The Perils of Trump 2.0 for Ukraine and the World by Feng Yujun
Exclusive interview with Peking University Professor Feng Yujun (冯玉军)
Today's edition opens with a brief commentary from a familiar figure in this newsletter—Peking University professor and Russia specialist Feng Yujun (冯玉军). Originally posted on his WeChat Moments (朋友圈) last week, this short piece has been slightly revised for this newsletter. It is followed by a written exchange with Feng, which I conducted over the weekend.
Thomas
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Trump has been in office for barely two weeks, yet his governing philosophy already resembles a foul-smelling stew-like mishmash of things: mercantilism in industrial and trade [policies], populism and anarchism in governance, conservatism in social and cultural matters, “gangsterism [江湖主义]” in foreign policy, utilitarianism in his style of action, and a thuggish personal demeanour—all ultimately blending into opportunism in practice.
On the issue of the Russia-Ukraine war, Trump’s team has already laid bare its ignorance, unscrupulousness and shamelessness: not only have they placed the blame for the war on Biden and Zelensky, but they have also sought direct negotiations with Moscow while disregarding Kyiv, have attempted to pressure Ukraine into making concessions to the aggressor, and have even interfered in Ukraine’s internal affairs by demanding an expedited presidential election. Trump's actions have undoubtedly heightened the uncertainty of the war in Ukraine, bringing great and unexpected joy to a Russia already at the end of its tether.
But, having fought bitterly for three years, will Ukraine bow to Trump’s tyranny? Will Europe, which has already felt deeply the repercussions of the crisis, abandon its support for Ukraine? I think not. Trump’s rise to power may prolong the Russia-Ukraine war, inflicting greater losses and suffering upon Ukraine, but it will not change the ultimate outcome—Ukraine's victory in its war of national defence.
Trump’s egocentric and profit-driven behaviour will not make America great again; rather, it may mark the beginning of America's decline on the international stage as its isolationism and hegemony intertwine chaotically. An “unrestrained” world in which every country has its own difficult problems to deal with, individuals only take care of their own affairs, and ambitious strongmen stir restlessly, is bound to descend into greater disorder.
However, there is no need to be overly pessimistic. Amidst the stormy turbulence, have we not also witnessed Europe taking steps towards strategic autonomy, the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force becoming operational, Middle Eastern terrorist forces being crippled, and Assad being forced into exile?
[Just as] a person’s appearance is shaped by their heart and mind [相由心生], so too is the world around them shaped by their inner thoughts. What matters is not only the changes in the external world but also the beliefs and aspirations within each individual. Whether one chooses to drift with the tide and become an accomplice to the wicked or to hold fast to justice, one’s conscience, reason and kindness—this choice not only determines an individual’s future but also shapes the course of the world.
Feng Yujun (冯玉军)
Key Points
Trump poses one of the greatest challenges to the US constitutional system since its founding.
His return could yield some tangible economic gains for the US, but it will come at the cost of America's international standing as well as increased global instability.
His “success” will partly depend on whether his opponents and partners yield to his pressure tactics or remain patient and engage in a prolonged “dogfight” with him.
Scholars in China are split into two camps:
Those who see him as a decisive conservative leader focused on results and committed to fulfilling his electoral promises;
and those who view him as driven purely by practical interests, arguing that his policies lack strategic direction and often shift unpredictably.
However, both camps portray him as a businessman primarily focused on diplomatic deal-making.
Instead of debating whether Trump’s return is good or bad for China, focus should be placed on redefining the PRC’s core national interests and its global role.
The Trump administration's approach to Ukraine reflects its ignorance and will only exacerbate the country's suffering and losses.
However, Ukraine's ultimate victory in this war is inevitable as Russia is too weak and Moscow too blinkered to sustain it much longer.
If a deal is struck that grants Moscow concessions at Ukraine’s expense, Russia’s “insatiable desire for territorial expansion” is certain to resurface in the future.
Historically, Russia has inflicted the most harm on China precisely when it professed to be its closest friend.
Thus, a US-Russia détente may not be inherently bad for China, though it is unlikely to happen any time soon.
The Author
Name: Féng Yùjūn (冯玉军)
Year of birth: 1970 (age: 54/55)
Position: Professor, Department of History, Peking University
Formerly: Deputy Dean of the Institute of International Studies and director of the Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, Fudan University (2016-2024); Analyst at CICIR (1994-2016).
Research focus: Russia and the Soviet Union; China’s international strategy and great power relations; Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)
Education: BA Hebei University (1991), MA Jilin University (1994), PhD China Foreign Affairs University (2001)
Experience abroad: Two years in Russia and half a year in Japan as a visiting scholar
Question 1: Professor Feng, Sinification, as you know, is a newsletter that focuses on Chinese scholars and their views on international affairs. So, may I begin by asking for your assessment of how Chinese analysts have generally reacted to Trump’s election and his first few weeks in office? What are some of the key points of consensus and disagreement you have observed so far?
Feng: Compared with Trump's first entry into the White House, Chinese scholarly circles were on the whole psychologically prepared for his return to power, and their reaction was generally calm. However, there have been notable differences and conflicting perspectives on both his re-election and his conduct since resuming office.
One group believes that Trump's approach to governance is basically conservative, having gained the support of a majority of Americans dissatisfied with globalisation and “woke” policies. His leadership style is described as swift and decisive [雷厉风行; lit. passing like thunder and moving like the wind] and, whether in domestic or foreign affairs, he is expected to achieve clear results and fulfil his promises.
The opposing view holds that neither Trump nor his team adheres to a specific ideology; instead, they base everything on practical interests as the ultimate consideration [一切以实际利益为最终考量]. Despite Trump's outspoken and attention-grabbing style, his policies are said to lack clear strategic guidelines and consistency, often leading to abrupt changes or to their being abandoned halfway.
At the same time, the vast majority of Chinese scholars emphasise Trump's background as a businessman, viewing him as a US president who is open to making deals [一个可以做交易的美国总统].
Question 2: Do you feel that your views on Trump differ from those of your colleagues? If so, in what way?
Feng: I believe that the “Trump phenomenon” is a significant event in American history, reflecting the various problems and contradictions [矛盾] that have accumulated in American society during the “post-Cold War era”. [He] represents one of the greatest challenges to the US constitutional system since its establishment. It is difficult to observe and understand this phenomenon using past paradigms and methods. Instead, we must recognise the diverse and complex characteristics of Trump's approach to governance [执政理念].
Moreover, the effectiveness of Trump's governance does not depend solely on his personal beliefs and style but also on the interactions between him and his partners and opponents—whether they capitulate easily under Trump's blackmail or choose to remain patient and engage in a prolonged “dogfight” [缠斗] with him.
Question 3: I have noticed that although some in China view Trump’s return to power as detrimental to China’s national interests, others see it as beneficial. What is your perspective on this?
Feng: Unlike these two views, I believe that the most important factor for China is not the changes taking place outside its borders nor Trump returning to power, but rather whether the country has truly clarified its core national interests at a time when the world order is undergoing historic changes. Additionally, it is about whether China has determined its appropriate role within the global system [在世界体系中的正确身份], formulated the right strategy and ensured its effective implementation.
Question 4: How do you assess Trump’s potential impact on the war in Ukraine? I recall your outlining four different scenarios shortly after his election victory. Which of these scenarios do you now consider most likely? Which would be most favourable to China?
Feng: What we are observing is that although Zelensky and his team are working to find common ground with Trump’s team and to avoid provoking them, they have not made any concessions on core principles.
We have also witnessed the United Kingdom taking over the leadership of the Ramstein aid mechanism for Ukraine, and NATO, the EU and other European countries increasing their support for Ukraine [in response to] the US pausing its aid.
I remain convinced that although Trump’s eagerness for a quick resolution and his policy of “freezing the conflict” may bring further suffering and losses to Ukraine, it will not change the ultimate outcome—Ukraine's victory in its war of national defence.
For China, the most favourable scenario is for the Russia-Ukraine war to end with a just peace, with the UN Charter and international law being genuinely upheld, and without the existing international and regional order suffering from fundamental disruption and damage.
Question 5: Some in Europe have also argued in favour of striking a deal with Moscow over Ukraine, while others believe that making any concessions will only embolden Russia. As the expression goes, give an inch and they'll take a mile [得寸进尺]. As someone who has studied Russia for decades, what is your view on this?
Feng: Although Russia has made multiple attempts at “modernisation” throughout its history, it has never truly embraced the principles of “modernity”—the equality and mutual respect of countries regardless of their size, respect for private property, and respect for human life and freedom.
Russia's traditional strategic culture—including its inherent sense of insecurity, deep-seated hostility towards the outside world, insatiable desire for territorial expansion, geopolitical impulse to seek spheres of influence, and the messianic ideology rooted in Orthodox Christianity—continues to shape very strongly its worldview and foreign policy today.
Therefore, if the Russia-Ukraine war does not end through a “just peace [公正的和平]” and instead remains in a frozen state, Russia's hostility toward the outside world will only intensify. Before long, once it has regained a certain level of strength, it may pose even greater challenges and threats both to the international community and its own self.
For Russia, the renewal of ideas and ideology is the only path for both the state and its people to break free from the burdens of history and achieve a true rebirth.
Question 6: You have often emphasised the inevitability of Ukraine’s ultimate victory and Russia’s eventual decline. Is this a reflection of your hopes or an objective judgment?
Feng: My assessment is based on the following analysis:
First, throughout this war, Ukraine has demonstrated a strong will to resist, an unprecedented sense of national identity and an unexpectedly high level of combat capability.
Second, Ukraine has received extensive international support, even though this support has not yet fully met all of Ukraine's needs.
Third, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia experienced severe deindustrialisation, and its current industries, including its military-industrial complex, are no longer capable of sustaining this war.
Fourth, Russia has suffered heavy losses on the battlefield, and its efforts to replenish its forces—including support from North Korea—are no longer sufficient to offset its troop attrition. Recently, we have observed a significant slowdown in Russia’s offensive operations on the battlefield.
Fifth, Russia’s national security apparatus has largely become trapped in an “information bubble [信息茧房]”, lacking an effective error-correction mechanism. In contrast, Ukraine’s national security team, under Zelensky’s leadership, remains largely united and efficient.
The combined effect of these factors has, in essence, already determined the final outcome of this war.
Question 7: Do you see any similarities between Trump and Putin?
Feng: I believe the most distinctive trait of both individuals is their preference for “strongman politics [强人政治]” and their pleasure in acting as strongmen.
Question 8: Chinese analysts have long expressed concerns about the possibility of a US-Russia rapprochement. Since Trump’s election, these concerns have resurfaced, though some strongly dismiss the likelihood of such an outcome. How do you assess the chances of a rapprochement between Washington and Moscow?
Feng: Given the vast disparity in overall national strength [综合国力], fundamental differences in values and numerous structural contradictions between the United States and Russia, I do not believe that the two countries will achieve reconciliation any time soon.
At the same time, I do not think that the deterioration of US-Russia relations is necessarily beneficial for China, nor that a US-Russia reconciliation would automatically pose a challenge to China. Historically, Russia has inflicted the greatest harm on China precisely when it claimed to be China’s “closest friend”.
Therefore, I want to reiterate that for China, the key to security and development does not lie in changes taking place outside its borders but in whether China has truly grasped the direction in which the world is changing, whether it can perceive accurately the essence of the policies that countries have towards China, as well as whether it has formulated and implemented the right strategies and policies.
Question 9: What do you think the US and the world will look like after Trump’s four years in office?
Feng: Trump's profit-driven [唯利是图] and self-centred [唯我独尊] style may bring some tangible benefits to the United States over the next four years, such as reducing its trade deficit or promoting the return of manufacturing. However, it could also further intensify political and social tensions within the country.
At the same time, the international image of the United States is set to deteriorate, its global leadership position will decline, and the world could become even more chaotic and disorderly [混乱无序].
Question 10: I have noticed that recently some voices within China, including a couple of your former colleagues at Fudan University’s Institute of International Studies, have expressed concerns about the possibility of a conflict between the US and China. Is this a concern you share? If so, what steps should governments on both sides take to prevent such a scenario?
Feng: I believe that the conflict between China and the United States should not be discussed in broad, general terms. Instead, each issue should be analysed on a case-by-case basis.
For example, in the field of trade, the Trump administration has already imposed a 10% tariff increase on China, to which Beijing has responded with countermeasures. However, overall, I believe China's countermeasures have been relatively restrained [相对和缓], without the tit-for-tat escalations seen in 2018. China will maintain its own pace rather than dance to Trump's tune [中国会保持自己的节奏，而不是随着特朗普的指挥棒起舞].
In the military sphere, I believe neither China nor the United States intends to engage in direct conflict. The ways to prevent their strategic competition from spiralling out of control are: first, to enhance communication and avoid misjudgements; and second, to achieve a balance of interests, striving for mutual benefit and win-win outcomes rather than harming each other.
Question 11: Finally, I would like to conclude by mentioning your recently published book, Who will assume control of Russia: Russia's political elites after Putin. Could you share with Sinification's readers a bit more about this project and what you consider the most important takeaway from your research?
Feng: Thank you for mentioning my book. The motivation behind writing it was my consideration of the fact that, against a backdrop of the drastic changes taking place both within and outside of Russia, the “replacement of its elites [精英更替]” has already begun to take shape. Therefore, I selected nearly 30 political elites who have risen and begun to stand out in Russia’s power circles during the more than 20 years of Putin's rule and who may play an important role in Russia’s political life in the future. My aim was to provide readers with a rough roadmap for understanding the future political landscape of Russia.
However, what I want to emphasise most is that the development of any country requires not only a healthy and orderly turnover of elites but also a continuous renewal of ideas and ideological concepts. For a country like Russia, which has a deep imperial tradition and tends to dwell on the past rather than look towards the future, the inertia of its thinking is particularly evident. As I just mentioned, the Russia-Ukraine war is a war shaped by the accumulation, fermentation and consolidation of such things as Russia’s sense of insecurity, imperial complex, messianic thinking, Pan-Slavism and relentless pursuit of spheres of influence.
Thus, for Russia, its future does not depend solely on the frequency and intensity of the replacement of its elites but, more importantly, on the speed, breadth and depth of the renewal of the Russian national mindset and ideological concepts.