September 2025 Digest

China & The West | US Politics (Charlie Kirk) | Artificial Intelligence | Military Parade | Middle East | India | South China Sea | Russia | Resource and Energy Security | China's Economy

Today’s post offers a round-up of noteworthy analyses and commentaries from September. Your feedback on this new monthly digest would be much appreciated.

1. China & The West:

   1. Da Wei on US–China decoupling eroding negotiation incentives but fostering Chinese composure through self-reliance.

   2. Li Wei on the US deliberately pushing the PRC toward self-sufficiency and China’s need for bold unilateral opening-up.

   3. Jin Canrong on addressing Western “thought colonialism” in Chinese academia and among elites.

   4. Yan Xuetong on the increasing importance of regional security architectures in the absence of great-power consensus.

   5. Jian Junbo on advancing cooperation with Europe even as China is viewed as a strategic threat.

2. US Politics (Charlie Kirk):

   1. Wu Xinbo on the fracturing of American society and the likely shape of a post-hegemonic world as the US turns inwards.

   2. Zheng Zhigang on how China would benefit from figures like Charlie Kirk in its society.

   3. Zheng Ge on American gun violence exposing the hollowness of American claims to institutional universalism.

   4. Song Wei on the likely endurance of US democratic institutions and international standing despite strains under Trump.

3. Artificial Intelligence:

   1. Xu Jilin on the negative outlook for society as AI binds people to systems—as they were once bound to land and machines.

   2. James Jianzhang Liang on the impact of AI on fertility and the continued importance of population scale in the AI era.

   3. Zheng Yongnian on the hollowing out of civic meaning and marketisation of emotions by AI and social media algorithms.

   4. Cai Fang on the need for the state to decisively tilt towards workers to mitigate the impact of AI on employment.

4. Military Parade:

   1. Zheng Yongnian on China seeing military modernisation as the basis for peaceful diplomacy and Western misinterpretations.

   2. Victor Gao on the spectrum of messages from the Victory Day parade to China’s partners, rivals and adversaries.

   3. Yu Bin on how a deliberate “fog of peace” in Japan provides political cover for militarisation.

5. Middle East:

   1. Sun Degang on Israel fuelling “defence diversification” away from the US by Gulf states and the strategic opening for China.

   2. Wang Cheng on the extractive reputation of Chinese firms limiting the future potential of their economic involvement in Gulf states.

6. India:

   1. Lin Minwang on Modi’s conduct around the SCO meeting in Tianjin suggesting a hedging strategy rather than a tilt towards China.

7. South China Sea:

   1. Wu Shicun on deploying an ecological policy to assert Chinese sovereignty by establishing a nature reserve around Scarborough Shoal.

   2. Cheng Hanping on the Philippines being pushed towards confrontation with China by diplomatic calculus rather than the factor of Marcos Jr. as President.

8. Russia:

   1. Ding Xiaoxing on Russia’s war with Ukraine weakening its standing in Central Asia as China’s influence there increases.

   2. Han Yichen on infrastructure strains in the Russian Far East and Siberia amid Ukrainian attacks and Russia’s eastern pivot.

   3. Zhang Wenmu on the importance of Russia’s fundamental assets in territory and resources over GDP in determining the outcome of its war with Ukraine.

9. Resource and Energy Security:

   1. Wen Jiayun and Liu Yuanling on the importance of nuclear power to sustainable decarbonisation and the error of fixating on wind and solar.

   2. Zhao Yang on addressing China’s reliance on imports for numerous critical metals even as it dominates the market in rare earths.

10. China’s Economy:

    1. Luo Zhiheng on the recent surge in China’s stock market reflecting optimistic narratives and abundant liquidity over genuine fundamentals.

    2. Yao Yang on the central role of finance for capital allocation to the “real economy” in China as corrective policies ease up.

    3. Zhao Jian on economic pain and polarisation as China passes through a deep economic transition from the old growth model.

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1. China & The West

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Although both sides pulled back after the first wave of tariff exchanges, long-term US–China strategic decoupling is set to continue—eroding incentives for negotiation and amplifying volatility around Taiwan. Washington and Beijing are pursuing partial disengagement not only from each other but also from the global system more broadly. Beijing’s confidence has grown amid Trump’s dismantling of post-WWII institutions and the perceived success of its own industrial and technology policies, reinforcing an emphasis on “dual circulation”, self-reliance and investment-led growth over exports. Yet within this protectionist environment, a paradoxical long-term benefit may emerge: greater self-reliance could reduce “fear” and instil greater “composure” in Chinese policymaking. – Da Wei (达巍), Director, Centre for International Security and Strategy, Tsinghua University （RSIS, 1 September）

Washington’s strategic objective is to dismantle the global free trade framework that underpinned China’s rise and to push Beijing towards a “self-sufficient” [自给自足] model of “internal circulation” [内循环]. This strategy operates through trade, technology and finance: tariffs have depressed Chinese export growth, technological restrictions have constrained the PRC’s aerospace sector and the dominance of US capital markets has curtailed China’s ability to mobilise investment—with American spending on AI exceeding China’s by a factor of ten. To sustain globalisation and preserve its role as the “world’s factory”, China should respond with bold “unilateral opening-up” [单边开放], drawing inspiration from earlier industrial powers—Britain’s repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 and the US’s own Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. – Li Wei (李巍), Deputy Dean, School of International Relations, Renmin University of China (北京大学中外人文交流研究基地, 30 September)

As China grows stronger, the battle against Western “thought colonisation” [思想殖民] has become central to protecting sovereignty and identity, highlighting the unfinished project of decolonisation that began in the early PRC. A recent, widely cited Xinhua Institute report frames unfinished decolonisation as a global challenge for all formerly colonised or semi-colonised states—China included. The long experience of “studying from the West” [向西方学习] has entrenched Western-centrism and “America-worship” [崇美] in parts of Chinese academia, which must be overcome to develop theories grounded in local realities. The Foreign Ministry’s sanction on Japanese senator Ishihara Taro, a naturalised Japanese citizen who was born in China, symbolises resistance to internal “self-colonisation” among Chinese elites, some of whom continue to transfer their wealth abroad. – Jin Canrong (金灿荣), Professor, School of International Relations, Renmin University of China (金金乐道编辑部, 11 September 2025)

Conflict management is increasingly channelled into regional security architectures [地区的安全架构] as major powers fuel proxy wars and invoke “economic security” [经济安全] as a catch-all justification for trade restrictions. China’s consistent invocation of UN Charter principles during the Russo-Ukrainian war positions it as more conducive to peace than states supplying military aid. Yet in the absence of great-power consensus, regional frameworks remain central. In East Asia, ASEAN has proved effective at sustaining stability, true to its original design as a conflict-prevention body. By contrast, NATO’s founding purpose was winning the Cold War, leaving it ill-suited to maintaining peace in the post-Cold War era. – Yan Xuetong (阎学通), Honorary Dean, Institute of International Relations, Tsinghua University (观察者网, 18 September)

Europe’s widening perception of threat risks inflating a “bubble” [泡沫] of security anxiety that extends well beyond Russia to encompass China and other states. By adopting a “new Cold War” [新冷战] narrative, European powers risk casting Beijing as a systemic rival. However, given the limited capacity of these states for sustained extra-regional projection, the prudent response from China is to avoid overreaction: consolidating long-term stability with its neighbours while pursuing selective cooperation with Europe in traditional, non-security domains. – Jian Junbo (简军波), Director, Centre for China–Europe Relations, Fudan University (环球时报, 14 September)

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2. US Politics (Charlie Kirk)

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The world is bracing for the consequences of an America fracturing into hostile camps as its much-vaunted rule of law [法治] erodes, debt burdens grow, and demographic shifts risk producing a divided “white America” and “non-white America”—a tension starkly underscored by the assassination of Charlie Kirk. As the United States turns inward, the broader trajectory points towards cooperation among India, Europe, China, Russia and Brazil in a post-American hegemonic order. In the near term, Sino–US relations may “rise from a low point” [低开高走] as Trump seeks farm-state votes in the midterms and international credibility at the G20, yet systemic rivalry will remain entrenched. – Wu Xinbo (吴心伯), Dean, Centre for American Studies, Fudan University (澎湃新闻, 18 September)

China needs figures like Charlie Kirk, and the disapproval he faces in the PRC for his anti-Chinese remarks and “glib and artful speech” [巧言令色] is misplaced. His rejection of DEI has been interpreted by some as a threat to gains in equality by Chinese Americans that were “hard-won” [来之不易] and risk “being lost at the final hurdle” [功亏一篑]. Yet if Chinese history had produced more figures in Kirk’s mould, Chinese Americans might not face today’s concerns about defending their rights as an ethnicity. Kirk’s embodiment of open debate and his readiness to defend convictions at personal cost are precisely what give MAGA the claim to speak of restoring American “greatness”. – Zheng Zhigang (郑志刚), Professor, School of Finance, Renmin University of China – (FT中文网, 18 September)

The shooting of Charlie Kirk exposes the hollowness of “the narrative of US-institutional universalism” [美式制度普世化叙事], as a system once celebrated as a “fortress of liberty” [自由堡垒] now treats citizens’ lives as expendable inputs in a political–commercial bargain. Mass shootings trigger share price surges for arms manufacturers, while partisan actors—including Kirk’s own organisation—have weaponised the right to bear arms as a test of loyalty and even deploy it for armed voter intimidation. Such injustices reveal that the Constitution and its amendments are less universal principles than products of the specific political conditions prevailing at their moment of drafting. – Zheng Ge (郑戈), Professor, Koguan School of Law, Shanghai Jiao Tong University (东方学刊, 18 September)

America’s global power rests on deep structural advantages that no single presidency can dismantle, yet the endurance of Trumpism could gradually erode these foundations. Despite “extortionist policies” [讹诈政策] that damage credibility, the United States still commands formidable hard power, benefits from institutional checks rooted in the separation of powers and maintains alliances with partners who, confronted by strategic threats, have little choice but to rely on Washington. These strengths make a rapid collapse of US global standing improbable. But if Trump’s style of governance hardens into a lasting model, corroding the democratic and social foundations of the republic, the prospect of irreversible decline becomes far more tangible. – Song Wei (宋伟), Professor, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China (海外看世界, 1 September)

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3. Artificial Intelligence

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As the third great revolution in human history—after the agricultural and industrial revolutions—artificial intelligence is binding humanity to systems just as people were once bound to land and machines. The European Union’s cautious regulatory stance is prudent, yet great-power rivalry is driving unchecked technological progressivism, making the advance of AI all but unstoppable. The most hopeful outcome would be a revival of Axial Age humanism, reaffirming dignity and restraint—but “pessimists are always right” [悲观的人永远是正确的], and such a revival appears improbable. – Xu Jilin (许纪霖), Professor, History Department, East China Normal University (学人, 12 September 2025)

By eroding entry-level jobs, generative AI is striking at the core of China’s demographic challenge, hitting young people during their “peak fertility window” and accelerating the decline in births. With routine junior tasks—such as coding corrections and legal document review—now automated, graduates face lengthier, lower-paid preparation cycles that delay both marriage and childbearing. Yet in the AI era, population scale becomes even more decisive: essential for sustaining a reservoir of skilled talent, generating user data to refine algorithms and providing market feedback to upgrade applications. Expanded free education, large-scale pro-natal subsidies, extended career preparation subsidies for young people and increased deficit-financed spending should be introduced – James Jianzhang Liang (梁建章), Chairman, Trip.com Group (绕梁说, 29 September)

Artificial intelligence and social media algorithms are hollowing out civic meaning, producing societies of “empty-shell people” [空壳人] and fuelling populist mob behaviour online. Technology has accelerated a youth withdrawal into “lying flat” [躺平] and an emotion-driven consumer boom—exemplified by Pop Mart and its Labubu craze—pushing life toward a “sheep-pen” [羊圈] society where people, no longer defined by work, become the product themselves. To give life meaning in a post-work world, a focus on humanist education and Hannah Arendt’s concept of “action” in the via activa is needed. – Zheng Yongnian (郑永年), Founding Director, Institute for International Affairs, Chinese University of Hong Kong (Shenzhen) – (大湾区评论, 5 September)

As artificial intelligence transforms labour markets, safeguarding employment requires the government to tilt decisively toward workers rather than posing as a neutral arbitrator. Core measures include ensuring algorithmic transparency to prevent bias in recruitment, upholding ultimate human authority over hiring and dismissal and extending social security coverage to platform-based gig workers. Complementary steps involve mandatory retraining and dynamic monitoring of employment shifts, so that job security and welfare remain the paramount priorities of Chinese policy. – Cai Fang (蔡昉), Chief Expert, National High-End Think Tank(s), Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (北京日报, 17 September)

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4. Military Parade

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China approaches military modernisation through the principles of “preventing conflict stems from martial strength” [止戈为武] and “those without weapons get bullied” [没有戈，就受欺负]. Western critiques of China’s supposed “muscle-flexing” [秀肌肉] rest on the assumption that “a strong power is necessarily a hegemon” [国强必霸], overlooking Asia’s historical memory of China’s non-colonial conduct. For Beijing, military strength is the essential “backbone” [底气] of diplomacy, and with regard to Taiwan, greater “muscle” is seen as enhancing the prospects of “peaceful reunification” under the One Country, Two Systems framework. – Zheng Yongnian (郑永年), Founding Director, Institute for International Affairs, Chinese University of Hong Kong (Shenzhen) (大湾区评论, 3 September)

China’s Victory Day parade projected both historical legitimacy and modern deterrence, emphasising the shared wartime struggle of the KMT and the CCP against Japan as a rebuke to “Taiwan separatists”. Technologically, ICBMs and multiple re-entry warheads conveyed deterrence to the US, while fully indigenous and network-centric warfare systems stood in stark contrast to the Indian military’s eclectic “arms import expo” [进口博览会] quality. The intended signals are clear: Japan witnesses the historical narrative of Chinese resistance against its invasion “based on its own strength” [凭一己之力] rather than necessarily reliant on US or Soviet intervention, the US understands it cannot defeat China in either conventional or nuclear war and developing states are reassured by China’s strength as a defender of sovereignty. – Victor Gao (高志凯), Vice-President, Centre for China and Globalisation (CCG) (观察者网, 4 September)

Eighty years after Japan’s surrender, the boundaries between aggressor and victim remain dangerously blurred in global memory, through a deliberately created “fog of peace” [和平主义的迷阵]. The United States’ postwar shield of Emperor Hirohito and Cold War “whitewashing” allowed Japan to reframe its past, while a cultivated narrative of peace and cover from Japanese Constitution’s Article 9 “Peace Clause” conceals militarist tendencies—including large plutonium stockpiles. Japanese elites sustain victimhood by pairing Hiroshima with Auschwitz and diverting attention from atrocities in China—the primary target of invasion and mass violence during WWII. - Yu Bin (于滨), Senior Research Fellow, Shanghai Institute of American Studies (观察者网, 18 September)

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5. Middle East

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The Saudi–Pakistan defence pact marks a gradual shift away from exclusive dependence on US arms and security guarantees, creating greater scope for Chinese systems within an increasingly multipolar arms market. Israel’s repeated strikes on Qatar have underscored that neutrality and US protection offer little real security, driving Riyadh toward “defence diversification” [防务“多元化”] and fuelling discussions of an Arab–Islamic military alliance. The forthcoming China–Arab summit offers Beijing a chance to extend its “community of shared destiny” [命运共同体] into the realm of military diplomacy, with joint training exercises and reciprocal military visits likely to emerge as key areas of growth. – Sun Degang (孙德刚), Director, Centre for Middle East Studies, Fudan University (观察者网, 19 September)

China’s continued expansion into the Gulf hinges on whether its companies can overcome their reputation for “eating alone” [吃独食] and failing to share economic benefits locally. Unlike their positive experience with Aramco under US ownership, Saudi elites view Chinese firms as narrowly profit-driven and inattentive to local development priorities, while the rapid market capture of Chinese players has heightened fears of “carving up” [瓜分] the market. At a time when Gulf states are seeking to diversify beyond oil and demand greater value-sharing, Chinese companies risk hitting an “invisible ceiling” [隐形天花板] and provoking elite resistance unless they address this “cognitive mismatch” [认知错位]. – Wang Cheng (王诚), Research Fellow, Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Commerce (平衡学会, 9 September)

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6. India

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Modi’s conduct at the 1 September Tianjin summit underscores how a genuine Indian shift from the United States toward China remains relatively distant. Modi sought to downplay the visit’s sensitivity by first travelling to Japan, where both sides reaffirmed the Quad security dialogue and the Indo-Pacific strategy. His resistance to “Belt and Road” references in the SCO joint statement, together with a call to Zelensky shortly before meeting Putin, conveyed a stance of “tentativeness” [试探性]. Meanwhile, India’s fraught relations with Pakistan were evident in Modi’s pointed stress on sovereignty and territorial integrity when referring to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. – Lin Minwang (林民旺), Vice Dean, Institute of International Studies, Fudan University – (世界知识, 22 September)

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7. South China Sea

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China’s decision to establish a nature reserve at Scarborough Shoal marks a strategic turn toward deploying ecological policy as an “innovative sovereignty measure”. By framing conservation as governance, Beijing claims a “moral high ground” while restricting Philippine access. The reserve is expected to produce detailed implementation rules, including expanded scientific monitoring. Looking ahead, a policy of “zero-tolerance clearance” [清零] against illegal fishing and environmental violations should be adopted—both deterring Philippine encroachment and anchoring the Shoal’s long-term governance within the imperative of ecological protection. – Wu Shicun (吴士存), Founding Dean, National Institute for South China Sea Studies (观察者网, 21 September)

The deterioration of Sino–Philippine relations stems less from Marcos Jr’s personal leadership than from the alignment of the military elite with the United States and American sustained diplomatic pressure. US threats to the Marcos family’s overseas assets have drawn Manila towards a policy of confrontation with China, while a military establishment long tied to American intelligence networks, training and hardware has reinforced the shift. The “cost–benefit balance” [得失比] is also evident: Japan has offered “large rewards” [丰厚的回报] in the form of security cooperation and low-interest loans for naval hardware, whereas China has yet to pursue “decisive action” [果断的行动] in response to confrontation. – Cheng Hanping (成汉平), Senior Research Fellow, Collaborative Innovation Centre of South China Sea Studies, Nanjing University (海外看世界, 6 September)

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8. Russia

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Russia’s war in Ukraine has eroded its leverage among Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) members in Central Asia and the Caucasus while China’s role has steadily expanded. Armenia has drifted away after losing Nagorno-Karabakh without Russian support, Azerbaijan’s ties with Moscow have deteriorated and Central Asian states are accelerating “de-Russification” [去俄化] while pursuing new partnerships through frameworks such as the C5+1. Against this backdrop, Beijing has consolidated its influence through the Belt and Road and the 2023 China–Central Asia Summit. Once viewing the SCO as a tool to maintain control over its “backyard” [后院], Moscow now turns to it primarily for advancing economic cooperation, resisting Western pressure and promoting a common Eurasian security architecture during its pivot south and east. – Ding Xiaoxing (丁晓星), Deputy Secretary-General, Institute of Eurasian Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) (世界知识, 19 September)

Western sanctions and Ukrainian drone strikes are deepening Moscow’s energy infrastructure challenges in its Far East and Siberia during the wartime “eastern pivot” [东移] of its economic centre. Attacks on refineries and pipelines have weakened Russia’s refining capacity while strikes on airports and railways have pushed more reliance on private cars, driving up fuel demand. At the same time, inadequate infrastructure in Siberia has struggled to absorb the wartime shift of exports eastward, triggering regional price spikes. Compounding these pressures, Western embargoes have cut off access to vital technology and finance, while falling oil revenues leave Moscow unable to fund the necessary upgrades. – Han Yichen (韩奕琛), Associate Research Fellow, Institute of Eurasian Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR, 18 September)

Russia’s current economic difficulties are no indication it will lose the war in Ukraine, for history shows that “having wealth is inferior to having grain, and having grain is inferior to having land” [有钱的不如有粮的，有粮的不如有地的]. This principle is borne out by Napoleon and Hitler’s defeats in Russia, and by the Song dynasty’s collapse before nomadic powers despite its remarkable GDP at the time. Too many strategic misjudgements arise from “abstract”, “emotional” or “feminine” thinking—contrasted with “rational” or “masculine” thinking rooted in material realities. Vague policy slogans such as “cooperation” and “win-win development” overlook these fundamentals; as Mao observed, “you cannot summon a chicken without a handful of grain” [手里没有一把米，叫鸡都不来], enduring strength in resources and territory is the true basis of victory. – Zhang Wenmu (张文木), Professor, Strategic Issues Institute, Beihang University (张文木战略, 20 September)

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9. Resource and Energy Security

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An excessive fixation on green ideology is undermining power generation, decarbonisation and affordability in some Western countries; energy systems must instead prioritise resilience, with nuclear power playing a central role in grid stability. Germany’s ideology-driven 20-year Energiewende has demonstrably failed, while the UK’s aggressive net-zero push under Labour now risks further de-industrialisation and political backlash over soaring heating costs. An exclusive reliance on solar and wind strains grids through their inherent instability, underscoring the importance of nuclear as a reliable baseload source. China is currently the only country advancing fourth-generation nuclear plants toward commercialisation, but continued hesitation over the construction of plants in inland provinces risks eroding international confidence in them and constraining export potential. – Wen Jiayun (文佳筠), Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China; Liu Yuanling (刘元玲), Assistant Researcher, Institute of American Studies, CASS (文化纵横, 14 September)

Shifting demand for metals and the rise of geopolitical resource blocs reveal both strengths and vulnerabilities in China’s minerals security. Beijing remains highly dependent on imports of “big metals” such as iron ore, aluminium and copper, and to a lesser extent on “small metals” such as cobalt, nickel and lithium. At the same time, China’s control over rare earth “chokepoints” provides significant leverage, while the scale of its refining capacity secures advantages in both upstream and downstream pricing. To further mitigate supply risks, Beijing can expand large-scale circular recycling [循环回收] of critical metals, fully tap domestic mining potential [国内挖潜] and build overseas reserves [国外收储] through the acquisition of mining rights. - Zhao Yang (赵扬), Managing Director, CICC Global Institute (中金点睛, 20 September)

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10. China’s Economy

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China’s surging A-shares highlight a sharp divergence between “hot stocks” [股市热] and a “steady economy” [经济稳], as slowing real activity contrasts with valuations inflated by optimistic narratives instead of company earnings. Exports, consumption and investment all show weakening momentum, while market enthusiasm is sustained by abundant liquidity, AI-driven optimism, an “anti-involution” [反内卷] narrative and a shift of household savings from property into equities. To underpin continued stock growth, structural reforms are essential: raising wages and directing more SOE profits into pensions, broadening social security, introducing additional short holidays, creating a real estate stabilisation fund and liberalising the service sector to unlock fresh consumption. – Luo Zhiheng (罗志恒), Chief Economist, Yuekai Securities Research Institute (和讯, 16 September)

Contrary to the widespread view that finance is “shameful” or a “sunset industry,” the sector is a core pillar of the economy—channelling capital to the “real economy” and sustaining entrepreneurial innovation by rewarding success and cushioning failure. The recent policy “correction period” [矫正期], marked by anti-corruption efforts, was painful but necessary to curb “over-financialisation” and “financial hollowing-out”. With this adjustment now nearing completion, the stage is set for deeper capital markets to complement China’s bank-led system, generate genuine value and anchor finance at the heart of the country’s long-term economic strategy. – Yao Yang (姚洋), Dean, Dishui Lake Advanced Finance Institute, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics (凯程金融考研党, 26 September)

China’s ongoing transition away from its previous growth model marks an unprecedented but unavoidable cyclical shift, defined by “acute pain” [阵痛] and “extreme polarisation” [极致分化]. As the economy reduces its reliance on infrastructure spending and real estate, most households are experiencing falling incomes and shrinking assets, while a minority thrive through financial investments. Pensions remain insufficient to support retirees’ consumption, and millions of new graduates face the psychological strain of scarce jobs, “withering before growing old” [未富先衰]. These pressures are driving new patterns of “light consumption” [轻消费], marked by an aversion to large purchases—at trend that may prove hard to reverse. – Zhao Jian (赵建), President, Xijing Institute (西京研究院, 3 September 2025)

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