The Importance of France and Macron to China (Part 2)
"The policies promoted by France in the EU … run counter to US interests … Thus, the US will spare no effort to prevent Europe from becoming a French Europe."
Xi Jinping is in Paris today where he will be holding talks with France’s President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen. Tomorrow, Macron will take Xi to the Hautes-Pyrénées, a region dear to the French President, who spent time there as a child with his grandmother. It will add a soft touch to his hosting of Xi in an otherwise strained atmosphere marked, amongst other things, by a French-backed anti-subsidy investigation into electric vehicles from China, complaints about Chinese overcapacity and concerns over Beijing’s indirect support of Russia’s war in Ukraine.
A lot has changed since today’s author, Zhang Jian (张健), wrote relatively enthusiastically about the “Frenchification of the EU” in early 2022. He recently stated that, “After the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine, the ‘Europhiles’ [led by France] have arguably lost their power, while the ‘Atlanticists’ have gained the upper hand. This change is not short-term, but structural and long-term, and will be difficult to change in the foreseeable future.” Still, the reasons why Beijing continues to value its relationship with Paris, in spite of the growing difficulties, remain largely the same. Zhang’s 2022 piece is a useful reminder of what these reasons are and may provide some clues as to why Beijing has (so far) refrained from reacting too strongly to some of Paris’s recent affronts.
Key Points
Until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU was undergoing a process of “Frenchification”, with more and more French ideas being translated into EU policies.
With the UK out of the EU, distrust of the US rising and the EU’s leadership staffed with Macron allies, France’s sway over the European Union increased substantially.
If the EU has become more “integrated”, “geopolitical”, “protectionist” and “autonomous” in recent years, it is largely due to French efforts.
But France’s influence over the EU should not be overstated. Major disagreements with Germany exist, pushback by the Nordic and CEE Atlanticists is strong and Washington is doing what it can to stymie Paris’s proposals.
An EU modelled more closely after France's vision would prevent it from becoming a vassal of the US and would allow it to have a relatively independent and cooperative approach towards China.
Moreover, the mere prospect of closer EU-China cooperation, would help keep America’s hegemonic behaviour in check.
European strategic autonomy is largely about increasing the EU’s independence from the US.
That being said, an EU with a more geopolitical and protectionist mindset is sure to exacerbate the competitive aspects of its relationship with China, be they economic or political.
The Author
Name: Zhang Jian (张健)
Year of birth: N/A
Position: Vice president of the MSS-affiliated China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) and director of its Institute of European Studies (Zhang has been an analyst at CICIR since 2003).
Research focus: European integration; the European Union; EU-US and EU-China relations
Education: PhD Wuhan University (2003)
THE FRENCHIFICATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS IMPACT (EXCERPTS)
Zhang Jian (张健)
Contemporary International Relations (现代国际关系), Feb. 2022, No.2
© European Union, 2024, P060812-622679, CC BY 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons (Emmanuel Macron, Xi Jinping and Ursula von der Leyen in Beijing last year)
I. The Frenchification of the EU
“In recent years, one striking change within the EU has been that French (rather than German) policy ideas regarding the development of the EU have increasingly been translated into actual EU policies. In other words, the EU is undergoing a certain degree of Frenchification [法国化].”
“With regards to European integration, the EU is moving further towards a fiscal union and a transfer union. Through the monetary policy of the eurozone and the EU’s fiscal policies, the rich countries in the North, are either actively or passively, transferring more resources to the relatively less developed countries in the South and East [of the EU] in various forms, both tangible and intangible. The redistributive nature of the EU has become more pronounced, reflecting France's demands for [more] solidarity.”
“With regards to economic development, the European Commission is increasing its intervention in the economy. The concept of a ‘protected Europe’ advocated by France is being implemented and its so-called ‘economic patriotism’ is being translated into industrial policy and protectionism at the level of the European Union. France's economic patriotism runs deep [法国的经济爱国主义根深蒂固].”
“France [seeks to] protect the EU’s economic interests through such things as creating 'European champions' and increasing investment protection efforts.”
“There is a now clear shift in the EU's thinking, with a new Commission since the end of 2019 that is more understanding of France's desire for ‘European champions’.”
“The French concepts of ‘European sovereignty’ and ‘strategic autonomy’ are becoming geopolitical aspirations of the European Union.”
“Macron's idea of European sovereignty has been controversial within the EU, with some member states having doubts about this. But this may be exactly what France wants to achieve, namely, to stimulate a debate within the EU on autonomy. France wants the EU to think not only economically but also more geopolitically. Bold and provocative terms such as ‘sovereignty building’ are more likely to spur discussions.”
“‘Strategic autonomy’ and ‘European sovereignty’ have similar connotations, but 'strategic autonomy' is more widely used within the EU because it is a less political and more technical [term]. 'Strategic autonomy' serves as a pathway and means to achieve 'European sovereignty', implying that for Europe to enjoy sovereignty, it must be strategically autonomous.”
II. Previous Constraints on French Influence
“As a founding member, France has always seen the EU as a force multiplier for itself. [Charles] de Gaulle explicitly referred to Europe as France's 'Archimedean lever', saying that ‘Europe is the way for France to become again what it ceased to be at Waterloo: first in the world'.”
“Generally, however, France's efforts to shape Europe over the past few decades have not been very successful for two reasons:
“After the reunification of Germany, France's status and influence in Europe declined. Germany's Atlanticism was as strong as its Europeanism. In areas such as trade, the economy and relations with the United States, Germany often had more in common with the UK than with France.”
“France was unable to prevent Britain and Germany from joining forces to promote the enlargement of the EU to the East. As France expected, the accession of eleven Central and Eastern European countries made the EU even more difficult to control and made France's European ideals even more unattainable.”
III. Catalysts of the EU’s Frenchification
“The progress that France has made in recent years in shaping Europe can be attributed to a combination of favourable timing, geographical conditions and people [天时、地利、人和].”
“There have been global geopolitical changes which can be categorised as ‘favourable timing’ [天时]. The United States has been at the forefront of these changes. For a long time, Europe saw the US as an ally and a like-minded partner that could be relied on. But domestic political changes in the US have repeatedly undermined and gradually shaken this belief.”
“The UK's departure from the EU has triggered a shift in the power dynamics within the EU in France’s favour. This can be seen as the ‘favourable geographical conditions’ [地利].”
“Britain, France and Germany used to form the EU’s ‘stable triangle’ [稳定三角], with Britain and France at opposite ends of the spectrum when it came to integration, the economy and the independence of EU diplomacy, and Germany in the middle playing a mediating role. After this triangle became a bilateral [relationship], France's influence over Germany increased and Germany could no longer retreat on the grounds of British opposition.”
“President Macron's pro-European stance has been an important factor in France's winning over the support of other member states and, especially, of EU institutions. This part can be referred to as the ‘favourable people’ [人和].”
“When the EU leadership changed in 2019, the political leaders proposed and backed by Macron were given key positions. For example, the German national [Ursula] von der Leyen, who speaks French and has similar positions to France on many issues, was nominated by Macron to serve as President of the European Commission. However, after taking office, she was criticised for being ‘too pro-Paris’. [Charles] Michel, the President of the European Council, is a close ally of Macron’s. Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shares similar political views with Macron. [Christine] Lagarde, a French national, serves as President of the European Central Bank. The list goes on.”
“Macron's ideas on the development and construction of Europe can therefore be said to be highly compatible with the aspirations of the EU’s institutions. EU bodies are [thus] happy to accommodate France's geopolitical ambitions, which in turn gives France's ideas for Europe more legitimacy and makes them more likely to be recognised and supported by other member states.”
IV. The Limits of France’s Influence
“Of course, the Frenchification of the EU does not mean that France holds complete dominance within the bloc, nor does it mean that French policy ideas can all be carried forward in the EU.”
“Germany is not fully cooperative. There are relatively big disagreements between France and Germany on a number of crucial policy areas such as European monetary policy, fiscal policy, policy towards the US and export controls.”
“There is a backlash from the Northern and Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. Although the Nordic and CEE countries are small countries on the periphery of the EU, they are accustomed to banding together. They have similar positions to Germany in many policy areas, but are more radical [更加激进].”
“The US factor … The policies promoted by France within the European Union, in particular the construction of European sovereignty and strategic autonomy and not choosing sides between China and the United States (meaning that Europe will not follow the United States in containing China), all run counter to US interests. Therefore, the US will spare no effort in preventing Europe from becoming a French Europe by exerting influence on Germany, the Nordic states and the CEE countries. The prospect of Europe’s Frenchification is arguably the last thing the United States would like to see. [The US] is also the biggest obstacle to France's advancement of its European agenda.”
V. Implications for China
“Although the outcome of the EU’s Frenchification is [still] uncertain, the process itself is extremely important and will have an important impact on such things as the development of European integration, the EU's relations with the world and EU-China relations.”
“The image of the EU in the world is mainly that of an ‘economic power’, ‘normative power’, ‘trading power’ and ‘monetary power. You can add to that ‘environmental power’, ‘development aid power’, ‘astronautics power’ etc. But it is far from being a ‘diplomatic power’, let alone a ‘military power’. With the EU’s Frenchification, though it may still be difficult for the bloc to become an actual diplomatic and military force in the short term, it is set to become significantly more political [其政治性将明显增强] and its interaction with the rest of the world will become more complex.”
“The establishment of diplomatic relations between France and China in 1964 was undoubtedly an event of strategic significance, because it brought about a breakthrough in the sharp divide and antagonism that existed between East and West. The EU is still a long way from being a truly sovereign and independent entity and is unlikely to completely shake off its dependence on the United States. However, a ‘Frenchifying’ EU [一个趋于法国化的欧盟] will not become a vassal of the US and will pursue its own interests and values. This also means that the EU will have its own relatively independent policy towards China and cooperation has always been an important element of its approach towards us. This is fundamentally different from the way the US thinks about and formulates its policy towards China, which is entirely focused on containment.”
“In fact, China and the EU share common interests in curbing US hegemony and unilateralism, opposing polarised politics and bloc confrontation [阵营对抗]. China and the EU are important forces with global influence. Cooperation and the potential deepening of such cooperation between the two sides play an important role in restraining US hegemonism [具有重要的抑制作用]. It is precisely because of the ever-existing possibility of China and the EU working together to maintain peace and stability in the world that the US does not dare to act recklessly [肆意妄为], and this is also why the Biden administration is trying so hard to draw Europe closer to its side. The more European autonomy there is, the more strategic the relationship between China and Europe will be [欧洲自主性越强,中欧关系的战略性也会越强].”
“At the same time, the EU is placing more emphasis on expanding its power, influence and so-called European values globally. It also has a stronger sense of being a ‘major power’ and its competitive nature is more pronounced. The EU's efforts to create ‘European champions’ and promote European standards and norms all have great power competition in mind.”
“EU-China economic ties will face more obstacles. For example, the EU's protectionist trade and investment [policies] or the politicisation and pan-securitisation of its economic policies are all set to complicate economic ties between China and the EU. Of course, the EU does not only see China as a competitor, but also the United States. The EU's so-called autonomy and independence means, to a large extent, autonomy and independence from the US [欧盟所谓自主、独立,很大程度上意味着从美国获得自主和独立]. However, in their eyes, due to differences between the Chinese and European [political] systems, there is an additional element to EU-China competition, namely the so-called systemic competition.”
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