Russia-Ukraine War: Why China Chose Interests Over Values by Cheng Yawen

"Individuals may 'sacrifice their lives for righteousness', but a nation cannot afford to do so. A nation that cannot even guarantee its own survival has no place to bluster about morality."

Today’s commentary by Cheng Yawen, explaining China’s stance towards Russia since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, is an important one. In my view, it stands among the most insightful pieces to have been written on this topic by a Chinese analyst within the PRC since Russia’s invasion. Grateful to James for his excellent parsing and translation of this text. — Thomas

Readers may be familiar with the ongoing debate among Chinese intellectuals regarding their country’s stance on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Following the recent seismic jolts in US support for Ukraine, Cheng Yawen (程亚文) provides a necessary update. As with Zhao Huasheng (赵华胜), Cheng comes down on the side of “interests” over “values”, arguing that China’s strategic instinct has been vindicated. Cheng’s views—which are grounded in an analysis of Chinese history—are based on the idea that although upholding the sovereignty of small nations is a noble principle, doing so ultimately depends on painful compromise with great powers.

Chinese intellectuals’ stances on the current war are frequently informed by their appraisals of the historical Sino-Soviet relationship. While Feng Yujun (冯玉军)—whose views Sinification has covered extensively—argues that close relations with their Eurasian neighbour have usually been detrimental to China, Cheng contends that the relationship has, at different times, both benefited and harmed his country.

A particularly salient episode in this historical debate is Mao’s decision in October 1950 to follow Stalin’s lead and intervene militarily in the Korean War. Shen Zhihua (沈志华), China’s pre-eminent historian of the Sino-Soviet-DPRK triangular relationship, has argued that Mao prioritised China’s moral reputation within the value system of international socialism when he defied his generals’ concerns that fighting against American troops would harm their country’s interests. Shen believes that the resulting Cold War alignment was detrimental to China, and has recently warned against a return to it. Others have embraced values-based interpretations; the left-wing intellectual Wang Hui (汪晖) once invited ridicule from a noted historian for stating that China’s commitment at the time to international revolution ought to transcend a narrow conception of the national interest.

This tension between moralistic claims on the political order and pragmatic compromise—or maximalist versus limited conceptions of sovereignty—recurs throughout China’s history. Cheng mentions the example of the principled yet futile resistance of certain Ming loyalist scholars to the Manchu invaders during the Ming-Qing transition. During the subsequent Qing Dynasty’s faltering final decades, scholar-officials who clung to purist positions on China’s sovereignty in its diplomatic relations were known as the qingliu (清流 or “pure stream”). This group was notorious for excoriating officials such as Li Hongzhang (李鸿章), who engaged in the grubby business of compromises and strategic balancing with foreign powers—including by attempting to align with the Russian Empire against Japan in the resolution of the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War.

Regarding memories that are rawer still, Cheng’s reference to historians with personal experiences of the Japanese invasion during the 1930-40s—such as Niu Xianzhong (钮先钟) and Ray Huang (黄仁宇)—calls to mind China’s most recent historical experiences of limited scope to exercise sovereignty. It is a reminder—if needed—of how China’s history shapes the views of its intellectuals today.

– James Farquharson

Key Points

1. A large segment of Chinese public and scholarly opinion was critical of their government’s tacit support of Russia during its invasion of Ukraine, arguing that their country should “stand on the side of justice”.

2. However, if implemented, this would risk having both the US and Russia simultaneously turn on China. Trump’s recent rapprochement with Putin has made clear that this was a real possibility.

3. US politicians and intellectuals have for some time expressed the will to align with Russia against China; China’s early decision not to condemn Russia has significantly shrunk the possibility of this strategy attaining success.

4. As a rule, allying with a greater power (the US) against a weaker power (Russia) is strategically unwise, given the risk of the greater power turning on you once the weaker power has been eliminated.

5. A close historical analogy is the Song dynasty’s misguided and repeated decisions to ally with stronger rivals against weaker ones, such as the Mongols against the Jin, which lead to its eventual annihilation by the Mongols.

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6. China’s experience of full-scale invasion by Japan in the past century informs its perspective that pragmatic interests must be placed above assertions of moral values.

7. Ukraine’s geopolitical position and the weakness of its pre-war institutions meant it lacked complete sovereignty; its legally-recognised sovereignty was only guaranteed by an agreement between two great powers.

8. Due to fragmentation and polarisation in their immature democratic institutions, Ukrainian politicians—while “morally” in the right—failed to recognise its limited space to exercise full sovereignty, prioritising principles over interests and refusing to compromise with Russia.

9. Given the risk of fallout, China should prioritise peace and concord in its relations with other great powers as it rises. This necessitates compromising on certain principles such as the sovereignty of weaker nations.

10. In the face of the “end of globalisation”, China, Russia and America should pursue a renewed “Big Three”-style collaboration to re-establish a stable global order and help avert a looming global catastrophe.

The Author

Name: Cheng Yawen (程亚文)
Year of birth: 1972 (age: 52)
Position: Researcher and PhD supervisor, School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Shanghai International Studies University (SISU)
Previously: Researcher, PLA Academy of Military Sciences (AMS); Worked in the Committee Office of the Three Gorges Dam Project under the State Council
Research Focus: Comparative politics; International relations of East Asia; Reconstruction of the Confucian moral order and modern politics; Globalisation and political change
Education: MA China People's Liberation Army National Defence University (year: unspecified)

IF CHINA HAD SEVERED TIES WITH RUSSIA THREE YEARS AGO... JUST THINKING ABOUT IT IS FRIGHTENING
Cheng Yawen (程亚文)
Published by Guancha.cn on 25 February 2025
Translated by James Farquharson
(Illustration by OpenAI’s DALL·E 3)

1. The Perils of Russian Alignment with the US

When war broke out between Russia and Ukraine three years ago, China maintained a neutral stance, disregarding the West's unanimous designation of Russia as an “aggressor”. Like most other countries in the Global South, it did not openly condemn Russia at the United Nations, consistently referring to the war as the "Russo-Ukrainian conflict” [俄乌冲突].

This displeased the West greatly, who forcefully accused China of “covertly supporting” [暗挺] Russia. Within China, public opinion was deeply polarised over the war, with “pro-Ukraine” and “pro-Russia” stances clashing fiercely. Many Chinese people believed that China had failed to “stand on the side of justice” [站在正义立场] by not opposing Russia, viewing this as setting oneself up against “the mainstream of human civilisation” [“与人类文明主流” 为敌]. The clamour has not subsided to this day.

If China had indeed followed the wishes of Western countries and some Chinese citizens at the time by openly taking a stance against Russia—or even participating in sanctions and severing economic and trade ties—then using the term “dangerous” to summarise China’s predicament by now would not seem excessive. By comparison to this, the boycotts [杯葛] that China has faced from Western countries over the past three years pale in significance.

The worst-case scenario, of course, would be the recently much-discussed prospect of the United States executing a “reverse Kissinger” strategy [联俄制中; lit. joining forces with Russia to contain China]. The Trump administration’s efforts to bring an end to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and move closer to Russia have raised concerns about the possibility of a US-Russia alliance against China. Three years ago, China faced a difficult diplomatic choice regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict, with many among China's elite harbouring strong pro-Ukraine and anti-Russia sentiments [中国精英人群充满了反俄挺乌的情绪]. Yet even then, some were already raising the crucial question of how China ought to respond, should Russia align with the United States.

The idea of the United States partnering with Russia to contain China has long existed in American strategic thinking. For example, as early as 2012, former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski proposed in his book Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power that in response to Asia’s rise, the United States should reconsider its relationship with Russia and opt for cooperation with it. The “anti-Russia” faction in China, driven by a strong sense of justice, condemned Russia for violating international law and acting as an aggressor. One wonders how they now feel in light of recent developments.

An unthinkable reality emerged when US and Russian representatives suddenly held talks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. President Trump claimed that the responsibility for the war lay with Ukraine, even refusing to label Russia as an "aggressor" in the run-up to this week’s [i.e. the last week of February’s] G7 meeting and upcoming statement marking the third anniversary of the conflict—aligning the current US designation of the conflict with that of China. What, then, would have been gained [back then] by supporting America’s camp?

In a recent speech given at the European Parliament, the American economist Jeffrey Sachs said, "Don't listen to the Americans. Henry Kissinger once said that to be an enemy of the United States is dangerous, but to be a friend is fatal." Three years ago, if China had chosen to “side with the Americans”, today it might find itself facing a Russo-American alliance working to cut China down to size [修理中国]. This would not merely be an issue of China being “friendless” in the international community. Rather, China would be confronted by the hostility of the two major global powers, one of which shares a long land border with it. Would this not represent an extremely perilous geopolitical and security crisis for China?

2. The Primacy of Interests over Values

Looking back over the past three years of public discussions in China regarding the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, one key issue is the confusion between interests [利害] and morality [是非]. Both aspects are, of course, indispensable. A country without a sense of morality will struggle to gain the respect of others. As the saying goes, “Those who follow the righteous path will attract support, while those who lose the righteous path will only alienate others” [得道多助，失道寡助, a quote from Warring State philosopher Mencius]. On the other hand, a nation that ignores its own interests will have no future, as it may bring unnecessary calamities upon itself. Between interests and morality, a nation must first consider its interests, because, for a nation, survival is paramount. Individuals may “sacrifice their lives for righteousness” [杀身取义，舍身成仁 , a quote from Confucius’s Analects], but a nation cannot afford to do so. A nation that cannot even guarantee its own survival has no place to bluster about morality [奢谈道义是没有意义].

In recent years, Ukraine has become a tragic example of such a nation. It sought to integrate into Europe and join NATO, which, from the perspective of “national sovereignty”, was not inherently wrong. However, this severely violated Russia's security red lines, unwittingly embroiling Ukraine within a fierce competition between major powers. Over twenty years ago, I heard a Ukrainian scholar visiting China admit frankly that if Ukraine were to join NATO, that would be the moment Russia went to war with them. It is not that there were no voices within Ukraine that understood the reasoning behind why it could not join NATO. However, since the turn of the century, Ukraine has continued to strive for NATO membership, with the United States using this [prospect] as bait to lure Ukraine in.

Why did Ukraine’s politicians fail to consider fully the implications of these interests? Former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma once said, “Ukraine has never been a state in the full sense of the word” [Note: we were only able to find this quote written in English on a Russian war blog called “Top War”]. Perhaps, not many people have seriously reflected on the implications of this statement.

It is true that, since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Ukraine's independence, Ukraine has become a sovereign state within the scope of international law and the framework of the United Nations. However, when it comes to the institutional framework [制度体系], internal cohesion and political authority that a nation requires, can it be truly said that Ukraine has become a nation in the political sense? This is not the case.

Ukraine has yet to undergo what is commonly referred to as “state-building” [国家建构]. It is a country that embraced democratisation prematurely and is riven by political factions and polarisation, with the “appearance” but not the substance of a nation state [有了“国家”的外观而无“国家”之实]. Politicians are not working for the long-term future and the interests of the nation, but rather fighting on behalf of the interests and moral standpoints of their political faction. It is thus entirely natural for them to be unable to distinguish the relative importance of the national interest and their [own] moral principles, leading Ukraine into an inevitable tragedy. [Note: this echoes a common depiction of “political opportunists” in Taiwan by Chinese commentators.]

Ukraine has become a sacrificial victim of competition between great powers, now ruthlessly abandoned and even blamed as the instigator of the crisis by its former “benefactor” [金主]. This once again clearly demonstrates that in the interactive arena of international relations, no country’s actions can ignore the underlying power dynamics. The scope within which “sovereignty” can be exercised is actually limited; “national will” cannot simply be exercised arbitrarily [“国家意志”不是想怎么用就能怎么用].

Compared with smaller countries, for great powers, maintaining a balance in relations with one another is of the utmost importance. This is because great powers are always facing competition from other major countries, and the formation of an alliance between any one of these powers targeting another could not be more dangerous for the targeted state. As long as this remains a possibility, no great power should consider becoming an enemy of another lightly [一个大国不要轻易与其他大国为敌]. Once a friendly relationship has been established between great powers, it should be preserved with the utmost effort and not become entangled in momentary moral disputes.

Great power relations require a particularly high level of certainty. As long as the actions of other great powers do not harm one’s national interests, efforts should be made to maintain that certainty. Relying on [mere] hope in an uncertain future brings about uncertainty in one's own fate. The diplomatic efforts of Germany’s “Iron Chancellor” Otto von Bismarck were focused on preventing the formation of military and political alliances among other European powers aimed at Prussia and, later, Germany. This strategy created a relatively secure external environment for Germany, and it was during this period that Germany began its transformation into an important industrialised nation and global power.

3. Ukraine’s Predicament: Sovereignty and Geopolitics

When the Russia-Ukraine conflict broke out, some [in China] argued that Russia, with an economy roughly equivalent to that of Spain, was taking on the West, a move likened to striking a stone with an egg [无异于以卵投石]—it was destined to fail. They believed the war would further erode Russia's global influence and bring no benefits to China, only harm. Thus, China should cut its losses promptly and sever its ties with Russia [Note: this argument is probably best represented by Hu Wei’s critique of China’s stance early on in the invasion]. Others suggested that, in the two World Wars of the 20th century, China had always aligned with the right side, standing with those promoting civilisational progress. This was seen as a major success of the Republic of China’s diplomacy. The underlying message, they argued, was that China should once again "choose the correct side" and continue to align with those championing "civilisational progress" [Note: this position, albeit simplified, is more aligned with that of Prof. Feng Yujun].

Scholarly discussions are based on one's own observations and experiences, and there is no need to overly criticise whether they are right or wrong. However, with the passing of time, some of these statements have caused significant social reverberations, and as such it is necessary to revisit how these views align or diverge with the unfolding facts. In light of the changes brought about by the new Trump administration, [it is evident that] over the past three years the understanding and assessment of the Russia-Ukraine conflict within China—particularly ideas on the progress of the war, Russia’s position as a great power and the stance China should take—have involved some serious misjudgements. If policy decisions had actually been made based on these assessments and proposals, what [kind of] diplomatic [challenges] would China be needing to cope with right now?

To put interests or values first? To those who have experienced a long period of peace, this may seem an irrelevant question. However, those who have endured hardship will clearly perceive the tribulations that underly peace. The historian Ray Huang (黄仁宇), who once participated in the Kuomintang’s resistance against Japan [in the context of WWII], opted to “view history from a technical perspective, rather than a moral one” [从技术的角度看历史，而不是从道德的角度检讨历史] in his later historical evaluations. The “technical perspective” involves weighing up the pros and cons. Huang believed that across Chinese history, there was often a tendency to judge right and wrong based on morality, which led to mistakes that harmed both the country and the people [以道德论是非而导致误国误民的现象].

In his study of China's strategic history, the strategy-focused historian Niu Xianzhong [Note: 钮先钟 another historian with wartime experiences in the 1930s, who fled to Taiwan with the Kuomintang] similarly noted the tragic phenomenon of high-flown discussions of the “heart-mind” [心性] leading to [the state’s] downfall. During the late Ming and Qing periods, the thinker Yan Yuan (颜元), in summarising the history of the previous dynasties, once remarked sarcastically: “In times of peace they prattle on about the pure heart-mind; but to repay their lord in danger, to death they are resigned” [无事袖手谈心性，临危一死报君王]. He criticised the “corrupt Confucians” [腐儒] who followed Zhu Xi's teachings [Note: 朱熹, the pre-eminent scholar of the Neo-Confucian movement, a highly moralistic and refined form of Confucianism] from the southern Song onwards, but in the face of the Ming dynasty’s fall, could only choose suicide as a form of martyrdom. While this may appear noble, it was in fact a display of incompetence [看似高尚，实则无能], placing the nation in peril through empty posturing about the heart-mind [在空谈心性中置国家于危难].

[China’s] “pro-Ukraine” camp argues that Russia has violated international law and international rules, which is a fact. However, this is still not a reason for China to sever its ties with Russia. The international law and international rules referred to today emerged largely after the end of World War II. How, though, did they come about? In reality, they are closely linked to the “post-war international order”. The post-war international order, with institutions like the United Nations and international law at its core, has an egalitarian side, which is the result of joint efforts by many countries. However, it is impossible to ignore or deny that the two major powers of the time, the United States and the Soviet Union, played a leading role [in the creation and design of this new order]. It reflected the will of the Great Powers, thus embodying the concept of “the will of the sovereign shapes the law” [主权者立法].

Behind rules lies power. When those in power believe that the laws and rules no longer represent their will, they simply stop “acting according to the law”—a logic that is quite clear. In recent years, both the United States and Russia have shown a clear tendency to deviate from the international order they once helped establish, disregarding the very laws they played a role in shaping. The primary reason for this is that modern international law was built under their leadership. Since the post-war international order is a product of multiple competing wills and compromises, most countries continue to uphold post-war international law and rules, while a few major powers choose to depart from them. Each side can find legal justifications that align with its own interests and needs. This dynamic is fundamentally shaped by global power relations and the structure of power itself.

4. Looking Back: China Made the Right Choice

Fortunately, in the face of the major and unexpected events three years ago, China did not lose its strategic composure and maintained a clear understanding of the global situation. This has ensured that, even as the United States currently seeks to alter its relationship with Russia, the already established strategic ties between China and Russia will remain stable for the foreseeable future.

China’s stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict is not driven by national opportunism [国家机会主义]. It is of course initially based on its understanding of the historical rights and wrongs of the issue. [However,] since the conflict does not directly concern China and given that who is in the right and who is the wrong is not entirely clear-cut [其是非也并非一清二楚] —with each side having its own reasoning—China naturally has no obligation to take a definitive stance on the matter.

Secondly, the essence of the conflict lies in the confrontation of the United States and other Western countries against Russia. In recent years, the U.S. has explicitly labelled China as a “strategic competitor” [战略竞争对手] and has relentlessly worked to encircle our country, launching wave after wave of non-military offensives. In such a context, does China have any reason to align with its adversary to oppose a nation with which it maintains friendly cooperation?

Thirdly, the fact that most Global South countries have maintained a neutral stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict reflects their underlying discontent with the US-led hegemonic order and the dominance of Western countries. China has recognised this powerful international sentiment. When it comes to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the question of whether to align with Western nations or stand with the broader Global South hardly needs posing.

Moreover, the lesson from China’s past has always been to “maintain distance from the strong and align with the weak” [离强合弱], only forming close cooperative relationships with weaker parties. Currently, both China and Russia are weaker than the United States, making their cooperation a logical choice. What would be the result of allying with a stronger major power to eliminate a relatively weaker one? History provides classic examples: the Northern Song Dynasty allied with the Jin Dynasty to destroy the Liao, only for the Jin to turn around and destroy the Northern Song; similarly, the Southern Song allied with the Mongols to defeat the Jin, only to be later conquered by the Mongols themselves.

5. The Historical Complexity of the Sino-Russian Relationship

Just like with any major power, the relationship between China and Russia is complex, both historically and presently. It cannot be understood by isolating a single aspect as the basis for handling current Sino-Russian relations. For instance, during the era of Tsarist Russia, large swathes of Chinese territory were occupied, a painful chapter in China’s modern history. However, equally significant is the fact that without the Bolshevik Revolution and the support of the Comintern, it remains an open question as to whether post-Qing China could have successfully reunified. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union provided 156 industrial projects and extensive assistance, greatly facilitating China’s industrialization. Throughout modern history, China's interactions with Russia and the Soviet Union have been marked by both darkness and light [黑暗与光明同在]. Each aspect of the story has truth, and whether one supports or opposes Russia, there are ample historical records to justify either stance based on one's own sense of right and wrong.

The relationships between most countries have both a “bright side” and a “dark side”. Over-focusing on moral judgments can hinder effective cooperation. A nation must make choices based on its current interests and strategic considerations. The stable strategic trust and cooperative relationship between China and Russia today is the result of mutual interests, much like China’s decision in the early 1970s to improve relations with the United States—despite previously militating against “American imperialism”. One of the key factors driving Sino-Russian cooperation [today] is, of course, the United States. However, if the U.S. were truly willing to respect the reality of a multipolar world and abandon its prejudices against China and Russia, future Sino-American cooperation would not be out of the question.

The increasingly severe global challenges of the modern world demand cooperation among major powers. In future, if China, the US and Russia could once again engage in close collaboration, reminiscent of the period leading up to the end of World War II, the looming threats to world peace and common development—brought about by the so-called “end of globalisation” [全球化终结] and “great changes not seen in a century” [百年未有之大变局]—could be alleviated. This, in turn, might help prevent a global catastrophe.

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