Thank you for sharing this. It is is a well-articulated viewpoint shared by some and different from others amongst the prominent Chinese voices participating in the discourse. Using copious references to Mao quotes to elucidate and further support the author's points is interesting on its own right.
I think the same set of objections I raised last time still holds; China's conception of the developing world, when it isn't claiming membership as a matter of rhetorical convenience, is as a captive market and source of raw materials.
This is not dissimilar from how the United States and European Union have often treated the Global South, but the US order has the advantage of having routinely "admitted new members" into the ranks of developed nations. It is possible to become Malaysia, Poland, or even Japan or South Korea within the US-led trading order, even without necessarily being closely aligned to the United States' security system. Case in point... China itself!
There is no evidence, at present, that China is able or willing to give up control over its capital account and currency such that other countries might achieve a similar success by engaging with the Chinese market. And China is not nearly wealthy enough, nor dedicated enough to improving the consumptive capacity and standard of living of the man-in-the-street, to serve such a role anytime soon.
One specific point: the Yuan is not going to become a major international medium of exchange unless China liberalizes its capital account. For all that the PRC has crowed over Western moves to freeze and neutralize Russian USD and EUR reserves, it forgets (and its various foreign cheerleaders ignore or simply don't realize) that the end-state of Russia's foreign currency reserves is the *default* state of any foreign exchange held in RMB.
This is not to say it will not make diplomatic inroads, but the notion of welding together a true alliance built upon shared interests with countries like Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, Indonesia, and Bangladesh seems extremely remote. Russia, perhaps, albeit more as a satrap than a partner, because Russia has no alternatives. But the remaining players will never put themselves in such a position. They will seek to trade widely and climb the value-added chain themselves on the back of access to US, EU, and NE Asian markets, not to align themselves geopolitically with any particular country.
Three Rings: Building a New International System in the Face of Western Decoupling by Cheng Yawen
Thank you for sharing this. It is is a well-articulated viewpoint shared by some and different from others amongst the prominent Chinese voices participating in the discourse. Using copious references to Mao quotes to elucidate and further support the author's points is interesting on its own right.
I think the same set of objections I raised last time still holds; China's conception of the developing world, when it isn't claiming membership as a matter of rhetorical convenience, is as a captive market and source of raw materials.
This is not dissimilar from how the United States and European Union have often treated the Global South, but the US order has the advantage of having routinely "admitted new members" into the ranks of developed nations. It is possible to become Malaysia, Poland, or even Japan or South Korea within the US-led trading order, even without necessarily being closely aligned to the United States' security system. Case in point... China itself!
There is no evidence, at present, that China is able or willing to give up control over its capital account and currency such that other countries might achieve a similar success by engaging with the Chinese market. And China is not nearly wealthy enough, nor dedicated enough to improving the consumptive capacity and standard of living of the man-in-the-street, to serve such a role anytime soon.
One specific point: the Yuan is not going to become a major international medium of exchange unless China liberalizes its capital account. For all that the PRC has crowed over Western moves to freeze and neutralize Russian USD and EUR reserves, it forgets (and its various foreign cheerleaders ignore or simply don't realize) that the end-state of Russia's foreign currency reserves is the *default* state of any foreign exchange held in RMB.
This is not to say it will not make diplomatic inroads, but the notion of welding together a true alliance built upon shared interests with countries like Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, Indonesia, and Bangladesh seems extremely remote. Russia, perhaps, albeit more as a satrap than a partner, because Russia has no alternatives. But the remaining players will never put themselves in such a position. They will seek to trade widely and climb the value-added chain themselves on the back of access to US, EU, and NE Asian markets, not to align themselves geopolitically with any particular country.