth inequality, the rise of right-wing populism, disruption to traditional economic models and social structures due to technological innovation, and the evolving values and lifestyles of millennials and Gen-Z.
7. Decoupling, Ideology and US-China Rivalry
The Trump administration’s strategic competition with China will centre even more on economics and technology, rather than on human rights, political systems [社会制度], or conventional national security issues.
There may be increased trade friction between the two countries in areas such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence, electric vehicles and rare metals. However, the situation is unlikely to deteriorate to the point of a complete "decoupling”.
Businesses from both countries continue to play an active role in this economic relationship, acting as a "pressure relief valve”. I myself maintain frequent contact with business figures from both China and the United States. From these interactions, I have observed that Chinese entrepreneurs—whether from state-owned or private companies—genuinely hope to expand Sino-American trade ties and avoid decoupling, believing that such cooperation is mutually beneficial.
American businesspeople similarly hope to preserve their commercial interests in China. If given the chance, many would like to expand their investments here. However, due to pressure from political forces at home to adopt [America’s] “politically correct” hardline stance towards China, they often refrain from expressing support for ongoing trade cooperation publicly, even though they continue to lobby the federal and local governments.
Some degree of mutual interdependence between China and the United States, including in people-to-people exchanges between the two societies, is bound to continue [无法被完全切断的].
Of course, the American right is doing its utmost to hinder technological and people-to-people exchanges between China and the United States. Within the US, a new wave of McCarthyism has emerged. However, it remains impossible for the two countries to return to the total isolation of the early Cold War period.
The ideological and systemic confrontation between China and the United States will persist during Trump’s second term.
Though Trump himself does not place much emphasis on ideology, he cannot alter the [highly negative] view of China’s political system which dominates within Washington policy circles.
Both the Democrats and Republicans believe that China’s political system and ideology are completely at odds with [截然对立] those of the United States. Many of Trump’s closest advisers, as well as his appointees to various senior positions, harbour a Cold War mindset with strong biases against China.
Therefore, the US government will continue to take actions in the ideological realm against China, such as hyping up the issue of so-called “forced labour” in Xinjiang and imposing related sanctions, maintaining contact with “Tibetan independence” movements, and supporting the so-called “pro-democracy” forces in Hong Kong.
On the Taiwan question, I do not expect the Trump administration to publicly abandon the US’s One-China policy or support "Taiwan independence”, but it will probably support the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) authorities in improving their military equipment and increasing their defence budget.
However, these issues are unlikely to be central to US-China relations during Trump’s second term. Although Trump himself does not endorse the so-called “regime change” strategy towards China — nor constantly talk about democracy and freedom, as the Democrats do — he will not prevent Congress or executive agencies from maintaining ideological pressure on China.
He may also seize upon issues like these at any time as leverage to force concessions from China in other policy areas.
8. Navigating the Space for US–China Cooperation
The objective reality of US-China relations is that the two countries need to cooperate in order to develop together. However, Trump's goal of "making America great again" is fundamentally at odds [存在根本冲突] with our aspiration for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.
The mainstream political view in the US is that the United States cannot become “great again” without weakening China. On major issues of principle, there is no room for compromise between the two sides [没有妥协余地].
Trump himself is interested in “making deals” with China and is willing to engage in dialogue. This provides China with tactical opportunities, and it should engage with Trump’s team to understand their thinking and intentions.
This means that while the scope for cooperation in technology and trade will likely continue to shrink, there is a willingness and potential for collaboration in many other areas.
For instance, both sides are interested in strengthening military-to-military exchanges and discussing crisis prevention and management mechanisms. However, due to domestic constraints and procedural hurdles in both countries, progress towards such dialogues has been slow.
If the two governments can come to agreements on certain things in the coming months — expanding dialogue in areas such as trade, defence, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence and counter-narcotics — then US-China relations may stabilise over the next few years, with cooperation on some shared concerns becoming possible.
Trump differs from Biden in that he is willing to “make deals”, which suggests that the potential and space for US–China cooperation could increase, and that direct confrontation might be avoided.
9. The Enduring US Bipartisan Consensus on China
Within US policy circles and academia, there is a basic strategic consensus regarding what kind of country China is, the nature of the US–China relationship, and the scale of the challenge China poses to the United States.
The consensus across both major political parties and among the broader political spectrum in the US is that, for at least the next decade, China will be the United States' greatest security threat, most severe challenge and strongest competitor.
The United States now characterises the current US–China relationship as that of strategic competition. The all-out effort to “outcompete” China is the inevitable logical outcome of the domestic and international strategic direction pursued by Biden and both Trump administrations.
Virtually no one [in the US] still claims that China is a friend or a partner that can be won over.
The US's greatest concern regarding China is that our strategic ambition is not limited to the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, but also includes undermining or even upending the US-led global order, thereby displacing or replacing America in its hegemonic position.
At this stage, there is little value in the Chinese side continuing to argue with American officials and scholars over China’s strategic intentions. The United States has already concluded that China’s growing power constitutes a challenge to America, and that this growth will inevitably strengthen China’s intention to compete with the United States for global supremacy.
The US insists that the only reason China has not yet tried to challenge it more aggressively is because we do not yet have the necessary capabilities to do so. Once we do, [they believe] we will be more aggressive in challenging [the status quo].
The Americans do not believe the Chinese government's denials of such strategic ambitions or its official statements on US-China relations, partly because of the anti-American sentiment they have witnessed on Chinese social media.
The main disagreements within US policy circles now concern which specific strategies to adopt towards China. The US is now employing various methods to contain China in order to prevent it from gaining greater capabilities.
However, if they suppress China too quickly or forcefully, it may result in a direct confrontation between the two countries [会导致中美发生正面冲突], which could lead to significant losses for the United States and trigger a severe international backlash. Therefore, within US policy circles, the ongoing debate is about making careful strategic choices regarding China, with the goal of hindering China’s rise in power without triggering a hot war with China.
10. Why Deepening Engagement with Americas’s China Hands Matters
I don't believe that the number of China experts in the US is decreasing; rather, I feel that we are not engaging and communicating with them enough.
There are numerous scholars and experts in the US who study China, with clear generational differences. Older generations of "China hands”, such as David Lampton and Kenneth Lieberthal, have a more comprehensive understanding of China and a broader knowledge base.
Younger experts such as Evan Medeiros, Ryan Hass, Scott Kennedy, Jude Blanchette and Rush Doshi tend to have stronger Chinese language skills and focus on specific areas or time periods in their research. They also have a good grasp of China’s domestic situation, though their political positions often differ significantly from ours.
The key question is not whether or not the number of China experts in the US is decreasing, but how we can strengthen our engagement with them.
Since Trump’s first term, and particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, people-to-people exchanges between China and the United States have declined significantly. One cannot [truly] understand another country just through books, newspapers, websites and video calls. Genuine understanding comes from face-to-face interaction.
From my perspective, the most effective way to enhance mutual understanding is not through adjustments to visa policies or extensions of visa-free arrangements. Rather, it is through tangible support for think tanks and academic institutions on both sides—removing practical barriers, sending more scholars for research visits, and creating a more open and accessible environment for exchanges.
Many experts and scholars from both countries are wary about visiting each other’s countries, not just due to visa difficulties but also because of concerns that they may be barred from entering the country, that their personal safety is at risk, or that they will face limitations on their [ability] to communicate and exchange [freely]. These concerns are not unfounded — they are based on past experiences.
Only by conducting substantive and insightful discussions on specific issues—such as trade, technology, military affairs, cybersecurity and artificial intelligence—can mutual understanding between China and the US truly improve.
Chinese scholars need to conduct thorough research, articulate distinctive views and establish communication channels with policy circles and industry [stakeholders] in order to demonstrate the value of such exchanges to the US side. Vague, generalised discussions will not suffice.
Chinese academics should focus not only on policy issues but also engage more deeply with the realities of China’s rural areas, businesses, defence sector and scientific research institutions.
Chinese scholars who study the United States should actively seek opportunities for field research there, remain in communication with professionals across various fields such as science and technology, industry, finance and policy in both countries, and accumulate the knowledge and momentum needed to advance people-to-people exchanges and policy-related dialogue between China and the United States. States.
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Prof. Wang Jisi on Trump and US Foreign Policy (Part 1)
Professor Wang Jisi (王缉思) is one of China’s most respected international relations scholars, whose views have shaped a long line of Chinese scholars, diplomats and policymakers. After spending a decade working in the countryside as a sent-down youth during and just after the Cultural Revolution, Wang went on to build a distinguished academic career spanning more than four decades—marked by his moderate, internationalist and liberal-leaning outlook. Now 76, he continues to serve as an important bridge between China and the United States, advocating tirelessly for dialogue, trust-building and cooperation.