Turning Crisis into Opportunity: Zhong Houtao on China’s New Cross-Strait Strategy (Part 1)

"What is needed now is the right opportunity—if the United States produces such an opportune moment, the overall dynamics could shift fundamentally."

Zhong Houtao (钟厚涛) has a notably unorthodox background. Trained in Chinese literature, his doctoral research explored how the classic Song-dynasty poetics treatise, Canglang’s Remarks on Poetry (沧浪诗话), has been interpreted and culturally reframed within Anglophone scholarship. After completing his PhD in 2011, he made a remarkable shift in focus, joining the prestigious Institute of Taiwan Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), where he began analysing cross-Strait relations and political developments in the Republic of China (ROC). How such a transition was possible is not readily evident. He is now an Associate Professor at the University of International Relations in Beijing, known for its close ties with China’s Ministry of State Security. This may account for his apparent reluctance or inability to engage directly with foreign China watchers such as myself, particularly on so sensitive a subject as Taiwan.

I found his book talk on cross-Strait relations (below) fascinating, as it sheds light on some of the debates and developments in strategic thinking—objectionable or otherwise—currently underway in China. Although Presidents Trump and Lai Ching-te are described as highly unpredictable figures capable of upending the status quo on a whim, Zhong, like many of his colleagues, also highlight both Beijing’s growing capacity to deter such behaviour, and the US’s intent and ability to prevent Taipei from straying too far beyond Brijing’s red lines. Furthermore, there appears to be growing scepticism in China about the resolve of the US and its allies to intervene should a cross-Strait conflict ever break out, alongside increasing confidence in the PRC’s ability to prevail. As political scientist Zheng Yongnian (郑永年) recently observed: “The United States would find it difficult to sustain such an asymmetric conflict. For the US, Taiwan is merely one component of its broader geopolitical [strategy], representing the interests of a small minority. For mainland China, by contrast, it would be a war over sovereignty—one that reflects the will of its entire people.”

Rather than simply advocating that Beijing continue its “salami slicing” tactics towards Taiwan, as Zheng does, more hardline scholars like Zhong appear to favour the recent “Kinmen model”—put simply, seizing every possible opportunity to “take a mile when given an inch”—an approach that sits uneasily with his recommendation to prevent crises from spiralling out of control.

Equally uneasy is the stance taken by Zhong and others who, despite frequent insistence that China has no intention of exporting its political model abroad, actively extol the virtues of the PRC’s “whole-process people’s democracy” while simultaneously seeking to discredit Western-style democratic systems by denouncing what they see as their inherent flaws. The line between praising a system and promoting it is a thin one.

— Thomas

Today's post is too long to be sent out all at once. Part two will follow shortly.

Key Points (Part 1)

1. Lai Ching-te’s recent “New Two-State Theory” represents a shift from the DPP’s earlier “Nation-Building Theory”, reducing emphasis on formal independence in favour of de facto separation through reliance on external support, particularly from the US.

2. “Internationalisation of the Taiwan issue” will probably become a key battleground in US–China rivalry, as shown by debates over UN Resolution 2758 and Western claims that it does not endorse the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan.

3. Beijing faces a “communications predicament”: it has the facts but struggles to be heard or believed internationally, highlighting the need for smarter external messaging.

4. The US views Lai with growing suspicion: the strong influence of his deep-green pro-independence base, his use of separatist rhetoric to secure votes and his volatile temperament make him unpredictable and hard to control.

5. Washington will strive to restrain Lai through pressure from the American Institute in Taiwan, regular arms sales and its trusted “proxy”, Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim. Yet Lai’s tendency towards provocative pro-independence moves will remain.

6. The interaction between two highly unpredictable actors could see Trump push the "Taiwan card" to its limits, while Lai leverages America to counter China, driving a prolonged cycle of high-risk escalation.

7. However, the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait is tilting increasingly in Beijing’s favour. Since Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit, China’s large-scale military drills have effectively secured the PLA’s maritime and air dominance around Taiwan.

   1. Zhong: “When you connect all four exercises together, a clear pattern begins to emerge. It outlines a comprehensive, seamless, three-dimensional encirclement strategy with no blind spots.”

8. Beijing’s triadic approach of ”responding to (应对)”, “managing (管控)” and “leveraging (利用)” crises will help turn such situations into momentum for cross-Strait reunification.

   1. “Responding” entails “meeting soldiers with generals and meeting water with earth” — in other words, taking whatever measures are called for when challenges arise.

   2. “Managing” focuses on ensuring that crises do not spiral out of control.

   3. “Leveraging” — the most important of the three — involves exploiting crises to achieve strategic gains.

      1. Zhong: “Anyone who studies the Taiwan issue knows that it is a small island lacking sufficient natural resources and heavily reliant on imports … What is needed now is the right opportunity—if the United States produces such an opportune moment, the overall dynamics could shift fundamentally.”

The Author

Name: Zhong Houtao (钟厚涛)
Date of birth: May 1983 (age: 42)
Position: Associate Professor, University of International Relations (UIR) (2022–Present); Deputy Director, Strategic Communication Research Centre, UIR; Deputy Director, Department of Culture and Communication, School of National Security, UIR
Formerly: Researcher, Institute of Taiwan Studies, CASS (2011–2022)
Research focus: Cross-Strait Relations; Taiwan’s domestic politics; Cross-cultural communication
Education: BA-MA Capital Normal University (2001-2007), PhD Peking University (2007-2011)
Experience Abroad (visiting scholar): University of Oregon; Johns Hopkins University

RENOWNED SPEAKER BOOK TALK: ZHONG HOUTAO ON CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS AND THE TAIWAN STRAIT SITUATION [EXCERPTS]
Zhong Houtao (钟厚涛)
Q&A conducted on 17 October 2024
Published by China Review News Agency (中国评论新闻网) on 12 February 2025
Translated and put together by Daniel Crain
(Illustration by OpenAI’s DALL·E 3)

N.B. The following excerpts have been selected for conciseness. Readers are encouraged to read the original article in full.

1. Taiwan, UN Resolution 2758 and the Battle for Discourse Power

In his Double Ten Day speech, Lai Ching-te [赖清德] proposed a "New Two-State Theory” [新两国论] [Note: Double Ten (双十) is the commonly used name for the National Day of the Republic of China]. What, then, is new about it? Since taking office, Lai Ching-te’s rhetoric has fundamentally shifted from the earlier “Nation-Building Theory” [建国论], in that he no longer speaks of “Taiwan’s independence and founding a new state” [台湾独立建国] but instead embraces the existing framework of the “Republic of China” [中华民国]. This suggests that the previously concerning prospect of “de jure Taiwan independence” [法理台独] may no longer be Lai Ching-te’s primary objective. Instead, he may increasingly pursue independence by “relying on external forces” [倚外谋独]—the most notable of which is the United States. This brings us to the topic of today’s discussion: the influence of the United States on Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Washington’s support for the DPP goes beyond simply helping it rise to power; more crucially, it offers ideological reinforcement for the DPP’s flawed pro-independence narrative [台独].

The establishment of a nation depends on four clearly observable criteria: first, a defined territory; second, a permanent population; third, a government of its own; and fourth, international recognition. [The fourth criterion], international recognition, takes many forms. Diplomatic recognition by other countries is just one form. Another highly significant form is the recognition by international organisations of a government’s legitimacy. Therefore, we can see that when Washington stirs up debate over United Nations Resolution 2758—claiming that it did not resolve the issue of Taiwan’s representation—some begin to argue that Taiwan is therefore eligible to join the United Nations, or at least its affiliated agencies [Note: Zhong is referring to recent official US rhetoric on Resolution 2758, arguing that it does not preclude Taiwan’s participation in the UN system and other multilateral forums]. This creates a major issue. In future, the internationalisation of the Taiwan issue is likely to become a central battleground in the strategic rivalry between Mainland China and the United States, and a significant clash between the two sides is set to take place [双方之间会产生一个巨大的碰撞]. While Washington will push hard to internationalise the Taiwan issue, we on the Mainland will consistently assert and reaffirm that Taiwan is a matter of China’s domestic affairs.

So, how should Mainland China respond to the US hype over UN Resolution 2758 and the DPP’s corresponding echoing and manipulation of the issue? UN Resolution 2758 primarily resolved the question of representation by affirming that the government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legitimate representative of China in the United Nations. This clearly established the PRC’s international standing while also expelling Chiang Kai-shek’s regime [from the UN]. At its core, the resolution addressed a fundamental issue: the People’s Republic of China is granted representative authority over Taiwan. On 25 October 1945, Chen Yi, on behalf of the Chinese government, declared that from that day forward, Taiwan and the Penghu Islands were officially restored to Chinese territory [归入中国版图], and that all land, people and political affairs would henceforth fall under Chinese sovereignty. Therefore, whether in 1949, or in 1971 when Resolution 2758 was passed, or even up until 2022 before the United States began stirring up controversy over this issue, few in the world ever questioned the “One China” principle [一个中国原则]. It had long been a widely recognised consensus in the international community.

But the problem is that today, in the arena of international public discourse, China faces a communications predicament: we have reason and facts on our side, yet we struggle to get our point across; even when we do speak out, no one listens; and even if they listen, they don’t believe it [一个有理讲不出、讲了没人听、听了没人信的传播困境]. In a sense, this can be seen as a linguistic challenge. Although we occupy the moral high ground, the truth of history is neither heard nor believed. But this does not mean we are helpless. We are now fighting back actively. What is particularly needed now is for media platforms to strengthen external communication efforts [加大对外传播], as this plays a crucial role in dispelling misinformation and clarifying historical facts.

2. Growing US Suspicion: Lai’s Unpredictability and Political Constraints

A turning point lies [potentially] in whether Washington's level of suspicion towards the DPP will increase following Lai Ching-te’s rise to power. To assess this, we must use Lai’s predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen, as a point of reference. In Washington’s view, Tsai Ing-wen was moderate, non-provocative, and played entirely by America’s playbook—she was seen as predictable. As a result, throughout Tsai Ing-wen’s tenure, the United States maintained a very high level of engagement and coordination with her across various sectors. Any discussion of Lai must therefore be understood against this backdrop.

So has the United States' level of suspicion towards Lai Ching-te increased? The answer is clear: it definitely has. There are three main reasons:

First is Lai Ching-te’s unique personal commitment to “Taiwanese independence” [台独], especially his unpredictable and uncontrollable decision-making style. Lai is a conviction-driven advocate of “Taiwanese independence”; his pursuit of this path is deeply ingrained and sincere, which worries Washington greatly. He is not easily swayed by external forces, and more importantly, since taking office on May 20th, his combative personality has been on full display for all to see [一览无余]. What most concerns the US is that someone with such an aggressive disposition could eventually deviate from [Washington’s] strategic expectations and break free from its control, all while lacking predictability. A vivid example of this distrust is Lai’s recent “visits abroad” [外访], during which he was not allowed to transit through the US mainland [emphasis added]—clearly demonstrating America’s lack of confidence in him.

Second, in the longer term, Lai Ching-te is being coerced—or even politically kidnapped [绑架]—by hardline deep-green supporters [深绿的支持者], forcing him to keep advancing down this path [Note: “Green” refers to the official colour of Taiwan’s DPP] Lai is often referred to as the “Golden Grandson of Taiwanese Independence [台独金孙]”—a label that not only reflects the depth of his ideological commitment to the cause. More importantly, this title implies that he has effectively been politically captured by the deep-green faction on the island, who see him as their last great hope. They believe that Lai Ching-te is the DPP’s most perfectly groomed so-called “successor” [所谓接班人]. And if so-called “Taiwan independence” cannot be achieved under Lai’s leadership, then it will become all the more unattainable in the future.

This means that even if Lai wishes to maintain a relatively neutral stance and flexible position, the deep-green forces will keep pushing him forward, at which point he could potentially lose autonomy over his own political choices. Once such political momentum takes shape, it will be difficult even for the United States to halt it, because the deep-green camp has already become a significant force on the island. Thus, the greatest risk associated with the “Golden Grandson of Taiwan Independence” label lies in the expectation that Lai must fulfil the mission and duty that this title presupposes. He may be able to delay this during his first term, but if re-elected in 2028, he will be expected to fulfil the aspirations the deep-green faction has placed upon him. This is something the United States will find difficult to fully control or obstruct—and it remains a major source of concern for Washington.

The third [reason for Washington’s rising concerns] is the demands of upcoming elections. Lai Ching-te is currently governing with a minority mandate. Looking at the present and the forseeable future, his 2024 election to the leadership of Taiwan was secured with only 40% of the vote. This is a typical example of the tyranny of a minority rule over the majority [少数人对多数人的暴政]. If he wants to be re-elected in 2028, then he must first remove the political obstacles that stand in his way. Taiwan's economy is unlikely to perform well over the next two to three years. Under such conditions, it will be difficult for Lai to campaign on economic and livelihood issues. This leaves him with only one remaining option—the “Taiwan independence card” [台独牌]. Therefore, during the next election cycle, Lai is highly likely to revive rhetoric around so-called “Taiwanese independence” as the situation demands. At that point, cross-Strait relations could enter a new strategic phase characterised by volatility. Moreover, it is widely known that the DPP operates under a model of factional co-governance. Although Lai is its current chairman, it is uncertain whether he can effectively control and steer the party. Within the DPP’s Central Standing Committee, support for and opposition to Lai are currently split roughly 50-50. If he fails to maintain control, there is a real risk that he could be politically “kidnapped” [绑架] by rival factions within his own party.

3. US Levers of Influence over Lai Ching-te

So, how will the United States exercise restraint? First, by closely monitoring Lai and strictly controlling his rhetoric. There exists a critical channel of communication between the United States and Taiwan. In my book [published in 2024], I specifically emphasise one institution: the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). The United States will undoubtedly use the AIT Chairperson [who is based in Washington] to “sneak into Taiwan” [窜台] and engage directly with Lai, both to communicate and to apply pressure. Particularly, they will press Lai to exercise a degree of self-restraint in his cross-Strait policy. This is why we see that Lai’s Double Ten Day speech was, in tone—at least on the surface—somewhat more moderate than his May inaugural address. However, it is clear that while the posturing may change, the essence [of his stance] remains the same: it is old wine in a new bottle [新瓶装旧酒]—the fundamental nature of “Taiwanese independence” has not changed.

So why, at least in appearance, did Lai seem more moderate and conciliatory? There are certainly multiple reasons behind this, but one undeniable factor was the PLA’s “Joint Sword-A” military exercise. It served not only as a deterrent to pro-independence forces and the DPP within Taiwan, but more importantly, it served as a wake-up call to the United States. We can observe a chain reaction: Lai provokes Mainland China → the Mainland seizes the opportunity to strengthen control over airspace in the Taiwan Strait → the United States restrains Lai → Lai makes a modest concession.

Second, there will be tactical containment. Washington has many methods to keep Lai in check. Under the Biden administration, US arms sales to Taiwan have effectively become routinised. There is a fundamental difference between the approaches of Trump and Biden versus that of the earlier Obama administration. The Obama administration followed a bundled model of arms sales, whereas since the Trump era, sales have occurred every few months on a rolling basis. Thus, the US can use this channel to exert pressure on the DPP authorities and signal its lack of trust in Lai Ching-te. Within Taiwan, many groups—especially those aligned with the Pan-Green coalition—exhibit strong pro-American tendencies and rely heavily on the US. At such moments, it may lead the public to conclude that Lai lacks the capacity to manage relations with the United States effectively. This, in turn, would increase scepticism of Lai.

Third is the key figure: Hsiao Bi-khim. As a close confidante of Tsai Ing-wen, Hsiao was placed alongside Lai by Tsai herself, and she enjoys a high level of trust from the United States. Hsiao previously served as Taiwan’s representative to the United States, a role she assumed only after what is described as thorough vetting by Washington. Moreover, she was abruptly entrusted with a key role at a critical juncture in the election—to assist, or one might say, join forces with Lai’s team—which ultimately helped secure electoral victory. The role played by Washington in her successful bid for office is evident. However, it is clear that Lai Ching-te and Hsiao Bi-khim are not fully aligned. Positioning Hsiao so close to Lai is evidently a calculated move by the United States—a clever manoeuvre that should be plainly obvious to all observers [一清二楚].

4. Trump’s Return and the Risk of Escalation

So, what is the real issue [for the Mainland] now? It lies in preventing the DPP from moving towards a new form of “Taiwanese independence”. The “New Two-State Theory” [新两国论] differs from the earlier “nation-building” [建国论] form of radical independence—it manipulates the concept of a “Republic of China Taiwan” [他操弄的是“中华民国台湾”]. This is probably a source of growing anxiety for the United States, as it presents it with a significant strategic challenge. What’s even more concerning is that the US and Taiwan are increasingly converging in their efforts to internationalise the Taiwan issue. Rather than restraining this trend of internationalised pro-independence advocacy, the US has instead become an enabler—if not the original instigator. This development presents a renewed threat to Mainland China, introducing a new set of challenges to be confronted.

The greatest concern surrounding Trump’s re-election is that he may play the "Taiwan card” [台湾牌] to its limits in his relations with China. Trump has already stated explicitly that once elected he will continue to impose additional tariffs on China. It is therefore foreseeable that, under a renewed Trump presidency, US-China relations will enter a new and turbulent phase. Moreover, judging from his first term, Trump’s most defining trait—much like Lai Ching-te—is his unpredictability. This situation could become highly problematic: whereas the US leadership has traditionally been predictable, Lai is both uncontrollable and unpredictable. The interaction between the two creates a prolonged dynamic, where the United States uses Taiwan to contain China, and Taiwan uses America to oppose China— [potentially] escalating in a prolonged, intensifying and exponential fashion.

During Trump’s presidency four years ago, we were especially concerned about what was termed “doomsday panic” [末日疯狂]—a fear rooted in the fact that no one could predict what Trump might do, due to his inherent unpredictability. When Trump returns to office, the situation could become extremely troublesome. When faced with someone so unpredictable, Mainland China has limited options—we can only respond pragmatically: “meet force with force, and water with earth” [水来土掩], as the saying goes. We will need to defuse the crises that the United States may generate with care. More importantly—and to return to the topic of cross-Strait relations — I personally believe that cross-Strait ties may find a turning point within the crisis itself [在危机当中迎来一个转机]. Even with Trump winning today and taking office in 2025, the balance of power in 2025—between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, and between China and the US—will no longer be what it was several years ago.

5. Using Crisis as Opportunity: China’s Evolving Taiwan Strategy

After Pelosi's provocative visit to Taiwan in 2022, our military exercises in the Taiwan Strait presented a completely different picture compared with those during the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis twenty-six years earlier. Before 2022, it was difficult to say definitively which side—Mainland China or Taiwan—held the strategic upper hand across the Strait. But the situation has changed dramatically since then. At present, our strategic posture is “firmly securing maritime and air superiority in the Taiwan Strait” [牢牢掌控了台海地区的制海权与制空权] [Note: the original source of the quote Zhong uses here is unclear, but both Chinese state and private media frequently use variations of this wording to explain the Mainland’s strategic objectives for its military drills]. We now hold both the dominant position and the strategic initiative in cross-Strait relations.

Since 2022, we have conducted a total of four large-scale military exercises in the Taiwan Strait region. In April 2023, when Tsai Ing-wen made a provocative visit to the United States and had a meeting with then-Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy, we once again responded with military exercises. As everyone has seen, in 2024 we conducted drills in both May and again this October. In 2022, the closest point of our military activity came within just 10 nautical miles of Taiwan. We have effectively established an encirclement of Taiwan. As we often say: “Taiwan is not only in the hearts of the 1.4 billion people of the motherland—it is also firmly in their hands.”

[Our] 2024 military exercises were once again different. Compared with previous drills, the Joint Sword-A’s encirclement carried out in May 2024 was slightly smaller in scale—but crucially, it created a staggered, crisscrossed pattern. In other words, areas where we conducted exercises last time were deliberately avoided this time. Our most recent [Joint Sword-2024B] exercise also created this staggered arrangement. When you connect all four exercises together, a clear pattern begins to emerge. It outlines a comprehensive, seamless, three-dimensional encirclement strategy with no blind spots.

There is another extremely important point—the following chart is crucial—it shows our Coast Guard vessels. Although our Navy typically designates specific zones for its exercises, our Coast Guard conducts continuous patrols in these areas. What we are effectively exercising here is a form of law enforcement jurisdiction over Taiwan.

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Let’s return to the 2022 exercises to make a comparison—on the left is the 1996 military drill map, and on the right is the one from 2022. The 2022 exercise coincided with Pelosi’s provocative visit to Taiwan. Following her visit, we seized the momentum to launch a forceful response through this military exercise. But we have not yet fully considered the fact that this exercise has significantly enhanced China’s control over maritime and air superiority, as well as information dominance in the Taiwan Strait. This has laid a solid foundation for resolving the Taiwan question in the future.

This is precisely why I mentioned earlier that, should Trump truly push the “Taiwan card” to the limit in his approach to China, we cannot rule out the possibility that we will again seize the momentum and turn it to our advantage, because the conditions we’ve built up in recent years have become increasingly ripe for such a response. More importantly, we have three distinct postures [to adopt] in the face of a crisis:

• The first is to respond to the crisis [head on] [应对危机]: meet soldiers with generals, meet water with earth [兵来将挡，水来土掩]. Pelosi’s 2022 visit to Taiwan posed a massive challenge to us. Initially, our response was characterised by high alert and considerable tension. That was an example of a crisis response.

• The second posture is to manage the crisis [管控危机]—ensuring that the crisis does not spiral out of control.

• The third—and most important—approach is to leverage the crisis [利用危机]. When Pelosi visited Taiwan, we took advantage of the moment and acted accordingly [顺势而为]. In response to Lai Ching-te’s May 20th inaugural speech, we launched Joint Sword 2024A. In response to the Double Ten speech, we followed with Joint Sword 2024B. Having established Joint Sword 2024, there is now a foundation to roll out Joint Sword 2025 and then Joint Sword 2026. In future, this will evolve into a serialised and routinised pattern of military operations and strategic signalling.

This carries immense strategic significance, as it lays a solid foundation for the eventual resolution of the Taiwan question. Anyone who studies the Taiwan issue knows that it is a small island lacking sufficient natural resources and heavily reliant on imports. For example, Taiwan’s natural gas reserves are only enough to last just over ten days [Note: Taipei has approved storage expansions to reach at least 20 days by 2030]. Given this strategic posture that we have now established, the future model for cross-Strait reunification may well differ from past assumptions. What is needed now is the right opportunity—if the United States produces such an opportune moment, the overall dynamics could shift fundamentally.

Today's post is too long to be sent out all at once. Part two will follow shortly.

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